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1. INTRODUCTION 
Whistleblower advocates generally cheered Barack Obama's 
election in 2008 because they had a "longtime friend" ascending to 
the Presidency.l Before entering public service, Obama represented a 
qui tam whistle blower as an attorney, and then, as both a state sena-
tor and a U.S. senator, Obama supported whistleblower protection 
legislation.2 As a candidate for President, Obama reiterated his sup-
port for expanded whistleblower protections.3 Most importantly, as 
President-Elect, Obama promised to reinvigorate ethics in govern-
ment, and part of his plan included increased protections for whistle-
blowers. Before he took office, the Obama-Biden transition team 
stated, 
[0 ]ften the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse 
in government is an existing government employee committed to 
public integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and 
patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer 
dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled. We need to em-
power federal employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners 
in performance. Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws 
1. Joe Davidson, Joe Davidson's Federal Diary: Whistleblowers May Have Friend in Oval 
Office, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2008, at D3; see also TOM DEVINE & T AREK F. MAASSARANI, 
THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER'S SURVIVAL GUIDE 183 (2011) ("The Obama Administra-
tion's arrival brought high expectations that times are, indeed, a-changin'."); Megan Chuchmach 
& Rhonda Schwartz, Will Obama Keep His Promise to Federal Whistieblowers?, ABC NEWS 
(Aug. 4, 20(9), <http://abcnews.go.comlBlotterlstory?id=8241580&page=1>. 
2. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1; Davidson, supra note 1. 
3. Letter from Barack Obama to The National Academies (Oct. 9, 20(8), available at 
<obama.3cdn.netl08fe869a2e4de42afl_zam6b5vn2.pdf> ("I will strengthen protections for 
'whistlebJowers' who report on any government attempts to distort or ignore scientific re-
search."). 
2012] WHISTLEBLDWERS AND THE DBAMA PRESIDENCY 
to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of 
authority in government. Obama will ensure that federal agencies 
expedite the process for reviewing whistleblower claims and whis-
tleblowers have full access to courts and due process.4 
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In many ways, President Obama has lived up to his promised 
support for whistleblowers. Obama's appointments to key administra-
tive positions in charge of whistleblower protection consistently sup-
ported employee rights and worked steadily to unravel the long-
standing anti-whistleblower bias in those agencies.s Moreover, the 
three most prominent pieces of Obama's legislative agenda - the eco-
nomic stimulus package, the financial reform bill, and health care re-
form - all included key provisions that enhanced whistle blower pro-
tections.6 
However, the Obama Administration's record regarding whistle-
blower protection for national security whistleblowers has been de-
cidedly less emphatic and more nuanced.7 Indeed, the Obama Admin-
istration has been accused of conducting a "war on whistleblowers," 
because of its aggressive prosecution of leaks related to national secu-
rity.8 Obama's Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted six people 
who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to non-governmental 
entities (such as the media) under the Espionage Act, a statute typi-
cally used to prosecute disclosure of national secrets to foreign gov-
ernments - more such prosecutions than all previous administrations 
combined.9 Moreover, Obama's Administration has continued the 
4. Agenda' Ethics, CHANGE.GOV <http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agendal> (last visited 
Apr. 16,2012). 
5. See discussion infra Part ILA.l. 
6. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
7. See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, THE NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 47, 48 (assert-
ing that President Obama has drawn a "sharp distinction between whistle-blowers who exclu-
sively reveal wrongdoing and those who jeopardize national security"). 
8. Glenn Greenwald, The DOl's Creeping War on Whistle-Blowers, SALON (Feb. 25, 2011, 
7:26 AM CDT), <http://www.salon.comJ2011/02/25/whistleblowers_4/>; Scott Horton, Obama's 
War on Whistleblowers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE (Aug. 31, 2010, 1:33 PM), <http://www. 
harpers.org/archive/2010/08/hbc-90007562>; see also Conor Friedersdorf, The Obama Admin-
iso'ation's Whistleblower Problem, THE ATLANTIC (June 30, 2011, 7:10 AM ET) <http://www. 
theatlan tic.com/poli tics/archi ve/2011/06/the-o bama -Administrations-whistleblower-problem/ 
2412621> (noting that the Obama Administration, "for reasons big and small, fair and possibly 
unfair, ... has acquired a reputation for retaliating against whistieblowers"); Josh Gerstein, Jus-
lice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, POLITICO (May 25, 2010, 4:44 AM EDT) <http://www. 
politico.com/news/stories/051O/3772l.htmi> ("President Barack Obama's Justice Department 
has taken a hard line against leakers, and Obama himself has expressed anger about disclosures 
of national security deliberations in the press."). 
9. Charlie Savage, Ex-C.l.A. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2012, at AI; Scott Shane, U.S. Pressing lIs Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 
2011, at A1; discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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Bush Administration's attempts to coerce reporters into identifying 
the sources of national security leaks. lO Further, his support for statu-
tory improvements to antiretaliation laws varies depending on wheth-
er the proposed protection affects whistle blowers in the intelligence 
• 11 
commumty. 
This Article explores President Obama's seemingly contradictory 
approach to whistle blowers and the distinction he appears to draw be-
tween whistleblowing about governmental misconduct generally, 
which he supports, and whistleblowing in the national security con-
text, which he appears to disdain. Part II of the Article describes the 
numerous moves Obama made to improve whistle blower protection 
through his Presidential appointments and his support of improved 
antiretaliation statutory measures. Additionally, this Part contrasts 
that support with Obama's seemingly antagonistic approach to whis-
tleblowing about national security. 
At least two questions arise from drawing this distinction be-
tween national security whistleblowing and other types of whistle-
blowing. First, where does the distinction come from? Second, does 
the distinction make sense? 
Part III answers the first question by examining why Obama 
might approach national security whistle blowing differently than oth-
er types of whistleblowing. In some respects, this different approach 
continues a long-standing separation of powers dispute between the 
legislative and the executive branches of the federal government. 
Congress desires transparency and oversight of the executive branch, 
which it hopes to achieve by encouraging executive branch employees 
to disclose information to Congress. Presidents traditionally have re-
sisted these efforts, particularly when they involve matters over which 
the Constitution arguably has empowered the President with exclu-
sive domain, such as protecting secrecy related to national security. 
The state of the law related to national security whistleblowers re-
flects this dispute in that such whistleblowers generally receive far 
fewer protections than other types of whistle blowers. In short, Presi-
dent Obama values secrecy over transparency and oversight when it 
comes to national security whistleblowing, and the law often reflects 
and supports this choice. 
Part IV responds to the second question - does this distinction 
make sense? - by analyzing whether President Obama and the cur-
10. See discussion infi-a Part rI.B.2. 
11. See id. 
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rent state of the law correctly balance the competing goals of secrecy 
and security on the one hand and transparency and oversight on the 
other. Although reasons certainly exist to treat national security whis-
tleblowers differently than other whistle blowers, I argue in this Part 
that the law could be modified to increase transparency and oversight 
without a corresponding negative impact on secrecy and national se-
curity. I conclude the Article with several suggestions to re-balance 
the scales and to provide national security employees appropriate en-
couragement to blow the whistle on governmental misconduct. 
II. OBAMA'S NUANCED ApPROACH TO WHISTLEBLOWING 
Every government has an interest in concealment; every public, in 
greater access to information. In this perennial conflict, the risks of 
secrecy affect even those administrators least disposed at the outset 
to exploit it. How many leaders have not come into office deter-
mined to work for more open government, only to end by fretting 
over leaks .... 
Sissela Bok (1982/ 2 
A. Obama's Support for Whistleblowers Generally 
In several important respects, President Obama has supported 
whistleblowers as he promised during the campaign. 
1. Presidential Appointments 
First, President Obama appointed supporters of whistleblower 
rights to key administrative positions involved in protecting whistle-
blowers.13 At least one whistleblower advocate felt that Obama's ap-
pointments were "a weathervane that the Obama Administration is 
serious about its good government rhetoric.,,14 This same advocate as-
serted that the President appointed "the strongest, most qualified 
team in history to protect government and corporate whistleblow-
ers. ,,15 
12. SrSSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 177 
(1982). 
13. Whistleblower advocacy groups greeted these nominations with acclaim, likely indicat-
ing the extent to which these appointments support whistleblowers generally. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Gov't Accountability Project, GAP Executive Director to Become Deputy Special 
Counsel (June 15, 2011), available at <http://www.whistleblower.orglpress/press-release-archive/ 
1195-gap-executive-director-to-become-deputy-special-counsel> ("The Obama Administration 
has appointed a very strong team to lead the agencies that implement whistleblower laws."). 
14. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1 (quoting Tom Devine of GAP). 
15. See Tom Devine, GAP Praises Confirmation of New Special Counsel Lerner, Gov'T 
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a. Merit Systems Protection Board 
For example, in 2009, Obama appointed Susan Tsui Grundmann 
as Chairman of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and 
Anne Marie Wagner as Vice Chairman. The MSPB hears appeals 
from administrative judges of complaints by federal employees, in-
cluding whistleblowers, related to the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978 (CSRA) and the amendments to that act in the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989 (WPA).16 Grundmann was the general counsel 
for the National Federation of Federal Employees, and Wagner had 
been the general counsel for the Personal Appeals Board of the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office.17 These appointments in particu-
lar signaled hope for whistleblowers because the MSPB under Presi-
dent Bush's nominees routinely ruled against whistleblowers: by one 
count the Bush MSPB found for a whistle blower in only one out of 
forty-five cases. IS 
Although it may still be early to completely assess the effect of 
these nominations, some moves by the new MSPB indicate a reversal 
of the old Board's harsh stance towards whistleblowers. By January 
2011, one year into the new Board's tenure, whistle blowers had won 
half (four of eight) of the cases brought to the full MSPB. 19 One of the 
most visible of those cases, involving Washington D.C. Park Police 
Chief Theresa Chambers, highlights the Board's new approach under 
Obama's nominees. The Department of Interior had fired Chambers 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 15,2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1068-
gap-praises-confirmation-of-new-special-counsel-Ierner>. 
16. See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTEcnON BD., <http://mspb.gov/About/about 
.htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012). The CSRA, as amended by the WPA, provides retaliation 
protection to certain federal employees who report specific types of misconduct within the ex-
ecutive branches of the federal government. 
17. Chuchmach & Schwartz, supra note 1. 
18. Id. ("Unlike Bush Administration appointees who compiled a 1-44 track record against 
whistleblowers, these leaders are seasoned veterans with a proven track record of commitment 
to the merit system throughout their careers." (quoting Tom Devine from GAP)). The MSPB's 
miserable track record for whistleblowers actually goes further back than President G.W. Bush; 
Tom Devine testified to Congress that in 2,000 cases between 1979 and 1988, the Board ruled 
for whistle blowers four times on the merits. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and 
Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before 
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 11lth Congo 11 (2009) (statement of Thomas 
Devine, Government Accountability Project) [hereinafter Devine Statement], available at 
<http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513183928.pdf>. Since 
2000, whistleblowers have won three out of 56 cases. See id. 
19. Tom Devine, MSPB Turnaround Highlights Problems with Administrative Judge Sys-
tem, GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Feb. 1,2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-
2010/971-mspb-turnaround-highlights-problems-with-administrative-judge-system>. Tom Devine 
stated that "[fJor whistleblowers, to date the [new] Board's leadership has been turning on the 
lights after the Dark Ages." Id. 
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for disclosing that cutbacks in the Park Police budget resulted in in-
creased public safety problems.20 After previous Boards and the Fed-
eral Circuit earlier rejected Chambers' claims, the Obama MSPB 
overturned these decisions, restored her to her previous position, and 
awarded her backpay.21 In another early case under the new Board, 
the MSPB found that the WPA protected whistle blower disclosures 
even if the disclosures violated an agency policy of confidentiality.22 
Also, in 2011, the Board issued favorable rulings for whistleblowers, 
or vacated and remanded administrative judge decisions against whis-
tleblowers, in at least seven cases - an extraordinary number given its 
. d 23 previOus recor . 
In addition to issuing favorable rulings, Obama's MSPB appoin-
tees also signaled their understanding that whistleblower protection 
remains an important aspect of the Board's responsibility. For exam-
ple, in December 2010, the Board released a detailed report on the 
status of federal employee whistle blower protections and the "diffi-
culties" a whistleblower must overcome to receive protection.24 Alt-
hough the Board carefully did not take a position on whether the law 
should be changed,25 the Board paved the way for legislative reform 
by highlighting the deficiencies in the current legal regime.26 The 
20. See Chambers v. Dep't of Interior, 2011 M.S.P.B. 7 'Il'll 3-6 (2011). 
21. See id. 'll'lI 49-50. 
22. See Parikh v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 2011 M.S.P.B. 1 'Il'll18-19 (2011). 
23. See King v. Dep't of Army, 2011 M.S.P.B. 83 'Il'll5-7 (2011) (finding that the WPA pro-
tects employees whose agencies perceive them to be whistle blowers, even if the employee never 
actually blew the whistle; and finding that the AU should have told the employee about the 
possibility of making a claim as a perceived whistleblower); Ingram v. Dep't of Army, 2011 
M.S.P.B. 71 'Il'll 4-6 (2011) (finding that employee had engaged in protected conduct when he 
objected to a department event the employee claimed would have violated ethical regulations 
and potentially reveal trade secrets of agency contractors); Usharauli v. Dep't Health & Human 
Servs., 2011 M.S.P.B. 54 'Il'll 6-8 (2011) (finding that refusing to reappoint an employee and plac-
ing the employee on administrative leave are "personnel actions" under 5 U.S.c. § 
2302(a)(2)(A) (2006) that could form the basis for a retaliation claim); Vaughn v. Dep't of Agri-
culture, 2011 M.S.P.B. 48 'Il'll5-7 (2011) (overturning an AU and finding that an agency had not 
fully complied with the Board's previous order in favor of a whistleblower); Peterson v. Dep't of 
Veterans Affairs, 2011 M.S.P.B. 38 'll'll 3-11 (2011) (finding that an AU improperly dismissed a 
whistleblower's claim at the pleading stage); Mason v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 2011 M.S.P.B. 39 
'll'll 8-12 (2011) (vacating and remanding whistleblower case because the AU should have con-
cluded that an employee engaged in protected conduct); Hamilton v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 
2011 M.S.P.B. 35 'll'lI 14-15 (2011) (vacating and remanding case because AU should have found 
that whistleblowing played a contributing factor in the employee's removal). 
24. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEES, at unnumbered 2 (2010), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs. 
aspx?docnumber=557972%20&version=559604&application=ACROBAT>. 
25. See id. at 2. 
26. See id. at unnumbered 2 ("This report spells out in greater depth the difficulties a po-
tential whistleblower may face when navigating the law to seek protection from agency retalia-
tion."). 
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Board also surveyed federal employees generally on their perceptions 
of various prohibited personnel practices, including whistleblowing,27 
and, most recently, released the results of a study examining whistle-
blowing in more detail, including how to encourage more employees 
to report misconduct.28 At a minimum, then, the Obama MSPB ap-
pointees have taken their call to protect whistleblowers seriously and 
indicated that whistleblowers might actually have success through the 
administrative process set up by the CSRA and the WP A - proposi-
tions that many whistleblowers would have found hard to believe dur-
ing previous administrations.29 
b. Office of Special Counsel 
Obama's appointments to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 
provide more examples. The OSC exists to protect federal govern-
ment whistleblowers and to investigate their disclosures.3o During the 
Bush presidency, the OSC did little to fulfill these roles, leading some 
whistleblower advocates to call it "dysfunctional.,,31 OSC employees 
filed a formal complaint against Bush's Special Counsel, Scott Bloch, 
for issuing a gag order prohibiting employees from talking to anyone 
outside OSC about sensitive internal matters without prior clearance 
- an order that likely violated the First Amendment and federal law 
permitting employees to give information to Congress.32 He also 
summarily dismissed hundreds of whistleblower cases in order to 
clear a backlog of pending matters.33 Adding insult to injury, Bloch 
later resigned in disgrace amid charges that he had retaliated against 
27. See generally MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES: 
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS 32-33 (2011), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs. 
aspx?docnumber=634680&version=636592&application=ACROBAT>. 
28. See generally MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES MAKING DISCLOSURES (2011), available at <http://www.mspb.gov/net 
search/viewdocs.aspx? docnumber=662503& version=6644 75&application=A CRO BAT>. 
29. This is not to say that the administrative process for federal whistleblowers works well. 
Tom Devine has argued that even though the MSPB has become more open to whistle blower 
complaints, the ALJs who adjudicate an employee's initial hearing remain hostile to whistle-
blowers. See Devine, supra note 19. 
30. See Introduction 10 OSC, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, <http://www.osc.gov 
11ntro.htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012). 
31. PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
WHlSTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 13 (2005); see also Joe Davidson, 
Federal Diary: Whistleblowers Get a Defender, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,2011, at B4 ("OSC is an 
independent federal agency with a long and well-deserved reputation for failing to protect fed-
eral whistleblowers. "). 
32. See Peter Katel, Protecting Whistleblowers, 16 CQ RESEARCHER 265, 278 (2006). 
33. See PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, supra note 31, at 13-14. 
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whistleblowers in his own office.34 
In June 2011, after leaving the Special Counsel position vacant 
for several years, Obama appointed as Special Counsel Carolyn Ler-
ner, an experienced plaintiff's civil rights lawyer.35 Lerner subsequent-
ly appointed Mark Cohen, the Executive Director of the Government 
Accountability Project (GAP), a whistleblower advocacy group, to 
become Deputy Special Counsel. The GAP President announced that 
"[t]his is a time of celebration for whistleblowers everywhere .... 
[Cohen] is exactly the kind of whistle blower advocate who should be 
working in the Office of Special Counsel. ,,36 
Within months of their appointments, Lerner and Cohen imme-
diately altered the direction of the OSC by asking the Merit Systems 
Protection Board to prevent federal agencies from taking adverse 
personnel actions against two alleged whistleblowers,37 an action the 
MSPB granted less than a week later.38 Lerner stated that the unprec-
edented actions "make clear that this agency will vigorously protect 
federal employees against retaliation when they blow the whistle. ,,39 
The National Whistleblowers Center remarked that the move "marks 
the beginning of new assertiveness by the OSC, and new grounds for 
optimism by federal employees at every level.,,4o Indeed, the Depart-
ment of Defense ultimately reinstated the security clearance of one 
whistleblower, allowing him to return to work.41 This whistle blower, 
34. See Joe Davidson, Workers Applaud Special Counsel's Return to Private Sector, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 22, 200S, at B4; Robert Brodsky, White House Forces OSC Chief Out, GOY 
EXEC.COM (Oct. 23, 200S), <http://www.govexec.com/oversight1200S/1O/white-house-forces-osc-
chief-out/279111> (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Bloch pled guilty to contempt of Congress after he 
had his computer hard drive erased when Congress began to investigate those allegations. Da-
vidson, supra note 31. Subsequently, he successfully withdrew his guilty plea because he claimed 
he was not fully informed that his conviction would result in a mandatory jail sentence. Id. 
35. See Carolyn Lerner, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, <http://www.osc.gov/Lerner. 
htm> (last visited Apr. 16,2012). 
36. Press Release, Gov't Accountability Project, GAP Executive Director to Become 
Deputy Special Counsel (June 15,2011), available at <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-
release-archive1201111195-gap-executive-director- to-become-deput y-special-counsel>. 
37. Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Seeks Quick Action to Protect Two 
Public Health and Safety Whistleblowers (Oct. S, 2011), available at <www.osc.gov/documents/ 
press/20111pr11_17du.pdf>. 
3S. See Special Counsel ex. reI. Hardy v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. CB-120S-
12-0002-U-1 (MSPB Oct. 14,2011); Special Counsel ex. reI. Gayl v. Dep't of Navy, No. CB-
120S-12-0001-U-1 (MSPB Oct. 13,2011). 
39. Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, supra note 37, at 2. 
40. Nick Schwellenbach, Special Counsel Seeks Protection for Two Whistleblowers 
(Oct. 10, 2(11), <http://pogoblo.typepad.com/pogo/2011110/special-counsel-seeks-protection-
for-two-whislleblowers.html> (quoting Richard Renner). 
41. See Press Release, Govl. Accountability Project, MRAP Whislleblower to Return to 
Work (Nov. 16, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/1592-mrap-
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Franz Gayl, who reported the Marines for failing to provide protec-
tive armor for vehicles in Iraq, stated: 
The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) has been transformed under 
the inspiring leadership of Carolyn Lerner. Since her arrival in the 
summer of 2011 OSC has truly come to fulfill its intended mission 
as a Federal guardian of whistleblower rights. For example, OSC's 
determination to request a stay of an indefinite salary cutoff that 
would have starved me out of the Marines and the Merit Service 
Protection Board's willingness to support it, was the turning point 
in my case during the darkest hours this fall, when I thought it 
would be necessary to sell my home and give up. I don't think it 
was a coincidence that the Department of the Navy then issued a 
favorable security adjudication that now permits me to get back to 
work. 42 
Moreover, the OSC filed an amicus brief in the case of a promi-
nent whistleblower and former air marshal in his appeal of a MSPB 
administrative judge's ruling against him, arguing that the MSPB was 
improperly expanding a narrow exception to the Civil Service Reform 
Act.43 Noting these moves, a long-time employment lawyer in Wash-
ington, D.C. stated that, "[b]y taking the position that [Lerner] did, 
and making it clear she was not going to be a wallflower or someone 
who could just be walked over, ... she sent a very strong message that 
whistle-blowers would be protected.,,44 According to the Washington 
Post, Lerner has brought a jolt of energy to the Office of Special 
Counsel because she took on long-neglected cases and, in several 
high-profile cases, has "gone to the mat and tried to expand the 
boundaries of the law's protections for whistleblowers.,,45 
c. Administrative Review Board 
One final area deserves mention: the Administrative Review 
Board (ARB) of the Department of Labor. The ARB hears the final 
whistleblower··to-return-to-work>. 
42. Marcus Baram, Let's Ensure Whistleblowers' Good Deeds Go Unpunished, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2011,11:40 AM), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marcus-baram/ 
making-sure-that-whistleb_ b_11 05272.html>. 
43. Stephen Losey, Decision to Fire Air Marshal Risks Silencing Whistle-Blowers, OSC 
Says, FEDERAL TIMES (last updated Aug. 26, 2011), <http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20ll 
0826/DEP ARTMENTS03/108260301/>. 
44. Carrie Johnson, Government Whistle-lJIowers Gain New Advocate, NPR (Nov. 22, 
2011), <http://www.npr.org/20111l1/221142599974/government-whistle-blowers-gain-new-
advocate>; see also id. ("The agency has switched from being poison ivy for whistle-blowers to 
being the first option for organizations like ours that are always looking for the best way to de-
fend people who commit the truth.") (quoting Tom Devine). 
45. Lisa Rein, Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner Quickly Raises the Profile of Her OiJlce, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2011, at Cl. 
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administrative appeals of whistleblower claims under twenty-one dif-
ferent federal whistleblower laws.46 As with his other appointments, 
Obama dramatically influenced the direction of the ARB. Obama's 
Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, appointed five new members to the 
ARB's five-member panel in 2010 and 2011, and, as two whistleblow-
er advocates remarked, "[t]ogether they have the most experience, 
subject matter expertise, and demonstrated commitments to the 
board's mission of any members in its history.,,47 For example, the 
Board's Chair, Paul Igasaki, formerly chaired the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission during President Bill Clinton's Administra-
tion and has worked for numerous non-profit civil rights organiza-
tions.48 The Vice Chair, E. Cooper Brown, previously served on the 
ARB during Clinton's presidency, and another member, Joanne 
Royce, worked for GAP, the whistleblower advocacy group men-
tioned above, for fifteen years.49 
During a six-month period in 2010 after the appointment of four 
of these new members, whistle blowers won six out of sixteen cases 
(37.5 percent) before the ARB on the merits, as opposed to 19.75 
percent (eight out of forty-one cases) in 2009.50 However, more than 
just statistics indicate the sea change caused by their appointments. 
The ARB's recent decisions, particularly with regard to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, expanded the scope of whistleblower protections 
and overturned numerous Bush-era decisions adverse to whistleblow-
ers. For example, when President Bush's appointees dominated the 
Board, the ARB had a narrow view of the scope of protected conduct 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Although the Act's terms protected employ-
ees who reported any of six different types of misconduct,S1 including 
violations of broad statutory provisions prohibiting mail and wire 
fraud, the Bush ARB held that any whistleblower report must also 
"be of a type that would be adverse to investors' interests."s2 If a whis-
46. See ARB Areas of Responsibility, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, <http://www.dol.gov/arb/ 
areas.htm> (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); The Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, <http://www.whistleblowers.gov/index.html> (last visited Apr. 16,2012). 
47. DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 1, at 183. 
48. ARB Board Members, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, <http://www.dol.gov/arb/members.htm> 
(last visited Apr. 16,2012). 
49. Id. 
50. DEVINE & MAASSARANI, supra note 1, at 183. 
51. See 18 U.S.c. § 1514A (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who reports 
conduct the employee reasonably believes violates laws against mail fraud, wire fraud, banking 
fraud, securities fraud, "any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders"). 
52. See Platone v. FLYi, Inc., ARB Case No. 04-154, at 15 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at 
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tleblower reported what she reasonably believed to be securities 
fraud, then the ARB also required that the whistleblower demon-
strate the fraud was material, which in essence required proving actu-
al securities fraud, not just that the whistleblower "reasonably be-
lieved" securities fraud occurred as required by the statute's plain 
language.53 Moreover, the ARB held that a whistleblower's protected 
disclosure must "'definitively and specifically' relate to any of the 
listed categories of fraud or securities violations,,54 - another require-
ment absent from the statutory language. 
In the summer of 2011, the new ARB overturned those holdings 
in several sweeping opinions. First, the Board found that allegations 
of mail and wire fraud did not also need to relate to shareholders' in-
terests.55 Second, the Board rejected its earlier holding regarding "ma-
teriality," by finding that a whistleblower will be protected when dis-
closing fraudulent conduct, even if a reasonable shareholder would 
not consider it important in deciding how to vote. 56 Third, the Board 
criticized the use of the "definitively and specifically" standard as "in-
appropriate" because it was imported from a case interpreting a dif-
ferent whistleblower statute with language not found in Sarbanes-
Oxley.57 
Other cases reflected the ARB's willingness to apply the Act's 
protections broadly. For example, almost immediately after Congress 
passed Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the issue arose whether privately-held 
subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies could be held liable under 
<http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/04_154.S0XP 
.PDF>. 
53. See id. at 16. 
54. See id. at 17 (quoting Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007, ALl No. 
2000- ERA-31, slip op. at 9 (Sept. 30, 2(03), and adopting that case's interpretation of the whis-
tleblower provision of a different statute, the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, 42 
U.S.c. § 5851 (2006». 
55. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., ARB Case No. 10-050, at 9 (Feb. 28, 2(11), 
available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/10 
_050.S0XP.PDF>; see also Funke v. Federal Express Corp., ARB Case No. 09-004, at 8 (July 8, 
2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/ 
SOX/09004.S0XP.PDF>; Sylvester v. Parexel, In1'l, ARB Case No. 07-123, at 21 (May 25, 
2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/ 
SOX/07 _123.S0XP.PDF>. The Board arguably went even further and found that a whistle-
blower's protected disclosure did not have to disclose fraudulent conduct at all, as long as it 
could be seen as "in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud." Brown, ARB Case No. 10-
050, at 9. 
56. Sylvester, ARB Case No. 07-123, at 21. The Board did leave open the possibility that a 
complaint may concern "such a trivial matter" that there is no protected activity. See id. at 22. 
57. [d. at 18. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley's antiretaliation provision.58 The Bush ARB had de-
termined that Sarbanes-Oxley could cover a subsidiary, but only 
when the subsidiary acted as an agent for a publicly-traded parent 
specifically to retaliate against the employee - a relatively narrow in-
terpretation.59 After this decision, administrative law judges (ALJs) 
and courts still debated the issue until 2010,60 when Congress passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.61 
Dodd-Frank amended Sarbanes-Oxley to make clear that the Act 
prohibited subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies from retaliating 
against whistleblowers.62 Although this legislation resolved the issue 
going forward, the question remained whether the inclusion of subsid-
iaries in Sarbanes-Oxley would apply retroactively for cases that 
arose before Dodd-Frank's enactment. The new Obama ARB deter-
mined that Dodd-Frank merely clarified Sarbanes-Oxley's true mean-
ing, and that Sarbanes-Oxley should have always included subsidiar-
ies as covered entities, essentially overturning Bush-era precedent.63 
The new ARB also interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley broadly to ex-
pand the concept of who could receive whistle blower reports. Sar-
banes-Oxley'S language states that, in order to receive protection, a 
whistleblower must report misconduct to "(A) a Federal regulatory 
or law enforcement agency; (B) any Member or committee of Con-
gress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee 
(or such other person working for the employer who has the authority 
to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).,,64 In July 2011, the 
58. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sar-
banes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 110-13, 134-37 (2007). 
59. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Tech. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, at 15 (May 31, 
2006), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/ 
SOX/04_149.S0XP.PDF>. This restriction arguably contravened the purpose of the statute and 
resultcd in numerous dismissals of whistleblower cases by Department of Labor Administrative 
Law Judges. See Moberly, supra note 58, at 134-37. 
60. See Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., ARB No. 08-032, at 10-11 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ ARB/DECISIONS/ ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/ 
08_032A.SOXP.PDF> (citing cases with different holdings regarding this issue). 
61. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act) (codified at 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
62. Section 929A of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Sarbanes-Oxley section 806(a) to add 
the following italicized language regarding the entities that may not retaliate against a whistle-
blower: "No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c. 780(d», ... including any subsidiary or affiliate 
whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such company, 
[may retaliate)." Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. at 1852 (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 
1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2010». 
63. See Johnson, ARB No. 08-032, at 16. 
64. 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(a)(I). 
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ARB interpreted this language to include a report to local or state 
law enforcement, despite the ambiguity in the statutory language re-
garding whether "Federal" in subsection A modifies "law enforce-
ment agency" as well as "regulatory. ,,65 Only protecting reports to 
federal law enforcement would, according to Obama's ARB, result in 
a "hypertechnical distinction" that would be inconsistent with the 
goal of the statute to promote disclosures.66 In September 2011, the 
ARB also determined that Sarbanes-Oxley protected whistleblowers 
who reported to the IRS as part of its whistleblower bounty program, 
because the IRS is a "Federal regulatory ... agency. ,,67 
Obama's ARB expanded upon what would be considered an 
"adverse action" under Sarbanes-Oxley. In Menendez v. Hallibur-
ton,68 an employee had reported violations of accounting standards to 
the company and the SEc.69 Although this whistleblowing qualified as 
protected activity, the ALl held that the employee did not suffer any 
retaliatory adverse action.70 The new ARB, however, reversed this 
decision and detailed an easy standard for plaintiffs to meet in order 
to satisfy the "adverse action" element of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim.71 
The ARB stated that "minor acts of retaliation can be sufficiently 
substantial when viewed together," and therefore held that a whistle-
blower could recover if retaliation was "more than trivial,,,n a stand-
ard that likely would cover a broader range of retaliatory actions than 
the Supreme Court previously found actionable for Title VII claims in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. 73 The ARB in 
Menendez used this new standard to find an adverse action when a 
company merely released the name of the whistleblower to its em-
ployees as part of its internal investigation into the employee's com-
65. See Funke v. Federal Express Corp., ARB Case No. 09-004, at 16 (July 8, 2011), availa-
ble at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONSISOX/09_004. 
SOXP.PDF>. 
66. Id. 
67. See Vannoy v. Celanese Corp., ARB No. 09-118, at 12 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at 
<http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIARBIDECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONSISOX/09_118.S0XP.PDF>. 
68. ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/ 
PUBLICI ARBIDECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09 _002.S0XP .PDF>. 
69. See id. at 2-4. 
70. See id. at 9, 1l. 
71. See id. at 21. 
72. fd. 
73. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The ARB distinguished Burlington Northern and found that the 
case was helpful in determining the scope of prohibited actions, but was not dispositive because 
Sarbanes-Oxley clearly prohibits "a very broad spectrum" of retaliatory activity, including non-
tangible adverse actions. See Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 15-16. 
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In addition to broadening Sarbanes-Oxley's reach, the new ARB 
restricted employer defenses. In one remarkable case, Obama's ARB 
even seemed to undermine an employer's ability to fire an employee 
for revealing confidential information and taking confidential docu-
ments, if the employee uses that information and those documents as 
part of the whistleblowing process. In Vannoy v. Celanese Corp.,75 a 
whistle blower took confidential employer documents, including in-
formation related to personal information of current and former em-
ployees, to help substantiate his claims of wrongdoing.76 The ALJ 
agreed with the employer's argument that it fired the employee be-
cause he violated his confidentiality agreement with the company, 
and therefore the employee did not demonstrate that the employee's 
whistle blowing was a contributing factor in his dismissal and that, 
even if the firing and the whistleblowing were connected, the employ-
er proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired 
the employee anyway because of the breach of confidentiality.77 How-
ever, the ARB determined that the ALJ did not give sufficient weight 
to the employee's need for internal documents in order to provide 
original information to government regulators, and the ARB re-
manded the case for a further evidentiary hearing, noting that, 
"[t]here is a clear tension between a company's legitimate business 
policies protecting confidential information and the whistleblower 
bounty programs created by Congress to encourage whistleblowers to 
disclose confidential company information in furtherance of enforce-
ment of tax and securities laws. ,,78 
The ARB's new approach also can be seen in the way in which it 
is deciding cases. In the first few years of Sarbanes-Oxley cases, ALJs 
tended to dismiss cases based on summary adjudications, finding that 
whistleblowers failed to prove their cases as a matter of law.79 In the 
few cases in which ALJs held hearings, whistleblowers fared much 
better, supporting the notion that whistleblower cases often present 
74. Menendez, ARB Nos. 09-002 & 09-003, at 22-26. The ARB supported this conclusion 
by noting that this breach of confidentiality violated Sarbancs-Oxley Section 301's requirement 
that companies provide a confidential, anonymous reporting channel for whistleblowers to re-
port misconduct. See id. 
75. ARB No. 09-118 (Sept. 28, 20ll), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/ 
DECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09 _118.S0XP.PDF>. 
76. ld. at 5. 
77. ld. al 7-8. 
78. ld. at 15-17. 
79. See Moberly, supra note 58, at 104-05. 
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fact-intensive issues that need evidentiary hearings to explore.30 The 
new ARB seems to be sending a message to ALJs that they should 
prefer evidentiary hearings over summary dispositions. In Sylvester v. 
Parexel International, Inc. ,81 the ARB stated that "Rule 12 motions 
challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings are highly disfavored by 
the SOX regulations and highly impractical under the Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (OALJ) rules,,,82 in part because they involve 
"inherently factual issues such as 'reasonable belief' and issues of 
'motive,.,,83 Also, in Vannoy v. Celanese Corp.,84 the ARB reversed a 
summary disposition in favor of the employer and ordered the ALJ to 
conduct a detailed and specific evidentiary hearing.85 It may be too 
early to tell whether these cases constitute a trend toward demanding 
that ALJs issue fewer summary judgments, but the ARB cases from 
2011 seem, at a minimum, to indicate that the ARB understands the 
negative impact summary dispositions can have on whistleblowers. 
2. Legislation 
President Obama also demonstrated his belief in the importance 
of whistleblowing by supporting the addition of whistleblower protec-
tibns in his most significant legislative achievements: the economic 
stimulus package, health care reform, and the reform of the financial 
industry. 
a. Stimulus Bill 
Immediately after taking office, President Obama signed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,86 also called the 
"Stimulus Bill," to respond to the recession and to create jobs. The 
Act protects a broad range of disclosures by employees of non-
Federal employers that receive stimulus funds. 87 On paper, the Act's 
80. See id. at 127-28. 
81. ARB No. 07-123 (May 25, 2(11), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/ 
DECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOXI07 _123.S0XP.PDF>. 
82. Id. at 13. 
83. Id. 
84. ARB No. 09-118, at 12 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ 
ARBIDECISIONSI ARB_DECISIONS/SOX/09_118.S0XP.PDF>. 
85. Id. at 14-17. 
86. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 
115,297 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
87. See id. § 1553(a)(I)-(5), 123 Stat. 297 (protecting disclosures related to use of the stimu-
lus funds, including a gross waste of the funds, gross mismanagement of them, or a violation of 
law related to use of the funds). 
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antiretaliation provision follows the "best practices" that began with 
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and have developed in the last decade, in-
cluding a burden of proof that seems favorable to whistleblowers.88 
Moreover, whistleblowers can report violations to a wide range of in-
stitutions and individuals, including both internal and external recipi-
ents.89 The Act provides for an administrative remedy first, but, like 
Sarbanes-Oxley, permits whistleblowers to file claims in federal dis-
trict court if the administrative process is not completed in a timely 
manner.
90 
Importantly, the Act's whistleblower provision also implements 
new innovations that would be repeated by other Obama whistle-
blower protections. It prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration pro-
visions to force a whistleblower to arbitrate claims brought under the 
Act. 91 Additionally, the Act expressly permits whistleblowers to use 
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that their protected activity 
played a "contributing factor" in the employer's retaliation, specifi-
cally including "evidence that the official undertaking the reprisal 
knew of the disclosure" or "evidence that the reprisal occurred within 
a period of time after the disclosure such that a reasonable person 
could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the re-
prisal. ,,92 
88. An employee must demonstrate that a protected disclosure was a "contributing factor" 
in an employer deciding to take an adverse employment action against the employee. See id. § 
1553 (c)(l)(A)(i), 123 Stat. 299. If the employee succeeds, the employer will be held liable for 
damages resulting from the retaliation unless the employee can demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that it would have taken the same action regardless of the protected activity. 
See id. § 1553(c)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 299. 
89. See id. § 1553(a), 123 Stat. 297 (protecting disclosures made to "the [Recovery Ac-
countability and Transparency] Board, an inspector general, the Comptroller General, a mem-
ber of Congress, a State or Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, a person with super-
visory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the 
authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct), a court or grand jury, the head of a 
Federal agency or their representatives"). 
90. See id. § 1553(c)(3), 123 Stat. 300 (permitting a whistleblower to file a claim for a jury 
trial in federal court if the inspector general of the federal agency has not issued an order within 
210 days after the submission of a complaint or has denied the whistleblower's claim). The whis-
tleblower must first report retaliation to an appropriate inspector general, who must then inves-
tigate and submit a report to the whistleblower and the employer within 180 days. See id. § 
1553(b), 123 Stat. 297-98. 
91. See id. § 1553(d), 123 Stat. 301. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 both have similar 
provisions. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1558(b)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) ("The rights and remedies in this section may not be 
waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of employment."); Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376,1739 (2010); 
id. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031. 
92. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, PUb. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(c)(1) 
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b. Health Care Reform 
Second, on March 23, 2010, Obama signed the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),93 commonly known as health 
care reform. The PP ACA protects employees from retaliation if they 
report violations of the ACt.94 Although not as detailed as the Stimu-
lus Bill's provision, the PPACA's whistleblower protections still pro-
vide the strong whistleblower protections found in other recent fed-
eral statutes, including permitting employees to make reports of 
misconduct internally or externally, and protecting employees who 
refuse to violate the ACt.95 The PP ACA also adopts the employee-
friendly burden of proof and procedures set out in recent whistle-
blower provisions such as Sarbanes-Oxley and the Consumer Product 
Safety Improvement ACt.96 In other words, the whistleblower must 
file an initial administrative claim with the Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration in the Department of Labor, which will deter-
mine whether the whistleblower's protected activity was a "contrib-
uting factor" in an adverse employment action.97 If so, the whistle-
blower will prevail, unless the employer proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action regard-
less of the protected activity.98 Moreover, if the Department of Labor 
does not finish its administrative review within 210 days, the whistle-
blower may file a de novo claim for a jury trial in federal district 
court.99 
c. Wall Street Reform 
Third, Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010.100 While his other major 
legislative achievements included antiretaliation provisions that mir-
(A)(ii)(I) & (II), 123 Stat. 115,299. 
93. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
94. Id. § 1558(a), 124 Stat. 261. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. § 1558(b), 124 Stat. 261 (adopting procedures of Consumer Product Safety Im-
provement Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b) (Supp. IV 2010»; cf. 49 U.S.c. § 42121(b) (2006) (whistle-
blower procedures adopted by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006». 
97. See 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b); 49 U.S.c. § 42121(b). 
98. See id. 
99. See 15 U.S.c. § 2087(b)(4) (adopted by The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, § 1558(b), 124 Stat. 261); cf. id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (permitting federal court claim after 180 
days without a final resolution by the Department of Labor); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(E) (per-
mitting jury trial). 
100. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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rored other statutes, Dodd-Frank truly revolutionized whistleblower 
law in the United States. Most importantly, the Act permits whistle-
blowers to file for rewards of 10 percent to 30 percent of any en-
forcement penalties recovered by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.lol These 
provisions attempt to adopt the False Claims Act's "bounty" model, 
which has been utilized successfully for decades to reward whistle-
blowers who reported fraud on the government.!02 Dodd-Frank ex-
tends this concept to reports of securities and commodities fraud on 
the general public.103 
Within a year after Dodd-Frank's passage, the Securities and Ex-
changes Commission (SEC) released rules and regulations imple-
menting the Act's "bounty" program.I04 The three Democrats on the 
SEC, including Chairman Mary Schapiro, the one Commissioner able 
to be appointed by President Obama at the time, approved the con-
troversial regulations over dissenting votes by the two Republicans 
appointed by President George W. Bush.IOS Despite heavy lobbying 
and pressure from business interests,l06 the SEC refused to require 
whistleblowers to report internally through a company's grievance 
101. ld. § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (Supp. IV 2010)) 
(SEC); ld. § 748,124 Stat. 1739 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.c. § 26) (CITC). 
102. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: 
Financiallncentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82 
(1992). Unlike the False Claims Act, however, Dodd-Frank does not permit the whistleblower 
to litigate claims on behalf of the government. 
103. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)) (defin-
ing "whistle blower" as "any individual who provides ... information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws"). 
104. See Securities Exchange Act, Release No. 34-64545, File No. S7-33-1O (May 25, 2011) 
(to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 240 and 249). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is-
sued substantially similar regulations. See Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Pro-
visions of Section 23 of the Commodities Futures Act, 76 F.R. 53172 (Aug. 25, 2011). In this ar-
ticle, I will focus on the SEC provisions. 
105. The five-year terms of the Commissioners are staggered so that one term ends on June 
5 each year, and no more than three Commissioners may belong to the same political party. See 
Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, <http://sec.gov/about/commissioner 
.shtmb (last visited Apr. 17,2012). President Obama inherited a Commission with two Demo-
crats, Ellise Walter and Luis Aguilar, and he appointed another Democrat, Chairman Mary 
Schapiro. SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM'N, <http://sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm> (last visited Apr. 17,2012) (provid-
ing information about presidential appointments and political affiliation of commissioners). All 
three Democrats voted for the rules, while Commissioners Paredes and Casey, both Republi-
cans appointed by President Bush, dissented. See id.; Resources, Office of the Whistleblower, 
U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, <http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/owb/owb-resources.shtml#remarks> 
(last visited Apr. 17,2012) (providing the Commissioners' remarks on the rules). 
106. The SEC received 240 comment letters and approximately 1,300 form letters regarding 
the proposed rules. See Securities Whistle blower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34,300,34,300 (June 13,2011). 
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procedure before reporting to the SEC (although the regulations do 
include incentives for internal reporting).107 Moreover, the SEC 
changed its proposed definition of whistle blower from one who re-
ports "potential" violations to one who reports a "possible" violation 
that may be "about to occur," and the whistleblower must simply 
have a "reasonable belief" that the violation might OCCUL IOS The new 
rules also provided some retaliation protection for auditors, lawyers, 
and other compliance personnel who report misconduct - a stark dif-
ference from the proposed rules that mostly denied protection to 
these whistleblowers. 109 Many perceived the SEC's rejection of indus-
try demands as a positive sign that the SEC would begin to take whis-
tie blowers seriously,110 although this remains to be seen because the 
first awards will not be issued until sometime in 2012. However, with-
in seven weeks of the beginning of the SEC's Dodd-Frank program, 
the SEC received 334 whistleblower tips,!!! the quality of which, ac-
cording to a former SEC lawyer, has been "remarkably high.,,1l2 
Additionally, Dodd-Frank included another strong antiretalia-
tion provision that permits whistle blowers to bring claims for retalia-
tion directly in federal district court.1J3 In fact, the Act appears to pro-
vide corporate whistleblowers an interesting alternative to Sarbanes-
Oxley: because Dodd-Frank's protected conduct includes making a 
107. See id. at 34,324-27. 
108. See id. at 34,302-04. 
109. See id. at 34,314-17. 
110. See Thad Guyer, Final Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules: Are You Prepared?, GOy'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (June 15, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/ 
Guyer.pdf> (noting that SEC often chose whistleblower-friendly rules when faced with two 
choices); Richard Renner, SEC's Dodd-Frank Rules Are a Major Victory for Whistleblowers, 
WHISTLEBLOWERS PROT. BLOG (May 25, 2011), <http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2011/05/ 
articles/whistleblowers-tax-fraud/secs-doddfrank-rules-are-a-major-victory-for-whistleblowers/> 
("The outcome [of the new rules] is a major victory for whistleblowers."); Press Release, Gov't 
Accountability Project, SEC Issues Win-Win Whistle blower Rules (May 26, 2011), available at 
< http://www . w his tl e b 10 wer. orglpress/press-release-archi ve/1134-sec-issues-win-win -whistl eblower-
rules> ("Yesterday the SEC took the high road to strengthen the role of whistleblowers against 
corporate fraud. It rejected demands by a big business 'fraud lobby' and House Republicans to 
twist whistle blowing into obstruction of justice. "). 
111. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 5 (2011), available at <http://sec.gov/about/ 
offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-2011.pdf>. The report covers claims from Aug. 12, 
2011, the date the regulations became effective, until Sept. 30, 2011, the end of the fiscal year. 
See id. 
112. See Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Receives 334 Tips in First Seven Weeks of Whistleblower 
Program, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16,2011,3:21 PM), <http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/ 
11116/sec-receives-334-tips-in-first -seven -weeks-of -whistleblower-program/>. 
113. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
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disclosure protected by Sarbanes-Oxley,1l4 whistleblowers who make 
disclosures protected by both statutes may opt to bring a Dodd-Frank 
claim because the statute of limitations is significantly longer (three 
years versus 180 days for Sarbanes-Oxley) and the Act permits two 
times the amount of back pay owed to the whistleblower, a bonus that 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not offer. lls Furthermore, Dodd-Frank fixed 
some of the flaws that had become apparent in Sarbanes-Oxley's an-
tiretaliation provision,1l6 such as extending Sarbanes-Oxley's statute 
of limitations from ninety to 180 days, adding an explicit right to a ju-
ry trial if a whistle blower brings a claim in federal court, and clarify-
ing that Sarbanes-Oxley protects employees of privately-held subsidi-
aries of publicly-traded companies.1l7 It also provides new 
whistle blower protection for employees in the financial services in-
dustry who report fraud or illegal conduct related to the provision of 
a consumer financial product or service.118 
d. Other Legislation 
Other legislation passed during Obama's presidency contained 
whistleblower protections. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009 (FERAt9 closed loopholes in the False Claims Act to 
better encourage whistleblowers to report fraud on the government. 120 
For example, FERA extended antiretaliation protection to contrac-
tors, sub-contractors, and agents who report fraud in addition to 
"employees" that the FCA already covered. l2l Also, the Coast Guard 
114. See id. (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii». 
115. Compare id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(J)(bb» (three year statute of 
limitations) and id. § 922(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii» (double back pay dam-
ages) with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2006) (180 day statute of limitations) and id. § 1514A(c) 
(permitting damage claim for back pay, but not two times back pay). 
116. See generally Moberly, supra note 58, at 132-37 (pointing out flaws in Sarbanes-Oxley's 
antiretaliation provision). 
117. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(c), 124 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b)(2)(D» 
(180 days); id. (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b)(2)(E» (jury trial); id., § 929A, 124 Stat. 1852 
(codified at 18 U.S.c. § 1514A) (adding language regarding subsidiaries). 
118. See id. § 1057, 124 Stat. 2031 (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 5567). 
119. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) [hereinafter FERAl. 
120. The Senate Report accompanying the legislation noted that the changes were necessary 
because "[tlhe effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently been undermined by court de-
cisions which limit the scope of the law and, in some cases, allow subcontractors paid with Gov-
ernment money to escape responsibility for proven frauds." S. REP. No. 111-10, at 4 (2009). The 
Report also detailed the ways in which the FERA amended the FCA "to clarify and correct er-
roneous interpretations of the law" by the Supreme Court. lei. at 10. 
121. FERA, § 4(d), 123 Stat. 1624 (codified at 31 U.S.c. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. IV 2010». 
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Authorization Act of 2010122 amended the Seaman's Protection Ad23 
to greatly expand the types of conduct in which a seaman can engage 
to be protected from retaliation124 and to provide the same type of 
"best practices" burdens of proof, administrative remedies, and de 
novo review in federal district court as Sarbanes-Oxley and the other 
recent antiretaliation statutes discussed above.!25 Most recently, the 
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,126 which President Obama 
signed on January 4, 2011, provided new whistleblower protections 
for employees who disclose violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.127 Once again, the Act utilized the same best practices 
from recent antiretaliation provisions.128 
In many ways, then, President Obama fulfilled Candidate 
Obama's promises related to whistleblowing. His appointees arguably 
revolutionized whistleblower protection for both public and private 
employees. His legislative accomplishments included strong whistle-
blower protections. In short, whistleblower advocates have much to 
cheer after three years of an Obama Presidency. Yet, despite this 
strong support for whistleblowers generally, Obama seems to believe 
that one type of whistleblower should receive less robust protection: a 
whistleblower who makes disclosures related to national security, es-
pecially if one discloses classified information publicly, such as to the 
media. 
B. National Security: The Great Exception 
The "national security whistleblower," as I use the term here, ei-
ther works for an agency in the "intelligence community,,,129 like the 
122. Pub. L. No. 111-281, § 611, 124 Stat. 2905,2969 (2010). 
123. 46 U.S.c. § 2114 (Supp. IV 2010). 
124. Coast Guard Authorization Act § 611(a)(3), 124 Stat. 2969 (codified at 46 U.S.c. § 
2114(a)(1)(C)-(G) (Supp. IV 2010». 
125. The Act deleted the previous provision allowing for a claim to be filed directly in fed-
eral court and adopted the "procedures, requirements, and rights" of the Surface Transporta-
tion Assistance Act (ST AA), 49 U.S.c. § 31105(b) (Supp. IV 2010). See H.R. REP. No. 111-303 
§ 2114 (2009) (showing deletions to old provision); Coast Guard Authorization Act § 611(a)(4), 
124 Stat. 2969 (amending 46 U.S.c. § 2114(b) to reference 49 U.S.c. § 31105(b». The STAA 
procedures, requirements, and rights mirror Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions. Compare 49 U.S.c. § 
31105(b) with 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006). 
126. Pub. L. No. 111-353,124 Stat. 3885 (2011). 
127. See id. § 402, 124 Stat. 3968 (to be codified as 21 U.S.c. § 1012(a». 
128. Compare id. with 18 U.S.c. § 1514A(b) (2006). 
129. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, defines the "intelligence community" 
to include a wide variety of agencies: 
(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency. 
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National Security Agency, or reveals classified information (or both). 
As discussed below, in some cases the Obama Administration reacted 
with outright hostility to such whistleblowers, making a distinction be-
tween "bad" whistleblowing, which Obama calls "leaking" when it re-
lates to national security, and "good" whistieblowing, which relates to 
non-security issues. In other instances, the Obama Administration re-
acted with more nuance by acknowledging the need for some protec-
tion for national security whistieblowers, but rejecting calls for the 
full panoply of rights the law typically provides other types of gov-
ernment whistleblowers. 
1. Statements from Obama's Administration 
The way the Obama Administration framed the issue through 
public statements demonstrates this more nuanced approach. For ex-
ample, in March 2009, less than two months into his presidency, 
Obama gave some indication that he would make finer distinctions 
about whistleblowing than his statements as a candidate might indi-
cate. He released a signing statement with a spending bill that provid-
ed protection to federal officials who reported information to Con-
gress in which he stated that the bill should not be interpreted to 
undermine his authority to control communications with Congress "in 
cases where such communications would be unlawful or would reveal 
information that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.,,130 
(C) The National Security Agency. 
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency. 
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office. 
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized 
national intelligence through reconnaissance programs. 
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, 
the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, and the Department of Energy. 
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. 
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. 
(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analy-
sis of intelligence information. 
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the 
President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and lhe head of the de-
partment or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community. 
50 U.S.c. § 401a(4) (2006). 
130. Statement by the President (Mar. 11, 2009), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_ office/Statement-from-the-President-on -the-signing -of-HR -1105>. The law prohibits 
the use of appropriations to pay salaries of anyone who "interferes with or prohibits" communi-
cations between federal employees and Congress related to the employee's job or agency. Om-
nibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 714(1), (2), 123 Stat. 524, 684. 
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As the Brennan Center for Justice, a non-partisan public policy and 
law institute affiliated with New York University School of Law, not-
ed, 
by objecting to a provision that was designed to prohibit retaliation 
against employees who reveal executive misconduct, President 
Obama's statement intentionally or unintentionally sends a mes-
sage to employees: If you report misconduct to Congress against 
the will of the head of your agency, and if the agency considers that 
information "confidential," you may face retaliation. This could 
have a chilling effect on potential whistle blowers and hinder the 
public's ability to learn about government wrongdoing.13! 
Shortly thereafter, in November 2009, Robert S. Litt, who Presi-
dent Obama appointed as General Counsel for the Office of the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, promised action against "leaks of clas-
sified information that have caused specific and identifiable losses of 
intelligence capabilities.,,132 More recently, in May 2011, Obama's ap-
pointment to head the Justice Department's national security divi-
sion, Lisa Monaco, testified to Congress that "it would be my priority 
to continue the aggressive pursuit of [leak] investigations" because 
leaks do "tremendous damage.,,133 Monaco noted that "twice as 
many" leak cases had been pursued during Obama's presidency than 
in all previous Administrations. 134 Similarly, after the raid that killed 
Osama bin Laden that same month, Leon Panetta, then the Director 
of the CIA, sent a memo to CIA employees stating, "Disclosure of 
classified information to anyone not cleared for it - reporters, friends, 
colleagues in the private sector or other agencies, former Agency of-
ficers - does tremendous damage to our work. At worst, leaks endan-
ger lives.,,135 
The media has corroborated that this anti-leak mentality begins 
at the top, asserting that Obama "is deeply troubled by leaks on sensi-
tive national security matters like Afghanistan and Pakistan.,,136 In his 
book, The Promise, Newsweek's Jonathan Alter wrote that "Obama 
131. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TRANSPARENCY IN THE 
FIRST 100 DA YS: A REPORT CARD 23 (2009), available at <http://brennan.3cdn.net/07b3343e216 
944 f6d9 _ggm6ib3yb.pdf>. 
132. Scott Shane, Obama Steps up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2010, at AI. 
133. Shane, supra note 9. 
134. Id. 
135. Leon Panetta Warns CIA Employees: No More OBL Raid Leaks, ABC NEWS (May 19, 
2011, 6:14 PM), <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/1eon-panctta-warns-cia-employces 
-no-more-obl-raid-leaks/>. 
136. Gerstein, supra note 8. 
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had one pet peeve that could make him lose his cool ... leaks. ,,137 Jane 
Mayer from The New Yorker related a conversation from a meeting 
between Obama and a group of advocates for more transparency in 
government, in which Obama "drew a sharp distinction between 
whistle-blowers who exclusively reveal wrongdoing and those who 
jeopardize national security.,,13s Ms. Mayer described a statement of 
Danielle Brian from the Project on Government Oversight who at-
tended the meeting, saying: 
Obama's tone was generally supportive of transparency. But when 
the subject of national-security leaks came up, Brian said, "the 
President shifted in his seat and leaned forward. He said this may 
be where we have some differences. He said he doesn't want to 
protect the peoole who leak to the media war plans that could im-
th t39 pact e troops. 
Unfortunately, as described in more detail below,140 the line between 
whistleblowing and leaking may not be as clear as Obama asserted 
during that meeting. Nevertheless, the statement provides some con-
text for evaluating President Obama's actions, which even more than 
his Administration's statements, demonstrate his approach to nation-
al security whistle blowers. 
2. Actions by Obama's Administration 
At the same time that it supported whistle blowers in the non-
security context, Obama's Administration criminally prosecuted 
those who publicly disclosed conduct related to national security, 
conveyed a conspicuous lack of support for legislation that would im-
prove protection for national security whistleblowers, and attempted 
to force reporters to reveal confidential sources for stories disclosing 
national security issues. 
a. Criminal Prosecutions of Whistleblowers 
Most alarmingly for whistleblower advocates, the Obama Ad-
ministration used the Espionage Act, a statute typically reserved for 
the treasonous act of giving secret information to an enemy, to prose-
cute six individuals who could be described as whistleblowers because 
137. JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE 154 (2010). Alter reported that Obama is "fear-
some" about leaks, although the leaks described in The Promise seem to relate to policy dis-
putes that Obama believed were better handled internally rather than in the newspapers. See id. 
at 155. 
138. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 48. 
139. See id. 
140. See discllssion infi'a Part IV.A. 
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they gave information about misconduct to the media. 141 For example, 
the Obama (and Bush) Administrations criminally pursued Thomas 
Drake, a former employee of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
for allegedly disclosing classified information to a reporter. 142 Alt-
hough Drake admitted telling a reporter that the NSA mismanaged 
certain projects and wasted almost $1 billion on a flawed surveillance 
system, he denied revealing any classified information. 143 Initially, 
prosecutors charged Drake with Espionage Act violations carrying a 
possible penalty of up to thirty-five years in jail.144 However, the DOl 
ultimately dropped almost all of the charges. After five years of inves-
tigation, Drake pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of "exceeding 
authorized use of a computer" and did not receive any fine or jail 
t · 145 Ime. 
The prosecution struck many observers as heavy-handed,146 par-
ticularly when the Department of Defense Inspector General re-
leased a report substantiating Drake's claims about mismanagement 
and waste of public funds. 147 Moreover, the evidence that Drake pos-
sessed classified information was thin. Indeed, l. William Leonard, an 
official who was in charge of classifying information during the 
George W. Bush Administration, recently filed a complaint against 
the NSA for improperly classifying the document that formed the 
core of the government's case against Drake, stating that he had 
"never seen a more deliberate and willful example of government of-
ficials improperly classifying a document.,,148 Remarkably, the judge 
141. Savage, supra note 9; Shane, supra note 9. These prosecutions total more than the three 
previous cases brought by all previous Administrations combined. See id. 
142. Mayer, supra note 7, at 47. 
143. See id. at 55. 
144. Id.; Glen Greenwald, Obama's Whistleblower War Suffers Two Defeats, SALON (July 
30, 2011), <http://www.salon.com/news/departmenCofjustice/index.html?story=lopinion/green 
wald/2011107 130/whistleblowers>. 
145. Ellen Nakashima, Judge Blasts Prosecution of Alleged NSA LeakeI', WASH. POST, July 
29,2011, at A2. 
146. See generally Mayer, supra note 7, at 48, 57 (describing reactions to prosecution). Even 
Gabriel Schoenfeld, a noted conservative author who has argued for stronger protection of clas-
sified information, called the prosecution "draconian." See id. at 47. 
147. See Kathleen McClellan, Inspector General Report Vindicates GAP Clients From Na-
tional Security Agency, Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECr (June 23, 2011), <http://www.whistle 
blower.org/blog/3111207>; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF., 
REPORT 05-INTEL-03, REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRAILBLAZER AND THINTHREAD-
SYSTEMS ii (2004), available at <www.whistleblower.org/storagc/documents/IGR.pdf> ("[T]he 
NSA transformation effort may be developing a less capable long-term digital network exploita-
tion solution that will take longer and cost significantly more to develop."). 
148. See Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16. 
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even excoriated the prosecutors for their handling of the case, saying 
that the prosecution was "unconscionable" and did not "pass the 
smell test." 149 
Another example involves WikiLeaks, the website begun in 2007 
to provide an anonymous place that whistleblowers from all over the 
world could post documents revealing government or corporate mis-
conduct.150 In 2010 and 2011, hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. 
government documents were provided to WikiLeaks, which posted 
them online and caused a diplomatic furor because they revealed em-
barrassing, and sometimes illegal, government conduct. 1s1 The Obama 
Administration reacted strongly: it added the organization to its list of 
enemies that threatened the security of the United States,152 claimed 
that the release of documents put American troops in danger,153 and 
ultimately arrested Army Private Bradley Manning for leaking many 
of the documents to the website. 154 Human rights activists criticized 
the Obama Administration for its treatment of Manning, who for the 
first year of his arrest reportedly was held in strict solitary confine-
ment and made to sleep with a "suicide-proof smock" rather than his 
normal clothes.1s5 The government also conducted a criminal grand 
jury investigation of WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange,156 
that at least one source, the Australian embassy in Washington, D.C., 
149. Nakashima, supra note 145. 
150. What is Wikileaks, WIKILEAKS.ORG, <http://wikileaks.org/About.html> (last visited 
Apr. 17,2012). 
151. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2010, at WK1; 
Brad Knickerbocker, WikiLeaks 101: Five Questions About Who Did What and When, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1201/WikiLeaks-l01-Five-
questions-about-who-did-what-and-when/Who-is-responsible-for-the-Ieaks> (last visited Apr. 
17,2012). 
152. See Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18,2010, at A18. 
153. See Scott Shane, WikiLeaks Leaves Names of Diplomatic Sources in Cables, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A4. 
154. See Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video 
Probe, WIRED. COM (June 6, 2010), <http://www.wired.com/threatleve1l2010/06/leak/>. 
155. The Assoc. Press, Germany: An Appeal to Obama Over a U.S. Prisoner's Treatment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A13; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Move Suspect in 
Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at A12 (noting that Amnesty International had concerns over 
Manning's treatment); Mark Benjamin, WikiLeakers and Whistle-Blowers: Obama's Hard Line, 
TIME (Mar. 11, 2011), <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0.8599.2058340.00.html>.Philip 
J. Crowley, a State Department spokesman stated that the Pentagon's treatment of Manning 
was "ridiculous, counterproductive and stupid," a comment leading to Crowley's subsequent 
resignation. See Bumiller, supra. 
156. See Ellen Nakashima & Jerry Markon, WikiLeaks Founder Could Face Charges, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at AI; Shane, supra note 9. 
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reported to be "unprecedented both in its scale and nature.,,157 Attor-
ney General Eric Holder asserted publicly that publishing the gov-
ernment documents was a crime that should be prosecuted. ISS At the 
time of this writing, the outcome of that investigation has not been re-
leased publicly.159 
Obama's DO] prosecuted at least four other individuals for whis-
tleblowing-type activities involving providing classified information to 
the media. In 2010, the DO] prosecuted Shamai Leibowitz, a former 
FBI translator, for sending classified information to a blogger.16o 
Leibowitz pled guilty to disclosing the transcripts from conversations 
overheard by an FBI wiretap at the Israeli Embassy in Washington 
DC, claiming that he was publicizing what he considered to be "a vio-
lation of the law. ,,161 The blogger who published the information 
agreed, stating that Leibowitz provided the transcripts to him "be-
cause of concerns about Israel's aggressive efforts to influence Con-
gress and public opinion, and fears that Israel might strike nuclear fa-
cilities in Iran, a move he saw as potentially disastrous.,,162 Leibowitz 
. d h . 163 receIve a twenty-mont pnson sentence. 
Also in 2010, the Obama Administration charged Stephen]. Kim 
with violating the Espionage Act for allegedly providing classified in-
formation about North Korea to Fox News. l64 Kim is an expert on 
North Korea's nuclear program who consulted with the State De-
partment and talked with Fox about how North Korea might respond 
157. Philip Dorling, US Targets WikiLeaks Like No Other Organisation, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Dec. 3, 2011, at 10, available at <http://www.smh.com.aultechnology/technology-news/ 
us-targets-wikileaks-like-no-other-organisation-20111202-10beo.html#ixzz1fV zUpHIT>. 
158. See Julian E. Barnes & Evan Perez, Assange Probe Hits Snag, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 
2011, at A3; Assange Making Arrangements to Meet Police, Lawyer Says, CNN (Dec. 6, 2010, 
1:59 PM EST), <http://www.cnn.com/201O/US/12/06/wikileaks.investigation/index.htmi>. 
159. In November 2011, a federal judge permitted the DOJ to subpoena information about 
WikiLeaks-related Twitter accounts. See DecJan McCullagh, Second Judge Gives DOJ Access to 
WikiLeaks-related Twitter Accounts, CNET (Nov. 10, 2011, 12:24 PM PST), <http://news.cnet. 
com/8301-31921_3-57322538-2811second -j udge-gi ves-doj -access- to-wikileaks-rela ted-twi tter-
accounts/>. 
160. Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look at Efforts by U.S. to Spy on Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2011, at AI. 
161. Gerstein, supra note 8. 
162. Shane, supra note 160; see also Richard Silverstein, Why I Published US Intelligence 
Secrets About Israel's Anti-Iran Campaign, TRUTH OUT (Oct. 14, 2(11), <http://www.truth-
oULorg/why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-anti-iran-campaign/1316550301>. 
163. Adam C. Estes, Obama and Whistleblowers: Leak for Me but Not for Thee, THE 
ATLANTIC WIRE (May 26, 2011), <http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/20llI05/obama-
whistleblowers-war-dodd -frank/38192/>. 
164. Shane, supra note 9; Benjamin, supra note 155. 
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to proposed U.S. sanctions.165 In January 2011, the DOJ arrested for-
mer CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling and charged him with giving infor-
mation to New York Times reporter James Risen about "a classified 
clandestine operational program designed to conduct intelligence ac-
tivities" and a "human asset" Sterling had handled for the agency.166 
Finally, in January 2012, the DOJ charged former CIA agent John 
Kiriakou with violating the Espionage Act by allegedly disclosing the 
identity of a CIA. analyst to a journalist.167 The Government Ac-
countability Project asserted that the government targeted Kiriakou 
because he had made public, remarks questioning the use of water-
boarding as an interrogation matter. 16S 
Obama's predecessors used Espionage Act prosecutions far 
more sparingly. Before Obama became President, the government 
charged only three individuals with violating the Espionage Act for 
giving information to non-government actors, such as the media. The 
most famous of these cases involved Daniel Ellsberg and the Penta-
gon Papers in 1971, in which Ellsberg provided defense-related classi-
fied reports to the New York Times. 169 The case against Ellsberg was 
dismissed because of the prosecutors' ethical violations. l7O Previous to 
Leibowitz, the only successful Espionage Act prosecution of a gov-
ernment employee for giving classified information to a journalist oc-
curred in 1984 when Samuel L. Morison was convicted of violating 
the Espionage Act by giving satellite photographs of a Soviet ship to 
Jane's Defense Weekly, a British publication. l7l Finally, in 2005, Law-
rence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst, was charged with providing classi-
fied information about potential attacks on American forces in Iraq 
to two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a 
pro-Israel lobbying group.172 He pled guilty, but claimed he did not 
165. See Horton, supra note 8. 
166. Pierre Thomas et aI., Ex-CIA Agent Jeffrey Sterling Arrested, Accused of Leaking to 
Reporter as Revenge, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), <http://abcnews.go.com/US/BIotter/cia-agent-
jeffrey-sterling-arrested-accused-leaking-reporterlstory?id=12557291>. 
167. Savage, supra note 9. 
168. Eric Tucker, Ex-CIA Officer Charged with Leaking Secret Info, <http://www.salon.com 
12012/04/06/ex_cia_officeccharged_witlUeaking_secreUnfoI> (last visited June 22, 2012). 
169. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). 
170. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
881,89911.115; William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leak-
ing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1477-78 (2008). 
171. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (4th Cir. 1988); Kitrosser, supra note 
170, at 899. President Clinton later pardoned Mr. Morison. See Eric Lichtblau & David John-
ston, Use of Espionage Law in Secrets Case Troubles Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, Ang. 6,2005, at AW. 
172. See David Johnston & Eric Lichtblau, Analyst Charged with Disclosing Military Secrets, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at AI. 
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want to hurt the United States; rather, he thought the lobbyists to 
whom he gave the information would advocate for his position with 
the Administration.173 
b. Avoiding Better Statutory Protections 
These criminal prosecutions present the most public and vivid 
indication of Obama's strong views regarding those considered to 
have "leaked" classified information to the media. However, it could 
be argued that these present isolated cases involving relatively few 
individuals.174 Indeed, counterexamples exist in which the Obama 
DO] dropped charges or investigations against individuals accused by 
the Bush Administration of improperly disclosing classified infor-
mation. In 2009, the DO] approved the recommendation from career 
prosecutors to withdraw charges against Steven ]. Rosen and Keith 
Weissman,175 who the Bush Administration had accused of receiving 
classified information from Lawrence Franklin, discussed above, and 
giving it to a reporter and an Israeli diplomat. 176 In 2011, Obama's 
DO] also dropped investigations of intelligence community employ-
ees who admitted giving New York Times' reporters information that 
helped the Times expose Bush's domestic wiretapping program.177 
173. See Lee, supra note 170, at 1482; Scott Shane & David Johnston, Pro-Israel Lobbying 
Group Roiled by Prosecution of Two Ex-Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, § 1, at 21. The 
judge sentenced Franklin to twelve and a half years in prison, see Lee, supra note 170, at 1486, 
Shane & Johnston, supra; however, the court subsequently reduced the sentence to ten months 
of home detention, see Gerstein, supra note 8; Shane, supra note 132. 
174. Indeed, one news report asserted that the "scattered" way in which the six cases devel-
oped "support the notion that they were not the result of a top-down policy." Scott Shane & 
Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record in Leak Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A14. In the same article, however, the reporters quoted Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder, defending the DOJ against criticism that it was not investigating leaks suffi-
ciently by telling the Senate Judiciary Committee, "We have tried more leak cases-brought 
more leak cases during the course of this administration than any other administration." Id. The 
reporters also note that the President is promoting his prosecution record "as a political asset." 
Id. One other explanation for the increased prosecution could be that better technology makes 
the leakers easier to track down through email andcellphonerecords.Id. 
175. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. to Drop Spy Case Against Pro-Israel LobbyL~ts, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A11. The prosecutors claimed that the judge had issued rulings 
making the case to difficult to prosecute. See id. For example, the judge rejected the prosecu-
tors' attempt to conceal classified information at trial, which would force the government to dis-
close it publicly. See id.; see also Shane & Johnston, supra note 173 ("Some legal experts say the 
prosecution threatens political and press freedom, making a felony of the commerce in infor-
mation and ideas that is Washington's lifeblood. Federal prosecutors are using the Espionage 
Act for the first time against Americans who are not government officials, do not have a securi-
ty clearance and, by all indications, are not a part of a foreign spy operation."). 
176. See Shane & Johnston, supra note 173. 
177. See Charlie Savage, No Prosecution Seen for Official in N.S.A. Leak, N.Y. TIMES, April 
27,2011, at A17. 
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Given the inherent distinctions that can be made among individ-
ual prosecutions, perhaps the Obama Administration's stance regard-
ing enhanced statutory protections for whistle blowers provides a 
more compelling example of its nuanced approach to national securi-
ty whistleblowing. For years, whistleblower advocates and their allies 
in Congress supported legislation aimed at fixing numerous loopholes 
and defects in the primary legislation affecting federal government 
whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act. 178 In 2007, the 
House of Representatives passed H.R. 985 with an overwhelming bi-
partisan majority, 331_94.179 The bill, called the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Enhancement Act of 2007 (WPEA), contained numerous im-
provements for federal whistle blowers, including access to jury trials 
in federal court and protections for a broad range of disclosures about 
government misconduct.180 Importantly, H.R. 985 also provided new 
rights and protections to national security whistleblowers, who typi-
cally do not receive statutory protection and often must rely on inter-
nal agency administrative procedures to remedy any retaliation they 
experience for blowing the whistle. 181 Among other things, H.R. 985 
protected national security whistle blowers who make disclosures 
about misconduct to a broad range of congressional and executive 
branch officials, and it allowed employees to bring claims of retalia-
tion to federal coure82 - a process whistleblower advocates have 
claimed necessary to give full due process rights to government whis-
tleblowers. 183 Additionally, the legislation barred revoking an employ-
ee's security clearance as retaliation for blowing the whistle184 - a 
common form of retaliation currently not prohibited. ISS It also limited 
178. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 38 (2009) (detailing legislative attempts to pass im-
provements to the WPA). 
179. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 153 (Mar. 14,2007), available at <http://c1erk.house 
.gov/evs/2007/roIl153.xml>. Two hundred twenty-nine Democrats and 102 Republicans voted in 
favor of the bill on March 14,2007. See id. 
180. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007). 
181. I discuss the law currently affecting national security whistleblowers in more detail in 
Part III.B., infra. 
182. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007). The protected disclosures would have mirrored 
the disclosures under the WP A, as amended by the WPEA, which would have greatly expanded 
the types of disclosures national security whistleblowers could make without fear of retaliation. 
183. See Press Release, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr., Major Reversal: House Cuts Whistle-
blower Jury Trials, (Nov. 3, 2011), available at <http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=1293&Itemid=178> ("Access to jury trials is a hallmark in 
all modern whistleblower laws and an absolutely essential provision to ensure that whistleblow-
ers can have a fair hearing. "). 
184. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007). 
185. See Hesse V. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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the use of the "state secrets privilege" in cases brought by whistle-
blowers,186 likely in response to the Bush Administration's highly pub-
licized use of the privilege to prevent an FBI whistle blower from 
bringing a claim in federal court.187 The House bill required that a 
court resolve an issue on which the privilege is claimed in favor of the 
employee and also required the agency to submit a detailed report to 
Congress whenever it invoked the privilege.188 By any measure, H.R. 
985 would have dramatically improved the protections available to all 
federal government whistleblowers, specifically including national se-
curity whistleblowers. 
As a candidate for President, Obama signed a declaration that he 
supported government whistle blower protections "under the frame-
work of H.R. 985.,,189 However, Obama's stance towards these provi-
sions changed after he became President. Although H.R. 985 never 
became law,190 in January 2009, the House attached to the stimulus bill 
measures identical to H.R. 985's national security whistleblower pro-
visions. 191 President Obama did not demand that they remain part of 
the stimulus bill, and the Senate removed them before passing the 
legislation in February 2009, a month after Obama took office. l92 The 
next month, members in the House introduced federal government 
whistleblower legislation again, and it contained protections for na-
tional security whistleblowers identical to H.R. 985.193 
However, the Obama Administration indicated that it had reser-
186. The state secrets privilege permits the government to withhold revealing military and 
state secrets during a civil trial. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,7 (1953). 
187. See MELISSA GOODMAN ET AL., DISAVOWED: THE GOVERNMENT'S UNCHECKED 
RETALIATION AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 11 (2007) (discussing claim 
of Sibel Edmonds). 
188. See H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10 (2007). 
189. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick, Obama, Gates at Odds Over Proposed Protec-
tions tor National Security Whistleblowers, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A3; Candidate Sur-
veys, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., <http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=58> (last visited Apr. 17,2012). 
190. The Senate passed a companion bill, S. 274, but Congress never reconciled the two 
bills. Notably, S. 274 did not contain the added protections for national security whistle blowers. 
See S. 274, 110th Congo (2007). 
191. See H.R. 1, l11th Congo § 1270 (2009); Brittany R. Ballenstedt, House Backs Whistle-
blower Provision in Stimulus Bill, GOVEXEC.COM (Jan. 28, 2009), <http://www.govexec.com/ 
dailyfed/Ol 09/012809b l.htm>. 
192. See 156 CONGo REC. H8,974 (daily ed. Dec. 22,2(10) (Statement of Rep. Van Hollen) 
(noting that provisions of H.R. 1507 were "stripped out of the Recovery Act during the confer-
ence with the Senate"); Smith & Warrick, supra note 189 (noting that the national security whis-
tleblower provisions were dropped from the stimulus bill "after Sen. Susan Collins (Maine) and 
other Republicans objected to their inclusion and the White House did not insist on it"). 
193. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 1507, l11th Congo 
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vations about the national security whistle blower provisions. 194 In-
deed, in a committee hearing on the new bill, H.R. 1507, an Obama 
Administration representative, Rajesh De from DOJ, approved of 
many of the bill's improvements for whistleblowers generally, but ob-
jected to H.R. 1507's enhancements for national security whistle-
blowers.195 De asserted that a provision permitting federal employees 
a chance to appeal to a federal court when an agency revoked the 
employee's security clearance was "inconsistent with the traditional 
deference afforded Executive Branch decision-making in this area."l96 
De also objected to federal district court review of MSPB decisions 
regardirig national security whistleblowers because of "the sensitive 
nature of the issues involved" with national security whistleblowers. 197 
The Obama Administration instead endorsed retaliation protection 
for national security whistleblowers through administrative proce-
dures located entirely within the executive branch.198 
At the same time, the Senate considered S. 372, another version 
of the WPEA, and held hearings at which De provided substantially 
similar testimony on behalf of the Obama Administration.199 In De-
cember 2009, a Senate committee endorsed S. 372, which provided for 
national security whistleblower protection through an administrative, 
rather than a judicial, process.2OO By providing some antiretaliation 
protection for national security whistleblowers, S. 372 potentially im-
proved the current lack of any real protection;201 however, the bill in-
cluded significantly less robust procedural protections than the judi-
cial review found in H.R. 1507 (and H.R. 985 before that).202 The 
194. Joe Davidson, Whistleblower Advocates Push for More from Obama, WASH. POST, 
May 15, 2009, at A17. 
195. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't 
Reform, lllth Congo 7 (2009) (statement of Rajesh De, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Le-
gal Policy, Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter De House Statement], available at <http://democrats. 
oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513192835.pdf>. 
196. See id. at 9-10. 
197. See id. at 11. 
198. See id. at 7-10. 
199. See Hearing on S. 372 - The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce, & the Dist. of Columbia, 
I1lth Congo 7 (2009) (statement of Rajesh De, Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, 
Dep't of Justice), available at <http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdflrajeshde-whistJeblower-senate.pdf>. 
200. See S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 76-80 (2009). 
201. See discussion infra Part IILB. (discussing current legal regime affecting national secu-
rity whistleblowers). The version of S. 372 originally introduced in the Senate did not contain 
any protections for national security whistleblowers. See 155 CONGo REC. S1435-38 (daily ed. 
Feb. 3, 2009) (providing text as introduced in Senate). 
202. Instead, S. 372 required whistle blowers to appeal an employment decision to the agen-
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Senate committee specifically accepted the Obama Administration's 
position that an administrative process would "better protect national 
security information.,,203 Moreover, unlike H.R. 1507, S. 372 did not 
contain any provisions related to the government's use of the state se-
crets privilege, nor did it provide for outside review of an agency de-
cision to revoke an employee's security clearance.204 
Given De's testimony at the House and Senate hearings on the 
two versions of the WPEA, some whistleblower advocates blamed 
Obama for abandoning the strong national security whistleblower 
provisions of H. 1507 for the weaker version in S. 372. Not only did 
the Obama Administration suggest the administrative protections as 
an alternative to the judicial remedy of H.R. 1507, but also it became 
clear that the White House and national security officials, who had 
long objected to strong protections for intelligence community em-
ployees, worked with the Senate committee to craft a compromise bill 
with the weaker provisions.20s The National Whistleblowers Center 
lamented that S. 372's "bad" provisions concerning national security 
whistleblowers "have the tacit or express approval of the Obama 
Administration, which throughout this process has deferred to the 
views of the federal agency managers and heads of the intel agen-
cies.,,206 News reports also indicated that Obama officials even weak-
ened protections for FBI whistleblowers initially,207 although the bill 
ultimately passed by the Senate in December 2010 retained the FBI's 
cy head (rather than to a more independent Inspector General), who could control the resulting 
investigation. See S. REP. No. 111-101, at 70 (2009). As part of the investigation, the agency 
could submit ex parte information to the agency decision maker if "the agency determines that 
the interests of national security so warrant." ld. The whistleblower would have a limited ability 
to subpoena witnesses or to compel production of evidence. See id. A whistleblower could ap-
peal the agency decision to an administrative board created by the new law; however, the board 
would not conduct a hearing and would be dependent on the record accumulated by the agency 
(the same agency accused of retaliation), including credibility determinations made by the agen-
cy. See id. at 71. The board proceedings would not need to be on the record nor even conducted 
by administrative law judges, and the board could not share any of the ex parte evidence with 
the whistleblower. See id. The board could award damages (capped at $300,(00) but could not 
order reinstatement of the employee. See id. at 72. Finally, the bill would have permitted agen-
cies to fire whistleblowers without any review whatsoever when the agency itself determines 
that national security requires it. See id. at 73. 
203. ld. at 30. 
204. See id. at 79-80. 
205. Tom LoBianco, WH Sought to Weaken Law on Whistleblowing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2009, at AI; Smith & Warrick, supra note 189. 
206. See David Colapinto, Shine More Sunlight on S. 372, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROT. BLOG 
(Mar. 10, 2(10), <www.whistleblowersblog.org/2010103/articles/whistleblowers-governmentempl 
Iterrorism/shine-more-sunlight-on-s-372/>. 
207. See LoBianco, supra note 205; Kasie Hunt, Critics Question Whistleblower Bill, POLITICO 
(Mar. 9, 2010, 4:44 AM EDT), <http://www.politico.com/news/storiesI0310/34105.htmi>. 
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current protectIOns. 
As the legislative session for the lllth Congress wound to a close 
in December 2010, the House took up a measure identical to S. 372 
rather than its own H.R. 1507, which had languished since the com-
mittee hearing eighteen months earlier. Yet, even the watered-down 
provisions for intelligence community whistleblowers proved to be 
too much for many Republicans,209 and the House amended its ver-
sion of S. 372 to delete all of the national security provisions.210 A lone 
Senator put a hold on the bill when it returned to the Senate, and the 
lllth Congress ended without passing any version of the WPEA. 211 
Professor Geoffrey Stone, Obama's former colleague at the Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School, complained that the Obama Administra-
tion "cooled to the idea" of a statute with enhanced federal employee 
whistleblower protection and "let it die" in the Senate.212 
However, after several Senators reintroduced the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act in 2011, generally along the same lines 
as S. 372 from the previous Congress,213 Obama publicly supported 
it.214 This bill keeps many of the improvements to the WPA found in 
previous versions of the bill, but retains the administrative remedies 
for national security whistleblowers.2!5 Interestingly, instead of detail-
ing specific enforcement procedures like S. 372, the proposed legisla-
tion simply grants the President the power to provide for enforcement 
208. Compare 156 CONGo REC. S8803 (daily ed. Dec. 10,2010) (detailing S. Arndt. 4760 to S. 
372, which did not include the FBI in the groups to which the administrative procedures were 
available under Section 201 and which the Senate passed on Dec. 10,2010) with S. REP. No. 111-
101, at 68 (2009) (including FBI in groups affected by administrative procedures) and 156 Congo 
REC. S8813 (daily ed. Dec. 10,2010) (reporting Committee's version to the Senate). 
209. See 156 CONGo REC. H8974 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (Statement of Rep. Towns) ("I am 
disappointed that we could not come to an agreement with the Republican side on extending 
protections to employees in the Intelligence Community."). 
210. See 156 CONGo REC. H8966-74 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010). 
211. House Republican Leadership Asked Senator to Place "Secret Hold" on Federal Whistleblower 
Bill, GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 4, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/press/ 
press-reI ease-archi veil 03 7 -h 0 use-re pub Ii can -lead ershi p-ask ed -senato r -to-p I ace-q secre th 01 dq-
on-federal-whistleblower-bill>. 
212. Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Untramparent President, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at A21. 
213. See S. 743, 112th Cong (2011). On Oct. 19,2011, the bill passed unanimously out of the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. See Dylan Blaylock, GAP 
Praises Senate Committee Vote on Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, GOy'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2011), <http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1556-
gap-praises-senate-committee-vote-on-whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act>. 
214. See Amanda Becker, Obama Pushes for Whistle-Blower Bill, ROLL CALL NEWS (Sept. 
21, 2011), <http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57 _32/0bama-Pushes-for-Whistle-B1ower-BiII-08883-
l.html?pos=hbtxt>. 
215. See S. 743, 112th Congo § 201 (2011). 
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of its protections along the same lines as the WPA.2I6 The administra-
tive remedy seems to appeal to Obama; he has declared that even if 
Congress does not pass the WPEA, his Administration might use ex-
ecutive orders to implement what he can.217 
Thus, the Obama Administration took a more nuanced approach 
to national security whistleblowing than candidate Obama's original 
endorsement of H.R. 985 would have indicated. Although the Obama 
Administration agreed the law should protect national security whis-
tleblowers, it objected to providing them the same type of rights 
available to other whistleblowers. Most dramatically, the Administra-
tion endorsed internal, administrative remedies instead of the 
House's preferred judicial remedies. 
c. Journalist Subpoenas 
The Obama Administration also focused on journalists who re-
vealed classified information. James Risen presents one specific ex-
ample. He co-authored the New York Times article that exposed the 
Bush Administration's domestic wiretapping program and wrote a 
book, State of War, which described a failed government attempt to 
undermine Iran's nuclear-weapons program.218 Both the Bush and 
Obama Administrations investigated the sources for Risen's stories 
for years before Obama's prosecutors finally attempted to force Ris-
en to testify against Jeffrey Sterling, the former C.I.A. officer charged 
with revealing national security information to Risen.219 In fact, the 
Bush Administration dropped its attempt to subpoena Risen; howev-
er, the Obama prosecutors revived the effort by SUbpoenaing Risen's 
credit reports as well as his personal bank and telephone records as 
part of their investigation.220 Issuing such subpoenas to a member of 
the press presents a host of thorny legal issues, including a potential 
clash with First Amendment protections. Accordingly, the Justice 
Department's own rules require the Attorney General to approve 
such subpoenas, demonstrating how seriously the Obama Administra-
216. See id. 
217. See Becker, supra note 214. 
218. See Jane Mayer, lames Risen's Subpoena, THE NEW YORKER (May 24, 2011), <http:// 
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/james-risens-subpoena.html>. 
219. See Greenwald, supra nole 8; Mayer, supra note 218. 
220. See Josh Gerstein, Feds Spy on Reporter in Leak Probe, POLITICO (updated Feb. 25, 
2011, 12:15 PM EST), <http://www.politico.com/ncws/slories/0211150168.hlml>; Glenn Green-
wald, Climate of Fear: lim Risen v. the Obama Administration, SALON (June 23, 2011, 4:24 AM 
CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2011/06/23/risen_3/>. 
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tion pursued Sterling.221 Indeed, the prosecutor's motion requesting 
the subpoena called Risen "an eyewitness to the serious crimes" at is-
sue in the case, namely the disclosure of national security infor-
mation.222 Ultimately, a federal judge quashed the subpoena this past 
summer.223 
The Risen subpoena reflects a policy reversal for Obama with 
regard to a reporter's right to protect sources, many of whom, of 
course, could be called whistleblowers. In 2007 as a U.S. Senator, 
Obama co-sponsored the Free Flow of Information Act, which would 
provide a federal journalist-source privilege allowing journalists to 
protect the confidentiality of their sources except in extreme circum-
stances, a right recognized by forty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia.224 As a candidate for President, Obama promised to give pro-
tection to journalists from having to reveal their confidential 
sources.
225 However, as President, Obama demanded that exceptions 
exist to require a reporter to reveal a source in order to protect na-
tional security,226 and he insisted that judges defer to the executive 
branch's judgment on whether national security would be affected.227 
Not surprisingly, whistleblower advocates have raised strong ob-
jections to these events. Thomas Drake's lawyer, Jesselyn Radack, of 
the Government Accountability Project, called Obama's actions "bru-
tal" and "a recipe for the slow poisoning of a democracy.,,228 The Os-
221. See Mayer, supra note 218; Shane, supra note 132 ("By Justice Department rulcs, inves-
tigators may seek to question a journalist about his sources only after exhausting other options 
and with the approval of the attorney general. Subpoenas have been issued for reporters rough-
ly once a year over the last two decades, according to Justice Department statistics, but such 
actions are invariably fought by news organizations and spark political debate over the First 
Amendment."). 
222. See Mayer, supra note 218. 
223. Greenwald, supra note 144. 
224. Stone, supra note 212. To overcome the privilege, the government would have to prove 
that disclosing the information would prevent significant harm to national security. See id. 
225. See Charlie Savage, White House Proposes Changes in Bill Protecting Reporters' Confi-
dentiality, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2009, at A17; Clint Hendler, A Change That's Hard to Believe In, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 2, 2009, 10:12 AM), <http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/a_ 
change_thats_hard_to_believe.php> (providing transcript and quoting campaign speech by 
Obama from Apr. 15,2008). 
226. See Shane Harris, Plugging the Leaks, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 2010, at 33, availa-
ble at <http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/plugging-the-leaksl>; Savage, supra note 
225 ("The Administration this week sent to Congress sweeping revisions to a 'media shield' bill 
that would significantly weaken its protections against forcing reporters to testify" by not per-
mitting protections for leaks involving "significant" harm to national security). 
227. Stone, supra note 212. 
228. Thomas Drake & Jesselyn Radack, A Surprising War on Leaks Under Obama, 
PHILL Y .COM (Aug. 1, 2011), <http://articles.philly.com12011-08-01lnews129838846_L whistle-
blowers-jesselyn-radack-obama>. 
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car-nominated director of a film about Daniel Ellsberg, of Pentagon 
Papers fame, claimed that Obama is the "worst President in terms of 
his record on whistleblowing.,,229 Obama's proposed national security 
provisions for the WPEA provoked substantial criticism as wel1.230 His 
former colleague, Professor Stone, criticized some of Obama's moves 
in a New York Times editorial titled, "Our Untransparent Presi-
dent. ,,231 
The Obama Administration's actions provoked strong reactions 
from the media too. Glenn Greenwald from Salon.com called 
Obama's prosecutions "the most aggressive crusade to expose, punish 
and silence 'courageous and patriotic' whistleblowers by any Presi-
dent in decades.,,232 The Atlantic complained that Obama is "waging a 
war on whistleblowers within the federal government,,,233 a sentiment 
others have echoed.234 
However, the Obama Administration's involvement in the wind-
ing legislative path of the WPEA indicates a more nuanced attitude 
towards national security whistleblowers than demonstrated by the 
media hyperbole. Obama is not necessarily conducting a "war" on na-
tional security whistleblowers, because he has supported legislation 
protecting them. However, he may be conducting a battle for national 
security secrecy. He prioritized the protection of classified national 
security information by attempting to limit the ways in which intelli-
gence community whistleblowers could disclose misconduct and the 
229. Ben Dowell, Barack Obama Worst President for Whistleblowers, Says Film-maker, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2011, 13:22 EDT), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/09/barack-
obama-worst-president-for-whistleblowers>. 
230. See Julia Davis, Here Comes the Bride of Frankenstein, EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 5, 2011), 
<http://www.examiner.comlhomeland-security-in-los-angelesIhere-comes-the-bride-offrankenstein> 
("The WPEA is replete with deceptive guillotines masquerading as haircut machines."); Green-
house: Senate Bill "Treats Whistleblowers as Second-class Citizens", Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr. 
(Dec. 15, 2010), <http://www.whistleblowers.orglindex.php?option=com30ntent&task=view& 
id=1166&Itemid=189> (noting that Bunnatine Greenhouse, an Army Corps of Engineers whis-
tleblower who testified before Congress on whistleblower protections, stated that S. 372 "leaves 
national security whistleblowers out in the cold"); LoBianco, supra note 205 (quoting Tom 
Devine from the Government Accountability Project stating that "the White House changes [to 
the WPEA] created obstacles that could stymie national security whistleblowers, such as a new 
review panel to hear complaints from intelligence employees who bring allegations of wrongdo-
ing to light"); Senate Passes S.372: A Bad Deal for Whistleblowers, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr. 
(Dec. 11, 2010), <http://www.whistleblowers.org/illdex.php?option=com_colltent&task=view& 
id=1163&Itemid=71> (stating that S. 372 does "little to aid" national security whistleblowers). 
231. See Stone, supra note 212. 
232. Greenwald, supra note 8; see also Benjamin, supra note 155 (noting that the Obama 
Administration "is rapidly establishing a record as the most aggressive prosecutor of alleged 
government leakers in U.S. history"). 
233. See Estes, supra note 163. 
234. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 8; Horton, supra note 8. 
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procedures they could invoke to remedy any retaliation they encoun-
ter. For Obama, administrative (rather than judicial) remedies for 
whistle blowers keep national security secrets within the executive 
branch and do not expose them to outsiders like Congress, judges, or 
the media. The criminal prosecutions and the Obama Administra-
tion's focus on "leaks" to the media supported the goal of national se-
curity secrecy. Obama appears to believe that not all whistleblowers 
are bad, just the ones who publicly disclose classified information 
when they blow the whistle. To put it bluntly, when it comes to na-
tional security, Obama would rather protect secrecy than protect 
whistle blowing. 
This distinction between Obama's broad support for whistle-
blowing generally and his lack of support, often even condemnation, 
of whistleblowing about national security (or, more disparagingly, 
"leaking") deserves further exploration. Part III, below, analyzes the 
source for Obama's disdain for leaking and concludes that Obama's 
stance continues a long-standing presidential attitude toward national 
security whistleblowing based on constitutional separation of powers 
concerns. Obama, however, may be unique among his predecessors 
because of his strong support for other types of whistleblowers, mak-
ing the distinction more apparent. Part IV evaluates the merits of 
Obama's singular distinction between national security whistleblow-
ers and other types of whistleblowers. 
III. WHISTLEBLOWING, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Conflicts over secrecy ... are conflicts over power: the power that 
comes through controlling the flow of information. 
Sissela Bok (1982/35 
From the earliest days of the republic, the government has had to 
consider how to respond to executive branch employees who disclose 
misconduct in the national security arena. As Stephen Kohn, a well-
known whistleblower advocate and lawyer, pointed out in The New 
York Times, Congress has encouraged people to report abuse and il-
legal conduct since the days of the Revolutionary War, when ten 
American sailors informed Congress that their commander treated 
prisoners of war inhumanly.236 After the commander retaliated against 
235. BOK, supra note 12, at 19. 
236. See Stephen M. Kohn, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at A23. 
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the whistleblowers, Congress passed what Mr. Kohn called "Ameri-
ca's first whistle-blower protection law": 
That it is the duty of all persons in the service of the United States, 
as well as all other inhabitants thereof, to give the earliest infor-
mation to Congress or any other proper authority of any miscon-
duct, frauds or misdemeanors committed by any officers or persons 
in the service of these states, which may come to their knowledge.237 
Two centuries later Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Pa-
pers to the New York Times, resulting in his prosecution under the 
Espionage Act. The landmark Supreme Court opinion that arose out 
of that case addressed the First Amendment rights of the recipient of 
classified information, but left open the question regarding the legal 
rights a whistleblower may have to disclose classified information 
about illegal or improper government conduct.238 Most recently, the 
"War on Terror" that began after the September 11, 2001 attacks led 
to numerous government employees publicly disclosing information 
that touched on national security. These individuals believed they re-
ported illegal or unethical government acts, such as the warrantless 
wiretapping by the National Security Agency,239 the CIA renditions 
and water torture of suspected terrorists,240 and the Abu Ghraib pris-
oner abuse.241 
These examples and others follow a similar pattern and reinforce 
the definition of "national security whistleblower" I set out above: an 
executive branch employee who either works in the "intelligence 
community" or reveals classified information, or both.242 Ellsberg met 
both definitions: he worked for the Department of Defense and re-
vealed classified information.243 Thomas Drake worked for the Na-
tional Security Agency, but claims not to have disclosed anything 
237. See id. 
238. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Lee, supra note 
170, at 1478 n.133. 
239. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 14 (discussing case of Russell Tice); Michael 
P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 
L. 567, 573-74 (2006); Michael lsikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 
200S, at 40, available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweekI2008112/12/the-fed-who-blew-
the-whistle.html> (discussing the case of Thomas Tamm who told the New York Times that the 
NSA was intercepting phone calls and emails in U.S. without judicial warrants). 
240. See Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 572-74; Jameel Jaffer & Larry Siems, 
Honoring Those Who Said No, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at 25. 
241. See Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 572-74; Jaffer & Siems, supra note 240. 
242. See supra Part II.B. 
243. See Daniel Elisberg, Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, 77 Soc. RES. 773, 
787-88 (2010). 
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classified.244 Conversely, Thomas Tamm worked for the DO] (not 
technically part of the "intelligence community"), but helped blow 
the whistle on the highly classified, but arguably illegal, NSA wire-
tapping program.245 In the typical pattern, the national security em-
ployee discovers conduct the employee believes to be illegal or im-
moral, often relating to classified or confidential information, and 
tells Congress or the media about it.246 Most recently, as noted above, 
the Obama Administration has ratcheted up government reaction to 
such actions by criminally prosecuting employees who arguably could 
be called whistleblowers.247 
One explanation for Obama's intense reaction towards national 
security whistleblowers may be that such whistleblowers present a 
President with a unique dilemma. On the one hand, presidential deci-
sion making, particularly about national security, requires some 
amount of secrecy.248 Executive branch officials need some private 
space in order to provide candid advice to the President and to vet 
proposals without the distorting impact of public scrutiny. Employees 
who blow the whistle undermine this process and destroy the ability 
of Presidents to keep what one author has called "necessary se-
crets. ,,249 On the other hand, the Constitution promotes government 
transparency and Congressional oversight of the executive branch.250 
Whistleblowers who expose misconduct play an important role in 
making the government transparent and assisting in inter-branch 
oversight. In other words, President Obama's nuanced approach to 
national security whistleblowing is part of a larger context related to 
these tensions that, at their core, result from the Constitution's sepa-
244. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 55. 
245. See Isikoff, supra note 239; Savage, supra note 177, at A17. 
246. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: NATIONAL SECURITY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33215.pdf>; 
GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187; Katel, supra note 32, at 265; Lee, supra note 170, at 1454-55. 
For example, Jesselyn Radack, a former FBI legal counsel, told a reporter about alleged "bar-
baric" treatment of John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban," after his arrest, and claimed 
to have been retaliated against as a result. See Drake & Radack, supra note 228. Radack claims 
to have "warned the Justice Department against interrogating [Lindh] without an attorney" and 
"exposed the FBI's ethics violations in deciding to proceed, its barbaric treatment of him, and 
the mysterious disappearance of evidence of the warning from DOJ files." ld.; see a/so Eric 
Lichtblau, Dispute Over Legal Advice Costs a Job and Snarls a Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22,2003, at A15. 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 141-73. 
248. See BOK, supra note 12, at 191. 
249. See generally GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, 
THE MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011). 
250. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 489, 522 (2007). 
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ration of powers among co-equal branches of government.2S1 
A. Valuing Oversight and Transparency over Secrecy 
Whistleblowing, particularly by executive branch employees to 
Congress, brings to a head these arguments about the competing 
needs for executive secrecy and Congressional oversight. Such argu-
ments have resulted in various attempts to balance these opposing in-
terests depending on the circumstances surrounding the whistleblow-
ing. Presidents of both political parties have long maintained that the 
chief executive can keep some secrets from Congress in order to do 
the President's job effectively.252 Thomas Jefferson noted, "The Sen-
ate is not supposed by the Constitution to be acquainted with the 
concerns of the Executive Department. It was not intended that these 
should be communicated to them.,,253 Indeed, some commentators 
have asserted that the President's ability to keep secrets presents one 
of the great strengths of the executive branch.254 Professor Heidi 
Kitrosser examines these arguments and goes one step further by as-
serting that "[i]t is virtually inevitable that the President's constitu-
tional capacity for secrecy expands dramatically over time,,255 due to 
the bureaucratic and technological realities of the office.256 Obama's 
251. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 2 ("Whistleblower activity is often viewed as a struggle 
between the executive and legislative branches."). 
252. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2701 - INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 (2009), available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php 
?pid=86389> (opposing changes to broaden executive branch reporting requirements to Con-
gress because they "would undermine what the executive branch refers to as a 'fundamental 
compact between the Congress and the President' regarding the reporting of intelligence activi-
ties, 'an arrangement that for decades has balanced congressional oversight responsibilities with 
the President's responsibility to protect sensitive national security information"); Kathleen 
Clark, "A New Era of Openness?": Disclosing Intelligence to Congress Under Obama, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 313,327-28 (2010) ("For decades, Presidents have claimed the right to control classi-
fied information and internal legal advice."); Katel, supra note 32, at 272 (quoting President 
George W. Bush official asserting that executive privilege doctrine includes keeping "intra-
agency deliberative materials prepared for senior officers in executive departments" from Con-
gress); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving In-
formation Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1061 (2008). 
253. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on Ihe Powers of Ihe Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA (John P. Foley ed., 1900), quoted in Glenn Sulmasy, Panel: Secre-
cy and Barriers 10 Open Government, transcript from Symposium: Left Out in the Cold? The 
Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9111 America, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1229, 
1233 n.56 (2008). 
254. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 887 (discussing writing of Alexander Hamilton 
and John Jay). 
255. See id. 
256. See id. at 887-89. 
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first signing statement, noted above, demonstrates that he takes the 
traditional executive's view that the President should be able to con-
trol federal employee communications to Congress "where such 
communications would be unlawful or would reveal information that 
is properly privileged or otherwise confidential.,,257 In contrast, Con-
gress and others have insisted that the legislative branch maintains 
constitutional authority to oversee all of the executive's actions,258 in-
cluding those related to national security. Congress, as a representa-
tive body, provides the best means for public oversight in a democra-
cy, but only if Congress has access to information about the 
government's programs.259 
Over the last century, each branch has erected legal bulwarks in 
this intra-governmental dispute between transparency and secrecy as 
it relates to executive branch employees providing information to 
Congress to assist the legislative branch in its oversight responsibili-
ties. For example, in 1902 and 1909, Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, 
respectively, issued "gag" orders in which they ordered executive 
branch employees to speak with Congress only if approved by their 
department head.260 Congress became concerned that these orders 
would stifle its ability to oversee the executive branch, and, in 1912, it 
passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,261 rejecting these orders and declar-
ing that no one should interfere with the "right" of federal employees 
to talk to Congress.262 
The debate continued in more modern times. When Congress 
257. Statement by the President supra note 130. The law prohibited the use of appropria-
tions to pay salaries of anyone who "interferes with or prohibits" communications between fed-
eral employees and Congress related to the employee's job or agency. Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 684, Div. D, § 714(1) & 714(2). 
258. See SEN. REP. No. 111-101, at 27 (2009) (noting that a previous Senate committee had 
determined that a bill permitting intelligence community employees to disclose information to 
Congress was constitutional because "the regulation of national security information, while im-
plicitly in the command authority of the President, is equally in the national security and foreign 
affairs authorities vested in Congress by the Constitution"); Katel, supra note 32, at 272 (quot-
ing memo from Congressional Research Service attorney concluding that "Congress has a clear 
right and recognized prerogative ... to receive from officers and employees of the agencies and 
departments of the United States accurate and truthful information regarding the federal pro-
grams and policies"); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1063-64. 
259. See Morton H. Halperin & Daniel N. Hoffman, Secrecy and the Right to Know, 40 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 132, 132 (1976) ("Congress, acting in behalf of the public, should first di-
rect, and then oversee executive Administration."). 
260. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 2-3. 
261. 37 Stat. 555, § 6 (1912). This language was carried forward and supplemented by the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and is codified as permanent law. See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). 
262. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 3; Thomas Newcomb, In from the Cold: The Intelligence 
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998,53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1235, 1239 n.lO (2001). 
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passed the Inspector General Act of 1978,263 it clashed with the Presi-
dent over whether Inspector Generals (IGs) must report findings of 
misconduct to Congress. 264 The House originally required IGs to re-
port "particularly serious or flagrant" concerns to Congress within 
seven days after discovery and without obtaining approval from exec-
utive branch agency heads.265 The Office of Legal Counsel objected 
because the provision potentially conflicted with the President's con-
stitutional right to withhold information from Congress on the basis 
of executive privilege: the President claimed the authority to control 
whether and how executive branch IGs should report information to 
Congress.266 The Senate version of the bill, which ultimately became 
law, compromised and required IGs to report "particularly serious or 
flagrant" concerns to agency heads, who should then provide them to 
Congress.267 The Senate Report on the provision acknowledges, how-
ever, that "the President's constitutional privilege for confidential 
communications" may require an agency head to alter or delete in-
formation before reporting to Congress. 268 This awkward compromise 
between the two branches gives Congress some oversight over the 
most serious problems reported to IGs, but appears to leave the Pres-
ident with the power (through his agency heads) to conceal what he 
considers constitutionally privileged information. 
The quarrel extends beyond the IG process. Since the early 
1980s, Presidents have required executive branch employees to sign 
nondisclosure agreements, while Congress has refused to provide any 
funds to enforce the agreements or to pay the salary of any executive 
branch official who prevents an employee from communicating with 
Congress.269 Congress repeatedly passed provisions in appropriation 
bills that require the nondisclosure agreements both to prohibit em-
ployees from disclosing classified information and to clarify that the 
prohibition does not apply to disclosures to Congress or to law en-
forcement related to a substantial violation of law.270 
263. 5 U.S.c. app. § 5(d) (2006). 
264. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1257-60. 
265. See id. at 1258 (citing S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 30-32, summarized in pertinent part in, 
H.R. REP. No. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)). 
266. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-1071, at 30-32, summarized in pertinent part in, H.R. REP. 
NO. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)). 
267. See 5 U.S.c. app. § 5(d); Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59. 
268. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 31-32 (1978), 
quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 105-747, at 18-19 (1998)). 
269. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 24-28. 
270. See id. at 28. 
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Although President Obama supported whistleblower protections 
generally, he demonstrated a willingness to continue the arguments 
made by his predecessors for a strong executive privilege. For exam-
ple, the Obama Administration refused to allow its social secretary to 
testify before Congress regarding security at a White House dinner 
because, as Obama's press secretary noted, "[b]ased on the separa-
tion of powers, staff here don't go to testify in front of Congress.,,271 
Nevertheless, despite the gag orders and nondisclosure agree-
ments, for the typical federal government whistleblower, the balance 
generally seems to be in favor of Congressional oversight and trans-
parency because, at least on paper, the law protects most federal gov-
ernment employees who report most types of misconduct. The WP A 
provides remedies for many federal employees who suffer retaliation 
for disclosing government misconduct, such as illegal behavior, mis-
management, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a sub-
stantial and specific danger to public health or safety.272 Although ad-
ministrative and court decisions have undermined these protections 
somewhat,273 on paper, the WPA provides robust whistleblower pro-
tection because it protects disclosures on a wide range of misconduct 
to a broad group of people, including to an employee's supervisor, 
Congress, or even the press if necessary.274 Moreover, entities inde-
pendent of an employee's agency will investigate and adjudicate 
claims of retaliation, which ultimately could be heard by the judicial 
branch on appeal.275 
B. Switching the Balance for National Security Whistleblowing 
The laws affecting national security whistle blowers differ dramat-
ically from these general provisions. As discussed in more detail be-
low, employees may report misconduct related to national security to 
271. Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 
483, 519 (2010) (quoting Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, 
WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 2009, at C7) (internal quotation marks omitted). In non-whistieblower 
contexts, Obama also asserted executive privilege positions eerily familiar to positions claimed 
by his predecessor, George W. Bush. See generally Stone, supra note 212. For example, Presi-
dent Obama continues to assert the state secrets privilege with regularity, even to defend ac-
tions taken by the Bush Administration related to the CIA renditions and the NSA wiretapping. 
Seeid. 
272. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2006). 
273. See Devine Statement, supra note 18, at 13-19. 
274. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 16-21. 
275. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04 (2006) (describing MSPB); id. §§ 1211-14 (describing OSe); id. 
§ n03(b)(1) (providing for review of MSPB decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit). 
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a more limited group of people, excluding most of Congress and all of 
the public. Moreover, less protection from retaliation exists, and the 
judicial branch has no oversight of retaliation claims because the 
claims are adjudicated administratively within the executive branch 
and often within the whistleblower's own agency, if at all. 
1. The Classification System for National Security Information 
A primary reason for the difference in the law's treatment of 
these types of whistleblowers relates to the different nature of the in-
formation being shared by the whistleblowers. A "national security 
whistle blower" often reveals "classified" information subject to spe-
cial rules about its disclosure. The classification system for the federal 
government results from a Presidential executive order describing the 
various levels of secrecy that applies to certain types of information.276 
Presidents also control whether an individual receives a security 
clearance providing access to classified information.277 As a result, 
whether information is classified, and therefore subject to tighter re-
strictions on whether and how it can be disclosed, "is almost entirely 
under the control of the executive branch.,,278 Further, the executive 
branch can utilize criminal prosecution to enforce secrecy related to 
certain types of classified information.279 For example, the Espionage 
Act of 1917, mentioned above, protects the secrecy of national de-
fense information.28o Presidents claim to derive the power to control 
276. See Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 890-91 (describing the classification system); KEVIN 
KOSAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CLASSIFIED INFORMATION POLICY AND 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526, at 3 (2010), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41528. 
pdf> ("[C]lassified information policy largely has been established through executive orders."). 
277. See KOSAR, supra note 276, at 4 (noting that executive orders typically have defined 
"who in the federal government may classify information, what levels of classification and classi-
fication markings (e.g., 'top secret') may be used, who may access classified information, and 
how and when classified information is to be declassified"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 
4.1, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2(10) (limiting access to classified information to those who 
demonstrate eligibility to an agency head, sign a nondisclosure agreement, and have a need to 
know the information). 
278. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 890; see aLw KOSAR, supra note 276, at 5 (noting that 
Congress passed provision in the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act "allowing the 
President to have a lead role in devising classified information policy"). 
279. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRIMINAL 
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 10 (2011), avail-
able at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/148793.pdf> (detailing criminal penalties). 
It should be noted, however, that the U.S. does not have a criminal statute prohibiting the pub-
lic disclosure of classified information generally - the statutes prohibit disclosing specific types 
of classified information. See id. In contrast, the United Kingdom has an "Official Secrets Act" 
that criminally penalizes the disclosure of any government secret. Congress passed a similar act 
in 2000 but President Clinton vetoed the bill. See id. at 25-26. 
280. Espionage Act of 1917,18 U.S.c. §§ 793-99 (2006). 
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the secrecy of national security information from the Constitution, 
which appoints the President as Commander in Chiet,281 
Supreme Court holdings provide part of the basis for this view as 
well. The Court determined in Department of Navy v. Egan,282 that the 
Merit Systems Protection Board could not review the revocation of 
an employee's security clearance by an executive agency.283 In so do-
ing, the Egan Court waxed philosophically about the President's con-
stitutional role as Commander in Chief under Article II and asserted 
that the 
authority to classify and control access to information bearing on 
national security and to determine whether an individual is suffi-
ciently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch 
that will give that person access to such information flows primarily 
from this constitutional investment of power in the President, and 
exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.284 
Moreover, in separate cases, the Court determined that the President, 
in some circumstances, has a privilege to refuse disclosing to courts 
confidential communications regarding national security and military 
issues.28s Additionally, in Snepp v. United States,286 the Court noted 
that the government has a "compelling interest" in withholding na-
tional security information from unauthorized persons.287 
However, the Constitution also provides Congress with oversight 
responsibilities, which leads to an inevitable conflict regarding when 
the President must provide national security information to Con-
gress.288 Interestingly, none of the Court's rulings provides the answer 
to whether the Constitution permits the President to withhold nation-
al security information from Congress - as compared to the prohibi-
281. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 1; see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERV., THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1 (2011), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RS21900.pdf> (noting that Presidents, 
including President Obama, cite constitutional authority when issuing an executive order related 
to classified information); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1061-62; Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 
507; Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1239-40; Sulmasy, supra note 253, at 1233 ("[T]he founders, as 
well as many modern administrators in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, have 
strongly insisted that the media, the citizenry, and even Congress are presumptively not privy to 
most wartime secrets and intelligence activities."). 
282. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
283. Id. at 530. 
284. Id. at 527. 
285. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
286. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
287. See id. at 509 n.3. 
288. See Kitrosser, supra note 250, at 522 (summarizing arguments that Congress has a con-
stitutional role in checking the President's secrecy-keeping powers). 
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tions against disclosure to the public generally.289 Egan dealt with 
whether an executive agency had authority to question the security 
clearance judgment of another executive agency, importantly noting 
that the Executive Branch has authority in military and national secu-
rity affairs, "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise.,,290 
Reynolds and Nixon addressed executive privilege in the context of 
revealing national security information to litigants and courts, not 
Congress.29 ! Snepp held only that the CIA's contractual requirement 
that a former CIA agent obtain approval before publishing material 
related to the CIA was a reasonable way for the CIA to protect its in-
terest in maintaining the "secrecy of information important to our na-
tional security.,,292 Thus, the question of how much information Con-
gress can demand from the President regarding national security 
remains somewhat of an open question as a constitutional matter. 
The Security Act of 1947 resolves some of this conflict through a 
delicate and complicated arrangement that details when the executive 
branch must share classified information with Congress. Under the 
Act, the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the in-
telligence agency heads must brief Congressional intelligence com-
mittees about "intelligence activities" and "any significant anticipated 
intelligence activity.,,293 Additionally, a smaller group of congressional 
members, the so-called "Gang of Eight,,,294 receive executive briefings 
on "covert operations," when the President considers it "essential ... 
to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the 
United States.,,295 The arrangement becomes complicated because 
congressional aides and staff members may not have the proper secu-
289. See ELSEA, supra note 281, at 1 ("The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 
extent to which Congress may constrain the executive branch's power in this area. "). 
290. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see also FISHER, supra note 246, at 
24 (arguing that Egan was based on statutory, not constitutional, framework and that Congress 
has authority to legislate about scope of security clearances). 
291. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 10 (1953). Moreover, Reynolds specifically dealt with executive privilege as an eviden-
tiary doctrine, not a Constitutional requirement. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7. 
292. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980). 
293. 50 U.S.c. § 413(a)(I) (2006) (President); id. § 413a(a)(I) (Director of National Intelli-
gence and agency heads). 
294. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1053 (noting that the Gang of Eight consists of "the 
chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority 
leaders of the Senate" and quoting Heidi Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency as Structural Directive: 
A Look a the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1204 nn.252-56 and accom-
panying text (2007» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
295. 50 U.S.c. § 413b(c)(2). 
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rity clearances (controlled by the executive branch) to receive thein-
formation. Also, although congressional members may receive classi-
fied information, the law prohibits them from disclosing the infor-
mation publicly, just as it would anyone else.296 
National security whistleblowers upset this arrangement because 
they potentially circumvent these statutory procedures. They might 
give classified information to congressional aides who do not have 
appropriate clearance or to congressional members who do not sit on 
the applicable committees entitled to the information under the Secu-
rity Act. Moreover, the executive branch traditionally has controlled 
when and how it conducts such security briefings, procedures under-
mined by an unauthorized whistle blower. National security whistle-
blowers run into even greater problems if they disclose classified in-
formation publicly (as opposed to Congress), because such disclosure 
could subject them to employment sanctions, such as dismissal,297 to 
civil penalties, and in some cases make them criminally liable under 
statutes like the Espionage Act.298 
Thus, whenever Congress insisted on receiving national security 
information from executive branch employees directly, without con-
trol by executive branch officials, Presidents have raised separation of 
powers objections. For example, in 1996, the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) concluded that separation of powers principles prevented 
Congress from providing executive branch employees a "right" to 
disclose national security information to Congress or anyone else, 
which in the Administration's view nullified the Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act. 299 As noted in the OLC's memo on this topic, 
the President's role as Commander in Chief, head of the Executive 
Branch, and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations re-
quire that he have ultimate and unimpeded authority over the col-
lection, retention and dissemination of intelligence and other na-
tional security information in the Executive Branch. There is no 
exception to this principle for those disseminations that would be 
made to Congress or its members.3°O 
296. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After 
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1545 (2008). 
297. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 5.5, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (stating that violating 
government security regulations may result in "reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, 
termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other 
sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation"). 
298. See ELSEA, supra note 281, at 11; Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1536-37. 
299. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1239-40. 
300. Memorandum from Christopher H. Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael J. O'Neil, General Counsel, CIA (Nov. 26,1996), quoted in 
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Congress, of course, often disagrees, as in 1997 when it passed an 
Intelligence Authorization bill with a section stating that "[i]t is the 
sense of Congress that Members of Congress have equal standing 
with officials of the Executive Branch to receive classified infor-
mation so that Congress may carry out its oversight responsibilities 
under the Constitution.,,301 Other experts, such as Dr. Louis Fisher, 
the Senior Specialist on Separation of Powers from the Congressional 
Research Service, agree with Congress because the Constitution does 
not explicitly provide for how national security information should be 
regulated.302 Instead, both Congress and the President have implied 
powers related to national security, which means that they "share 
constitutional authority to regulate national security information.,,303 
Like his predecessors, President Obama used separation of pow-
ers arguments to justify keeping from Congress secrets related to na-
tional security. His Administration objected to congressional pro-
posals to require the executive branch to give certain information 
related to national security to the full congressional intelligence 
committees, which would change the current requirement to notify 
only the so-called "Gang of Eight" Congressional leaders from both 
parties.304 Moreover, Obama threatened to veto a revised proposal 
that would give only generalized information to the intelligence 
committees, such as informing the committees that more details were 
provided to the Gang of Eight.30S 
Obama's Administration also cited separation of powers con-
cerns when testifying to the House of Representatives about the 
WPEA, which would have provided substantial new rights to national 
security whistleblowers, telling the committee that, although the Ad-
ministration supported whistleblower rights generally, "we must pre-
serve the President's constitutional responsibility with regard to the 
security of national security information.,,306 The provisions of the 
Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1240. 
30l. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-107, § 306, 
111 Stat. 2248, 2252 (1997), quoted in Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1241-42 n.17; see also 
FISHER, supra note 246, at 41 ("Congress has never accepted the theory that the President has 
exclusive, ultimate, and unimpeded authority over the collection, retention, and dissemination 
of national security information."). 
302. S. REP. No. 105-165, at 4-5 (1998) quoted in Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1243. 
303. Id.; see also Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 153 (arguing that the constitution-
al powers granted to Congress and the President are "independent but concurrent efforts by the 
respective branches on behalf of national security interests"). 
304. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 519. 
305. See id. 
306. De House Statement, supra note 195, at 3. 
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WPEA that would have permitted federal employees to reveal classi-
fied information when they believed it related to wrongdoing "would 
unconstitutionally restrict the ability of the President to protect from 
disclosure information that would harm national security. ,,307 
As a result of the heightened separation of powers concerns re-
garding national security, the law affecting whistleblowers who dis-
close problems related to national security differs dramatically from 
the law for other types of whistleblowers. National security employ-
ees receive limited antiretaliation protection and may disclose only a 
narrow range of wrongdoing to a restricted group of individuals.30B 
2. Limited Antiretaliation Protection 
The most obvious difference between antiretaliation protection 
for national security whistleblowers and other whistle blowers relates 
to the coverage of the WP A. Specifically, the WPA does not protect 
employees of agencies related to national security, such as the FBI, 
the CIA, and the National Security Agency.309 The Act also exempts 
from coverage employees who possess classified information or, even 
more broadly, who work in government agencies that likely deal with 
national security whether or not they handle classified information.310 
Whether they blow the whistle on national security issues or some-
thing more mundane, like gross mismanagement, these employees do 
not receive the WPA-provided right to investigation by the Office of 
Special Counsel and adjudication in front of the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board, an independent agency outside of their home agency. 
Moreover, even employees covered by the WPA who disclose in-
307. See id. at 8. 
308. This section will describe generally the whistleblower provisions related to national 
security. For a more detailed description of the variety of laws affecting national security whis-
tleblowers, please refer to FISHER, supra note 246, GOODMAN, ET AL., supra note 187, Vladeck, 
supra note 296, and Melissa Khemani, The Protection of National Security Whistleblowers: Im-
perative but Impossible: A Critical Appraisal of the Scope and Adequacy of Whistleblower Pro-
tection Laws for National Security Whistleblowers (May 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1412112>. 
309. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (excluding from WPA coverage "the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and, as determined by 
the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the con-
duct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities"). 
310. In particular, the Act excludes employees in positions that are "excepted from the 
competitive service because of its confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-
advocating character" or "based on a determination by the President that it is necessary and 
warranted by conditions of good Administration." [d. § 2303(a)(2)(B). Note that these excep-
tions explicitly do not include employees of the Department of Homeland Security or the De-
partment of Energy. 
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formation related to national security may not find much protection 
because the WP A limits disclosures about classified information by 
not protecting disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" or "specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.,,311 Typically, this 
means information designated as "classified" by Executive Order and 
prohibited by statute from being revealed publicly.312 Employees can 
make these types of disclosures only to an IG or the Office of Special 
Counsel,313 or perhaps Congress if the Congressional member receiv-
ing the information sits on the appropriate committee.314 The legisla-
tive history of the CSRA and the WP A provide some evidence that 
Congress never intended to protect whistleblowers "who disclose in-
formation which is classified or prohibited by statute from disclo-
sure. ,,315 Also, the WP A does not prohibit revocation of an employ-
ee's security clearance, which almost certainly would be revoked once 
an executive branch agency discovered the employee's whistle blow-
ing. 316 Because many jobs require a certain security clearance, revok-
ing a clearance often equates to a dismissal and leaves the employee 
with no protection from retaliation.317 
Some national security whistleblowers may receive antiretalia-
tion protections from other statutes and regulations; however they of-
ten provide protections inferior to those provided by the WP A to 
non-national security whistleblowers. For example, FBI employees 
who disclose misconduce18 to various entities within the DOt19 may 
311. See id. § 2302(b )(8)(A) 
312. See Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1537 (noting that the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) 
(2006), prohibits giving classified national security information "to any person not entitled to 
receive it"). 
313. See 5 U.S.c. § 2302(b)(8)(B). 
314. See id. § 2302(b )(8) ("This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withhold-
ing of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee 
who discloses information to the Congress."). 
315. FISHER, supra note 246, at 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-969, at 9 (1978» (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
316. See Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Egan does not address 
this issue because Congress amended the Civil Service Reform Act, upon which Egan was 
based, in 1989 and 1994, and the Hesse court considered whether Congress had "specifically" 
addressed the security clearance issue in those amendments, finding that it did not. See id. at 
1377-80. 
317. See S. REP. NO. 111-101, at 34 (2009) ("The effective result of the removal of an em-
ployee's security clearance or the denial of access to classified information typically is employ-
ment termination."); ELSEA, supra note 281, at 11. 
318. The types of disclosures protected by this provision mirror the WPA's protected disclo-
sures. See 5 U.S.c. § 2303(a) (2006). 
319. The disclosures must be made to the Department's Office of Professional Responsibil-
ity, thc IG, the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, the FBI Inspection Division Internal 
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bring a claim through an internal administrative process if they suffer 
retaliation because of the disclosure.32o An administrative office within 
DOJ conducts an investigation of reprisal claims,321 and the Director 
of the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (also located 
within DOJ) may conduct a hearing and award remedies if the em-
ployee demonstrates retaliation.322 The Deputy Attorney General 
may review the Director's decision, but the regulations implementing 
the Act do not permit an appeal to court or even the Office of Special 
Counsel. 323 Although the standards utilized under the FBI's proce-
dures appear similar to the WP A's standards, the entirely internal 
process can be problematic because of the lack of independence from 
the process's decision makers. 324 Moreover, the FBI provisions protect 
only disclosures made within the DOJ; an FBI agent who reports 
problems to Congress or the public will not receive protection from 
retaliation.325 
The Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWP A)326 provides 
similarly limited protections by prohibiting retaliation against mem-
bers of the military for lawful communications with Congress or an 
IG327 as well as for making certain, defined protected disclosures with-
in the military hierarchy.328 As with the FBI protections, an internal 
administrative process adjudicates claims of retaliation, ultimately 
concluding with review by the Secretary of Defense.329 The process 
remains entirely internal, and the Act also permits the Secretary of 
Investigations Section, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the FBI Director 
or Deputy Director, or the highest ranking official in an FBI field office. See Whistleblower Pro-
tection for Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, 28 C.F.R. § 27.1(a) (2011). 
320. Although a statute authorizes the FBI protections, see 5 U.S.C. § 2303, administrative 
regulations detail the procedure and substantive remedies, see 28 C.F.R. Part 27 (2011). 
321. See 28 C.F.R. § 27.3 (2011). 
322. See id. § 27.4. 
323. See id. § 27.5. 
324. But see Valerie Caproni, Panel: The Role of Whistleblowers to Facilitate Government 
Accountability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2008) (arguing that the procedures offer a "fairly 
robust regulatory scheme to protect whistleblowers within the FBI"). 
325. See 28 C.F.R. § 27.1(a) (defining protected disclosure). While I call this process prob-
lematic, it did not trouble Valerie Caproni, the FBI's General Counsel in 2008, because "[t]here 
are enough options [for disclosure] that no employee should feel he or she is in the position of 
knowing horrible secrets of criminality and have no place to turn." Caproni, supra note 324, at 
1245-46. Moreover, Ms. Caproni asserted that the DOJ will consider a disclosure made directly 
to Congress as "protected," even though it "thwarts the statutory scheme." ld. at 1248. The reg-
ulations, however, do not appear to require this position. 
326. See 10 U.S.c. § 1034 (2006). 
327. See id. § 1034(b)(1)(A). 
328. See id. §§ 1034(b)(1)(B); 1034(c)(2) (defining protected disclosure similarly to the 
WPA). 
329. See id. §§ 1034(c)-(g). 
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Defense to restrict IG investigations in certain intelligence and na-
tional security matters.330 That said, the Department of Defense regu-
lations adopt the whistleblower-friendly standards of the WP A and 
also improve upon the WP A's standards in one important respect: 
they permit a remedy for retaliation related to security clearances.331 
Like many of the whistle blower protections detailed here, the 
MWPA arose out of a separation of powers dispute. In 1954, Presi-
dent Eisenhower refused to permit Defense Department employees 
to testify to Congress about conversations between executive branch 
employees.332 The Attorney General and the DO] issued legal memo-
randa claiming the Constitution permits the President to withhold in-
formation from Congress in the public interest.333 Congress com-
plained that the President was forcing Congress to "rely upon spoon-
fed information from the President.,,334 Ultimately, Congress passed 
the MWPA declaring that "No person may restrict any member of an 
armed force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the 
communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the 
security of the United States,,,335 and subsequently added antiretalia-
tion protections in 1988.336 
Finally, national security whistleblowers likely have less protec-
tion under the First Amendment than other government employees. 
Garcetti v. Ceballoi37 held that the First Amendment does not protect 
government employees who speak out publicly "pursuant to their of-
ficial duties. ,,338 Importantly, the Court also stated that "[ r ]estricting 
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional re-
sponsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have 
enjoyed as a private citizen.,,339 Based on this statement, Professor 
Stephen Vladeck and others concluded that this likely means that the 
First Amendment does not protect national security employees who 
disclose classified information, even if about a matter of public con-
330. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § S(b)(2) (2006). 
331. Dep't of Defense 5200.2-R, Dept of Defense Personnel Security Program, Subsection 
DLl.1.30. 
332. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 22-23. 
333. See id. 
334. See id. at 23 (quoting CQ Almanac 740 (1956» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
335. 70A Stat. SO (1956) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.c. § 1034 (2006». 
336. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 23. 
337. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
33S. Id. at 421. 
339. Id. at 421-22. 
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340 As Vladeck noted, 
Garcetti also appears to preclude First Amendment protections for 
any speech made by a government employee that would not have 
been possible if he were not a government employee, even if the 
speech itself is not made as part of the employee's official duties. 
Where classified national security information is concerned, 
the stopping point of this logic is immediately clear: National secu-
rity secrets are, by definition, information to which the average pri-
vate citizen does not have access. Speech related to national securi-
ty secrets, then, would seem to fall squarely within the category of 
speech Justice Kennedy identified in Garcetti as falling outside the 
First Amendment's umbrella.341 
105 
Construing Garcetti more narrowly might permit a national security 
whistleblower to blow the whistle as a citizen, by disclosing infor-
mation to the public, such as through the media. However, Vladeck 
also relied on a 2007 D.C. Circuit opinion to point out that courts will 
be unlikely to uphold First Amendment protection for a disclosure 
made with knowledge that "it was unlawfully obtained or leaked.,,342 
Although a full analysis of Garcetti's impact on the First Amendment 
rights of national security whistleblowers is beyond the scope of this 
Article,343 at a minimum it would appear difficult for a national securi-
ty whistle blower to claim constitutional protection for revealing clas-
sified information. 
In sum, with constitutional protection questionable, retaliation 
protection for national security whistleblowers depends greatly upon 
the governmental agency for which one works. In the few agencies 
where statutes and regulations provide some protection, they rarely 
permit claims to be made outside of the employee's own agency or to 
be reviewed by a third-party, such as an independent board or a 
court. Moreover, the protections only extend to "lawful" disclosures 
of information, which because of the nature of the classification re-
340. See Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1540; see also Lee, supra note 170, at 1473 (concluding 
that "insiders" who leak information will have little protection from the First Amendment); Ja-
mie Sasser, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Work-
ing in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV 759, 760 (2007) (reaching same conclusion as Vla-
deck). 
341. Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1540. 
342. See id. at 1540 n.50 (citing Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 
2007)). 
343. Whether the First Amendment would protect a national security whistleblower is a top-
ic that deserves its own article, which others have written. See id. at 1540 (concluding that First 
Amendment would not protect national security whistleblowers after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006)); see also Lee, supra note 170, at 1473 (concluding that "insiders" who leak in-
formation will have little protection from First Amendment); Sasser, supra note 340, at 760 
(reaching same conclusion). 
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strictions, do not permit national security whistleblowers to disclose 
misconduct related to classified information to most members of 
Congress or to the media. 
3. Structural Disclosure Channels 
To counterbalance this inferior antiretaliation protection and in 
order to have some oversight over the executive branch, Congress 
developed a variety of structural channels that whistleblowers can use 
to disclose misconduct. These channels permit some reporting inter-
nally to other executive branch officials or entities, and in one limited 
circumstance, to Congress. However, these channels neither give na-
tional security whistle blowers an unrestricted right to report to Con-
gress nor permit them to disclose information to the general public. 
The WP A provides a disclosure channel for employees to report 
misconduct to the Office of Special Counse1.344 Typically, the OSC 
provides these reports to agency heads, who must then respond to the 
allegations with a written report that ultimately will be sent to the 
President and appropriate members of Congress.345 The law, however, 
specifically exempts reports involving foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence information, if the law or an Executive Order specifically 
prohibits the disclosure.346 The OSC will send those restricted disclo-
sures to the National Security Advisor and to Congressional intelli-
gence committees, which ends the OSC's involvement in investigating 
the disclosure.347 
In Part lILA., supra, I discussed the Inspector General Act of 
1978, which provides a person within each agency to receive disclo-
sures about the same types of information protected by the WPA: "a 
violation of law, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste 
of funds, abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to the 
public health and safety. ,,348 After investigating, the IG must report 
violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General,349 and "se-
rious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the Ad-
ministration of programs and operations of such establishment" to 
the agency head, who must report them to Congress within seven 
344. See 5 U.S.c. § 1213 (2006). 
345. See id. §§ 1213(c); (d); (c). 
346. See id. § 1213(j). 
347. See id. 
348. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 7(a) (2006). 
349. See id. § 4( d). 
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days.35o Congress later instituted statutory IGs for the CIA35l and the 
Department of Defense.352 In 2010, Congress implemented an over-
arching IG for the entire intelligence community, charged with coor-
dinating the IGs of each individual intelligence agency as well as con-
ducting its own investigations.353 
These various IG statutes, however, do not address some specific 
issues with regard to whistleblowing by members of the intelligence 
community. As with the WP A, for example, the IG Acts specifically 
exclude public disclosure of any information prohibited by law, such 
as classified information.354 Moreover, although the IGs must provide 
semiannual reports to Congress and publicly/55 nothing in the IG Acts 
provide executive branch employees the right to go directly to Con-
gress, or to the public generally, with concerns about misconduct. In 
fact, the Act appears to permit the President or the head of an agency 
to refuse to provide classified information to Congress under the 
claim of executive privilege.356 The IG Act -for the Department of De-
fense makes this privilege clear by placing the IG under the "authori-
ty, direction, and control" of the Secretary of Defense when the IG 
engages in an investigation requiring access to information "the dis-
closure of which would constitute a serious threat to national securi-
ty.,,357 Furthermore, although sound in theory, the IG system does not 
completely eliminate the inherent conflict of the executive branch re-
viewing retaliation claims by its own employees, because a President 
or an agency head actually appoints, supervises, evaluates and can fire 
IGs.358 After the initial IG Act passed, the most glaring problem with 
the IG system from Congress' perspective, however, could have been 
350. See id. § 5( d). 
351. See 50 U.S.c. § 403q (2006). 
352. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 8 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1257. 
353. See The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 
405,124 Stat. 2654 «codified at 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h (Supp. IV 2010». 
354. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 5(e)(1). 
355. See id. § 5(a) (Congress); § 5(c) (public). The CIA IG must provide a classified report 
to Congress. See 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(1). 
356. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1258-59. 
357. See 5 U.S.c. § 8(b)(1)(E) (2006). The Act also gives this same control when the investi-
gation requires access to "sensitive operational plans," "intelligence matters," "counterintelli-
gence matters," and "ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the De-
partment of Defense related to national security." See id. §§ 8(b)(1)(A)-(D). The Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which was amended to add a statutory IG for the CIA, has a 
similar provision permitting the Director of the CIA to prohibit an IG investigation when the 
"prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests." 50 U.S.c. § 403q(b)(3). A 
similar provision restricts the new IG for the Intelligence Community. See 50 U.S.c. § 403-
3h(f)(1). 
358. See PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, supra note 31, at 7. 
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that, for some reason, the intelligence agency IGs simply did not use 
the "serious or flagrant" process, and Congress was not getting the in-
formation it needed from front-line intelligence agency employees.359 
To address these limitations, Congress passed the Intelligence 
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA),360 which 
provides a way for national security whistleblowers to report miscon-
duct related to an "urgent concern." (Because the new Intelligence 
Community IG statute contains identical provisions/61 for conven-
ience, I will refer to them collectively as the ICWP A.) These statutes 
define an "urgent concern" as 
(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Exec-
utive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or 
operations of an intelligence activity involving classified infor-
mation, but does not include differences of opinions concerning 
public policy matters; (B) A false statement to Congress, or a will-
ful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating 
to the funding, Administration, or operation of an intelligence ac-
tivity; (C) An action, including a personnel action described in sec-
tion 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, constituting re-
prisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (7)( c) in 
response to an emplo~ee's reporting an urgent concern in accord-
ance with this section. 02 
Before reporting this urgent concern to Congress, an employee of the 
intelligence community363 must disclose the information to the agen-
cy's IG or to the Intelligence Community IG. The IG must investigate 
an "urgent concern" report within fourteen days, determine whether 
it is credible, and if it is, give the information to the head of the agen-
cy or the Director of National Intelligence,364 who must give it to Con-
gress within seven days.365 Importantly, the ICWPA permits the em-
ployee to report to Congress directly if the IG does not find the 
employee's report credible or does not provide it to the agency head 
359. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1256 n.61 (quoting a letter from Representative Por-
ter Goss to the heads of the intelligence agencies in which Goss makes this assertion). 
360. See The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 
701, 112 Stat. 2396 (199S) (containing the ICWPA, codified at 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § SH); id. § 702 
(containing an identical provision applicable to the CIA and codified at 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(5». 
361. See 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(k)(5). 
362. 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § SH(h)(l). 
363. The ICWPA covers a wide variety of intelligence agencies, including the CIA, the De-
partment of Defense, the FBI, and those designated by the President as having its principal 
function conducting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. See 5 U.S.c. app. 3 § 
SH(a)(l). 
364. See id. § SH(b). 
365. See id. § SH(c). 
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accurately.366 However, in that instance, the employee must tell the 
agency head about the employee's plan to report to Congress, the 
employee must follow any instruction from the agency head on how 
to contact Congress "in accordance with appropriate security practic-
es," and the employee may only give the information to Congression-
al intelligence committees.367 
Interestingly, these acts give the appearance of protecting from 
retaliation employees who report to an IG. For example, the Inspec-
tor General Act of 1978 states that no one shall "take or threaten to 
take any action against any employee as a reprisal for making a com-
plaint or disclosing information to an IG, unless the complaint was 
made or the information disclosed with the knowledge that it was 
false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.,,368 Identical pro-
visions appear in the CIA IG provision369 and in the new IG act for 
the Intelligence Community.370 However, despite such prohibitions, 
these Acts do not appear to permit employees to file a grievance or a 
cause of action for such retaliation, which obviously limits the protec-
tions' effectiveness. 
The ICWP A and the Inspectors General process differ greatly 
from the whistleblower provisions available to non-security employ-
ees under the WPA. Most obviously, they do not provide any sub-
stantive protection from retaliation, which likely reduces an employ-
ee's willingness to disclose wrongdoing and therefore gives the 
President almost unchecked authority to keep national security in-
formation secret from Congress. Moreover, the ICWPA only ad-
dresses misconduct that meets the definition of an "urgent concern," 
meaning that Congress likely will not hear from intelligence commu-
nity employees regarding matters that, although important, do not 
rise to the level of an "urgent concern.,,371 Further, under the WP A, 
any covered executive branch employee can make a protected disclo-
sure to anyone in Congress, while the disclosure options for national 
security whistleblowers are much more restricted. These differences 
relate specifically to the separation of powers concerns discussed 
above. 
For example, when negotiating the passage of the ICWP A, the 
366. See id. § 8H(d)(1). 
367. ld. § 8H(d)(2). 
368. ld. § 7(c). 
369. See 50 U.S.C. § 403q(e)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
370. See id. § 403-3h(g)(3)(B). 
371. See Sasser, supra note 340, at 784. 
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legislative and executive branches disagreed on whether the act 
should include a "holdback provision," allowing IGs and agency 
heads to keep whistle blower information from Congress in extraordi-
nary circumstances to "protect vital law enforcement, foreign affairs, 
or national security interests.,,372 Similarly to the debate in 1978 over 
the IG Act,373 the Clinton Administration in 1998 asserted that the 
presidential privilege required a holdback provision.374 Congress de-
murred and chose to leave such extraordinary circumstances to be re-
solved on a case-by-case basis "through personal communication" be-
tween agency heads and congressionalleaders.375 
Yet, even this compromise was laced with indications that each 
branch maintained its constitutional authority of either oversight, in 
the case of Congress, or secrecy, in the case of the President. In its 
legislative findings, Congress specified that the Constitution required 
it to "serve as a check on the executive branch," with the responsibil-
ity to find out about wrongdoing in the executive branch generally 
and in the intelligence community more specifically.376 It further de-
clared that "no basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization of 
disclosures" by the executive branch before an employee could report 
misconduct to Congress.377 In contrast, President Clinton issued a 
statement when he signed the bill noting that the" Act does not con-
strain my constitutional authority to review and, if appropriate, con-
trol disclosure of certain classified information to Congress .... The 
Constitution vests the President with the authority to control disclo-
sure of information when necessary for the discharge of his constitu-
tional responsibilities.,,378 In other words, as Thomas Newcomb noted, 
Congress labeled this compromise "comity," while the President la-
beled it a constitutional prerogative.379 
Not surprisingly, the separation of powers issue played a role 
when Congress recommended the creation of an IG for all of the 
372. Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1262 (quoting H.R. 3829, 105th Congo § 2(a)(E) (1998» 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 263-68. 
374. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1262. 
375. See id. at 1264 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-747, at 14 (1998» (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
376. See Pub. L. No. 105-272, title VII, § 701(b), 112 Stat. 2413 (1998). 
377. See id. 
378. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999, Oct. 20, 1998, available at Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55116>. 
379. See Newcomb, supra note 262, at 1265-67. 
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combined intelligence agencies, with reporting requirements similar 
to the ICWP A. Similar to President Clinton's reaction to the ICWP A, 
President Obama objected to reporting requirements imposed upon 
the new 10 and the Director of National Intelligence based on the 
same constitutional grounds that President Clinton objected to with 
the ICWP A. 380 Obama not only specifically referenced President Clin-
ton's signing statement for the ICWPA, but also he repeated that he 
did not view the disclosure requirements as mandating "disclosure of 
privileged or otherwise confidential law enforcement information.,,381 
The Obama Administration stated that while it supported expansion 
of retaliation protections for intelligence community whistleblowers, 
it also did not want any bill interpreted "to constrain the President's 
constitutional authority to review and, if appropriate, control disclo-
sure of certain classified information. ,,382 The Obama Administration 
stated that it preferred to work out a compromise with Congress on 
protections for intelligence community whistleblowers through the 
WPEA in order to address "constitutional and other concerns. ,,383 
In sum, for national security whistle blowers, the law's balance 
weighs in favor of secrecy. National security whistleblowers receive 
less robust protections and have fewer ways to report misconduct 
than other types of whistleblowers. The distinction President Obama 
and the law make among whistleblowers is based on the separation of 
powers tension between oversight and transparency on the one hand 
and secrecy on the other. Congress wants to encourage employees to 
disclose governmental misconduct related to national security, while 
Presidents want to keep vital national security information secret, 
even from Congress. National security whistleblowers are caught in 
this crossfire. 
IV. PROVIDING A BEITER BALANCE 
The contradictions and tensions of secrecy are never stronger than 
in the military stance of nations. 
Sissela Bok (1982/84 
380. See supra discussion accompanying notes 372-78; Barack Obama, Statement on Signing 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Oct. 7, 2010, available at Gerhard Pe-
ters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, <http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/wsl?pid=88549> (referring specifically to President Clinton's signing statement). 
381. See Obama, supra note 380. 
382. See Clark, supra note 252, at 326 (2010) (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra 
note 252, at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
383. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 252, at 2. 
384. BOK, supra note 12, at 191. 
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The answer to the second question I posed at the beginning of 
the Article - does Obama's distinction make sense? - depends on 
how one views the inevitable tradeoff society must make between se-
crecy and transparency in government. As Steven Aftergood, a prom-
inent researcher on secrecy policy for the Federation of American 
Scientists, asserted, Americans "seem to be of two minds about secre-
cy. ,,385 On the one hand, a democracy abhors secrecy - to govern our-
selves and hold elected leaders accountable, we must have access to 
information.386 On the other hand, government needs some secrecy to 
function wel1.387 For example, the Supreme Court concluded that 
some confidentiality assists a President in receiving good advice from 
advisors, and the importance of such secrecy "is too plain to require 
further discussion.,,388 The Court went so far as to say that this confi-
dentiality privilege for the Chief Executive "is fundamental to the op-
eration of Government, and inextricably rooted in the separation of 
powers under the Constitution. ,,389 Others have noted the "ever-
delicate balance" between transparency and secrecy,390 for as Profes-
sor Heidi Kitrosser observed, "[i]t is hardly news that secrecy has 
costs and benefits. ,,391 
Society seems particularly willing to accept secrecy when it re-
lates to national security. Aftergood asserted that "there is a near 
universal consensus that some measure of secrecy is justified and nec-
essary to protect authorized national security activities, such as intel-
ligence gathering and military operations. ,,392 Sisse1a Bok, a noted se-
385. Steven Aftergood, National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change, 77 SOc. RES. 839, 
839 (2010). 
386. See id. at 839; see also Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 132 ("The public's 'right 
to know' has always been a basic tenet of American political theory."). 
387. See BOK, supra note 12, at 174 ("[G]overnment secrecy is not always an evil. Among 
the many kinds of information that modern governments obtain, store, and generate, there are 
some that nearly all would agree to protect from full publicity [such as] personnel files ... tenta-
t.ive drafts circulated for discussion within an agency ... or sensitive explorations of changes in 
monetary policy ... "). 
388. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); see also id. ("Human experience 
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor 
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmak-
ing process."). 
389. Id. at 708. 
390. Sulmasy, supra note 253, at 1229. 
391. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1064; see generally BOK, supra note 12. 
392. See Aftergood, supra note 385, at 839; see also Ryan M. Check & Afsheen John Rad-
san, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA's Inspector General, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'y 
247,247 (2010) ("Gathering intelligence and conducting covert action, by their nature, depend 
on secrecy."); Suhnasy, supra note 253, at 1232 ("An acceptance of greater government secrecy 
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crecy scholar, concluded that "every state requires a measure of se-
crecy in order to defend itself against enemy forces. The legitimacy of 
such secrecy in self-defense is clear-cut.,,393 
Indeed, in United States v. Nixon,394 although the Supreme Court 
determined that a President must respond to a subpoena in a criminal 
case requesting generalized information, the Court indicated the ex-
ecutive confidentiality privilege might require a different result if the 
issue related to military or diplomatic secrets.395 In a separate case, the 
Court upheld a state secrets privilege that permitted the executive 
branch to refuse to provide information in a case after showing that 
"compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in 
the interest of national security, should not be divulged.,,396 Professor 
Kitrosser noted that secrecy's costs and benefits become amplified in 
the national security context because "they often consist not only of 
competing values (e.g., democratic openness versus national security) 
but also of competing means of achieving the same value (e.g., na-
tional security through openness versus national security through se-
crecy). ,,397 
Yet, even in this context, too much secrecy can occur. Bok ar-
gued that many levels of secrecy undermined the failed helicopter 
rescue of the hostages in Iran in 1980, including keeping the final de-
cision secret from those in the Carter Administration who thought it 
was too risky to proceed.398 Thus, "secrecy directed against military 
opponents can also come to distort domestic choices . . . [and] can 
cause reasoning and planning to go astray.,,399 More recently, the 9/11 
Commission blamed excessive secrecy for leaving the country vulner-
able to attack, because various government agencies' insistence on se-
is a tacit part of the decision making when any democratic nation commits to engage in armed 
conflict. "). 
393. BOK, supra note 12, at 191. Bok also recognized several problems with military secrecy, 
arguing that "secrecy is as often a weapon in the hands of the aggressors and an aid in every 
scheme of oppression." Id. 
394. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
395. See id. at 710 (noting this distinction and asserting that "courts have traditionally shown 
thc utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities"). The Court hinted that if the information 
related to "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets," it might not even require 
the President to produce the information for a court's in camera review. See id. at 706. 
396. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
397. Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1064; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Panel: Secrecy and Bar-
riers to Open Government, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1234, 1238 (2008) ("The need for Executive 
Branch secrecy is greatest when foreign policy and national security issues are implicated."). 
398. See BOK, supra note 12, at 195-96. 
399. Id. at 196. 
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crecy led to a lack of inter-agency communication.4oo Secrecy, even in 
the intelligence community, can undermine accountability ,401 particu-
larly the executive branch's accountability to the legislative and judi-
cial branches. Ultimately, for example, Professor Kitrosser argued for 
more transparency and less secrecy, noting that "national security 
based secrecy needs are dramatically overstated" and that secrecy en-
courages "poorly informed and under-vetted decision-making.,,402 
Inevitably, this balancing becomes context-specific. Everyone 
likely understands the absolute necessity to have kept secret the op-
eration that found Osama bin Laden in May 2011 in order to catch 
him by surprise.403 But, fewer people would support classifying docu-
ments to hide illegal or embarrassing conduct, particularly if the con-
duct has only a tangential relationship to national security.404 Interest-
ingly, whistleblowing in the national security context squarely 
presents the issue of how best to balance our desire for transparency 
with our need for secrecy. 
A. The National Security Whistleblowing Dilemma 
An intelligence community employee who leaked information 
about the bin Laden operation ahead of time would rightly face se-
vere public criticism and likely criminal prosecution, while the same 
employee blowing the whistle on government corruption in the FBI 
might receive societal praise.405 But, examples in the middle of these 
extremes present problems. What about the whistleblower who ex-
400. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 417 (2004) ("Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive 
compartmentation of information among agencies."). 
401. Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 247. 
402. Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1066. 
403. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et. al., Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
2011, at AI. 
404. C[. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7,75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010) (prohibiting the classi-
fication of information as secret in order to "prevent embarrassment" or to "prevent or delay 
the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of the national securi-
ty"). 
405. The Deep Throat source for the revelations about Nixon and the Watergate scandal 
may be a good example of this latter proposition. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB 
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); see also Susan Page & Mark Memmott, 
"Deep Throat" Was Ultimate Whistleblower to Some, USA TODAY, May 31, 2005, at 4A (noting 
that, although some criticized Mark Felt, who was revealed as Deep Throat, others considered 
him to be the "ultimate whistleblower, a man who saw wrongdoing and exposed it at risk to his 
own career"), available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-05-31-deep-throat-
inside_x.htm>. Notably, TIME magazine named an FBI whistleblower, Colleen Rowley, a "Per-
son of the Year," for trying to reveal government bumbling before 9/11. See Richard Lacayo & 
Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 31. 
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poses a government program that is illegal but also one that effective-
ly protects national security? Or one who publicizes wasteful military 
spending, but also discloses important military intelligence in the pro-
cess? Answering how best to balance secrecy and transparency to en-
courage the right type of whistleblowing but to discourage leaks 
harmful to national security becomes extremely difficult.406 
In many ways, good reasons exist to support Obama's distinction 
and treat disclosures related to national security information differ-
ently than other types of disclosures. Just as the issue of national se-
curity might make us willing to accept a higher level of governmental 
secrecy,' even a whistleblower advocate might also be willing to accept 
more limited antiretaliation protection for government employees 
who reveal national security information. The easiest cases would in-
volve leaks of classified information that have little to do with gov-
ernment misconduct. Some might not consider such leakers to be 
"whistleblowers" deserving protection because, as a definitional mat-
ter, a whistleblower believes he or she is revealing illegal, unethical, 
or improper misconduct in the public interest.407 For example, the 
1998 revelation in the media that the U.S. was tracking Osama bin 
Laden's satellite phone arguably caused bin Laden to stop using the 
phone, which of course made him harder to follow and did not reveal 
any governmental misconduct.408 Similarly, the U.S. classified docu-
ments revealed to WikiLeaks provide some embarrassing and often 
scandalous information, but they revealed arguably little in the way of 
illegal government conduct.409 For example, the State Department ca-
bles released by WikiLeaks revealed that Muammar Gaddafi enjoyed 
the company of "four blond Ukrainian nurses" and that a U.S. diplo-
406. Cf BOK, supra note 12, at 202 (concluding that the question of whether "informed de-
bate and government accountability" can survive in the national security context to be "the 
most difficult of all those that secrecy raises"). 
407. See Randy Borum et aI., The Psychology of "Leaking" Sensitive Information: Implica-
tion for Homeland Security, 1 HOMELAND SEC. REV. 97, 97 (2006); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. 
Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: the Case of Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1,4 (1985) 
(defining whistleblowing as involving the reporting of "illegal, immoral, or illegitimate" behav-
ior). 
408. See Porter Goss, Loose Lips Sink Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,2006, at A25 ("The [bin 
Laden disclosure] was, without question, one of the most egregious examples of an unauthor-
ized criminal disclosure of classified national defense information in recent years. It served no 
public interest. "). 
409. See Ginger Thompson, Competing Portraits in WikiLeaks Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2011, at A15 (noting that Manning's lawyers argued in court that none of the leaked information 
damaged national security). But see infra text accompanying notes 425-26 (describing some ar-
guably illegal conduct). 
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mat called North Korea's former President Kim Jong Ii "flabby.,,410 
Although serving no interest other than being "anti-secrecy," 
disclosures like these could damage diplomatic relationships and un-
dermine U.S. government initiatives internationally. In addition to 
petty disclosures, the State Department cables published by Wik-
iLeaks revealed that Arab countries have requested that the U.S. at-
tack Iran's nuclear facilities, even though those countries publicly 
promote their relationship with Iran.411 These cables did not reveal 
any U.S. misconduct and could be damaging because they disclosed 
behind-the-scenes communications that differ from some countries' 
public stances.4!2 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that publish-
ing the WikiLeaks' cables "puts people's lives in danger, threatens na-
tional security and undermines our efforts to work with other coun-
tries to solve shared problems.,,413 Such leaks may make the 
government more transparent, but they hurt national security without 
serving any other public interest, such as exposing misconduct. 
Yet, even when whistleblowers reveal purported wrongdoing, 
treating national security whistle blowing differently than other types 
of whistleblowing may make sense as well. National security whistle-
blowers might disclose damaging information and be wrong about its 
illegality because national security issues often present nuanced and 
complicated problems.414 For example, a Department of Defense em-
ployee could release classified information to a reporter about mili-
tary action he incorrectly believed to be illegal, endangering people's 
lives and exposing weaknesses that could be exploited by our ene-
mies. Such disclosures cause greater harm than the typical whistle-
410. See Massimo Calabresi, The War on Secrecy, TIME, Dec. 13, 2010, at 30, available at 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0.9171.2034488.00.html> . 
411. See id. 
412. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980) (noting that revealing even unclas-
sified information can harm national interests because "[i]n addition to receiving intelligence 
from domestically based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelli-
gence services of friendly nations and from agents operating in foreign countries. The continued 
availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of 
information that might compromise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign 
agents"). 
413. Calabresi, supra note 410. By contrast, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated, "Is this 
embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly 
modest." Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 409 (noting that Manning's lawyers argued in court 
that none of the leaked information damaged national security). 
414. Cf. Richard J. Barnet, 111e Ideology of the National Security State, 26 MASS. REV. 483, 
495 (1985) (noting that the topic of national security is "amorphous and seemingly complex"), 
quoted in Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn't Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 95 
(2011). 
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blower disclosure related to financial matters or mismanagement, 
without creating any offsetting public good by revealing any actual 
misconduct.415 
This ambiguity may be compounded because the dangers of the 
disclosure and the legality of conduct disclosed may not be clear when 
the information is disclosed. As discussed above, Jeffrey Sterling al-
legedly told James Risen about government waste and mismanage-
ment in an intelligence program focused on Iran.416 The government 
asserted that Sterling's alleged leak involved the disclosure of a hu-
man asset, which "placed at risk our national security and the life of 
an individual working on a classified mission," according to Assistant 
Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer.417 On the other hand, Sterling's 
defenders argue that it involved information about an out-of-date 
botched undercover mission that did nothing damaging except em-
barrass the government.418 In fact, by the time Risen published the 
book that included information allegedly from Sterling, the govern-
ment was shutting down the program as a failure costing almost $100 
million.419 It may be hard to judge whether and how much a leak dam-
aged national security, even years after a leak. Protecting whistle-
blowers in such ambiguous circumstances may result in too many dis-
closures of secrets without enough exposure of wrongdoing. 
Finally, assuming the employee was right about conduct being il-
legal, he or she might not understand the larger context for certain 
government conduct. As the Supreme Court found in a related con-
text in Snepp v. United States,420 "When a former agent relies on his 
own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA - with its broader understanding of what 
may expose classified information and confidential sources - could 
415. See generally Lee, supra note 170, at 1466 n.62 (noting numerous government assertions 
that leaks caused significant damage to national security); ct. Check & Radsan, supra note 392, 
at 251-52 ("[W]hen the USDA operates ineffective programs or violates the law, the scandals 
are likely to be contained within the borders of our country and the losses confined to the na-
tional treasury. By contrast, when the CIA faces problems, they are likely to implicate our na-
tional security, to affect our relations with other countries, and to put lives at risk."). 
416. See supra text accompanying notes 218-23. 
417. Thomas et aI., supra note 166. 
418. See Greenwald, supra note 220 ("While there is no good faith claim that Risen's revela-
tion six years after the fact harmed U.S. national security, Risen's story was unquestionably 
newsworthy because it revealed how inept and ignorant American intelligence agencies are 
when it comes to Iran."). 
419. See Harris, supra note 226. 
420. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In Snepp, the Court found that the CIA could enforce an agree-
ment with a former employee permitting the CIA to review any of the employee's writings prior 
to publication, even if the writings did not reveal classified information. See id. at 512-16. 
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have identified as harmful. ,,421 
Another example relates to what some have called the "mosaic 
theory" to support a "state secrets" executive privilege: intelligence 
may seem innocuous by itself, but will become more important when 
combined with other seemingly unimportant bits of information.422 A 
whistleblower's inability or unwillingness to see the big picture may 
lead to the harmful disclosure of national security information. For 
example, the New York Times published WikiLeaks' Guantanamo 
files on the internet one week before the raid that killed Osama bin 
Laden. These files included a document from which bin Laden could 
have inferred that the U.S. had learned the identity of bin Laden's 
courier (and thus possibly where bin Laden was hiding), meaning that 
"the house [where bin Laden was killed] could have been empty 
when the SEALs arrived.,,423 Like the Supreme Court in Snepp, we 
might question whether a potential whistle blower should be the per-
son balancing the benefits of revealing the illegality against the costs 
to our national security from its disclosure. 
Yet, exposing illegality, government waste, gross mismanage-
ment, and abuse of authority is just as important in the national secu-
rity context as in other contexts - if not more so. The whistleblowers 
who exposed the Bush Administration's domestic wire-tapping, secret 
CIA renditions, and waterboarding torture methods revealed im-
portant information about arguably illegal activities and also allowed 
public debate about the way in which the country fought the war on 
terror.424 Further, although WikiLeaks published numerous classified 
documents revealing little in the way of illegality, the website also 
published a disturbing video about an apparently illegal attack on Af-
ghanistan civilians by a U.S. Army helicopter. 425 One commentator as-
serted that 
many of WikiLeaks' disclosures over the last 18 months have di-
rectly involved improprieties, bad acts and even illegalities on the 
part of [Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton's own State Depart-
421. Id. at 512. 
422. See SCHOENFELD, supra note 249, at 213; Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Execu-
tive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 635 (2010). 
423. Graham Allison, The Biggest Bet, TIME, May 7, 2012, at 34, 40. 
424. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1052 (discussing arguments regarding legality of wire-
tapping); see also Isikoff, supra note 239 (discussing legality of NSA wiretaps); Shane, WikiSafe, 
supra note 151, at WK1 ("All those disclosures led to public debate and to action: the prisons 
were closed; coercive interrogations were banned; the N.S.A. program was brought under court 
supervision. "). 
425. See Shane, supra note 132 (stating that Manning was "suspected of passing a classified 
video of an American military helicopter shooting Baghdad civilians"). 
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ment. As part of WikiLeaks' disclosures, she was caught ordering 
her diplomats at the U.N. to engage in extensive espionage on oth-
er diplomats and U.N. officials; in a classified memo, she demanded 
"forensic technical details about the communications systems used 
by top UN officials, including passwords and personal encryption 
keys used in private and commercial networks for official commu-
nications" as well as "credit card numbers, email addresses, phone, 
fax and pager numbers and even frequent-flyer account numbers" 
for a whole slew of diplomats, actions previously condemned by the 
U.S. as illega1.426 
119 
The law should not permit illegal conduct to hide behind a veil of se-
crecy, even in the name of national security. 
Additionally, just because a government official labels infor-
mation as "classified" does not mean it should be classified. The gov-
ernment systematically over-classifies documents as "secret.,,427 For 
example, in 2010, the federal government classified almost 77 million 
documents, a 40 percent increase over the previous year.428 (Govern-
ment officials state this increase was due, at least in part, to better re-
porting by officials.t29 Steven Aftergood, the scholar on government 
transparency mentioned earlier, provided a terrific example of the of-
ten-incoherent nature of government classification: as of 2002, the 
government declassified the 1997 and 1998 budgets for CIA intelli-
gence, but kept the budget total from 1947 classified.430 Journalists 
and others have argued that government officials "use classification 
to hide embarrassing information about wrongdoing.,,431 Some whis-
426. Glenn Greenwald, Hilary Clinton and Internet Freedom, SALON (Dec. 9, 2011, 2:40 AM 
CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2011112/09/hillary _c1inton_and_interneCfreedom/singleton/>; see 
also Glenn Greenwald, What WikiLeaks Revealed to the World in 2010, SALON (Dec. 24, 2010, 
4:25 AM CDT), <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/24/wikileaks_23/> (providing links to newspa-
per stories about WikiLeaks revelations concerning U.S. government misconduct). 
427. See BOK, supra note 12, at 197 ("Mountains of worthless information are stamped Top 
Secret; levels of secrecy multiply."); Steven Aftergood, On Leaks of National Security Secrets: A 
Response to Michael Hurt, 8 NAT'L SEC. STUD. Q. 97, 97 (2002) ("A considerable quantity of 
information that is not sensitive is nevertheless formally classified."); William H. Freivogel, 
Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for "Benign Indeterminacy," 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & 
POL'y 95, 99 (2009) ("[T)he government engages in a vast amount of overclassification, which 
hid damaging information about the mishandling of the Vietnam War and about extensive tap-
ping of telephone conversations without warrants."); Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 894 ("There 
long has been widespread concern across the political spectrum about the existence of rampant 
overclassification. "). 
428. See Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A16. 
429. See id. 
430. See Aftergood, supra note 427, at 98 (calling such inconsistencies "capricious[)"). 
431. Freivogel, supra note 427, at 98. Similarly, Daniel Ellsberg has argued, 
[T)he apparatus of secrecy serves in very significant part to conceal- from Ameri-
can voters, Congress, courts - policy errors, recklessness, violation of domestic 
and international law, deception, crimes, corruption in various forms, questiona-
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tleblowers, like Daniel Ellsberg perhaps, simply act in "the public in-
terest by exposing important, wrongly classified information.,,432 
The government also can exaggerate the harm that comes from 
revealing classified information.433 For example, in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case, the government claimed that eleven specific secrets the pa-
pers revealed would harm peace talks and prolong the Vietnam War 
if the New York Times published them.434 Later, however, Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold admitted that he has "never seen any trace 
of a threat to the national security from the publication" of the se-
crets.435 Similarly, although President Bush claimed that the New York 
Times would have "blood on their hands" if it published the domestic 
wiretapping story, many have noted that the government has never 
demonstrated any proof that the publication resulted in damage to 
. 1 . 436 natlOna securIty. 
Sometimes national security whistleblowers reveal unclassified 
information, but it relates to national security and thus raises the gov-
ernment's sensitivities. Thomas Drake and others on his behalf as-
serted that he did not reveal anything related to national security se-
crets; rather, he exposed government waste and mismanagement.437 
ble or disastrous judgment, responsibility for catastrophes. The motivations for 
classifying these are real and strong, not just a reflection of carelessness. But they 
have to do with considerations of domestic and bureaucratic politics and blame 
avoidance, not at all with true national security. 
Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 797; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 198 ("[T]he appeal to 'national 
security' offers a handy reason to avoid scrutiny of neglect, mistakes, and abuses. "). 
432. See Kitrosser, supra note 414, at 118. 
433. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 95-96 ("White House and other national security offi-
cials routinely exaggerate the dangers of publishing secret information. Over the decades, gov-
ernment officials have presented scant proof of harm from such activities."); Wells, supra note 
422, at 635 (noting that the "government's tendency to exaggerate national security harms posed 
by the release of information is well-documented"). 
434. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 112 (describing secrets). As Professor Freivogel noted, 
These eleven secrets considered to be the most dangerous items within the Pentagon 
Papers volumes involve sensitive subjects in which the government has a strong inter-
est - diplomatic initiatives, intelligence activities, intelligence estimates and capabili-
ties, and military contingency plans. The government claimed that disclosure of the 
Pentagon Papers could endanger the lives of intelligence agents and prolong the war, 
with the resulting death of thousands more soldiers and many prisoners of war. 
See id. at 113. 
435. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified Information, 
WASIL POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25, quoted in Freivogel, supra note 427, at 113. An expert at 
Daniel Ellsberg's trial buttressed this claim by asserting that "at most" 5 percent of the classified 
material Ellsberg disclosed actually had potential relevance to national security when it origi-
nated, and that Y2 to 1 percent still had sufficient relevance to justify secrecy protection after two 
or three years. See Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 794. 
436. See Freivogel, supra note 427, at 113. 
437. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 55; Greenwald, supra note 144 ("Drake's leak involved no 
conceivable harm to national security, but did expose serious waste, corruption and possible 
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Similarly, Franz Gayl revealed bureaucratic self-dealing and inepti-
tude that kept soldiers in Iraq from receiving specially armored vehi-
cles.438 The Marines, however, revoked his security clearance for rela-
tively innocuous references in a public report about two internal 
requests for equipment that he made while stationed in Iraq.439 
In short, society's expectations regarding the relative importance 
of secrecy or transparency for national security whistleblowers may 
vary depending on the situation. At times it makes sense to treat na-
tional security whistleblowers less protectively than other types of 
whistleblowers, but at other times we may want to provide more en-
couragement to them. Developing general rules and legal incentives 
in this environment can be challenging because the factual circum-
stances involved vary from case to case. 
In Part III, I concluded that the law as it stands now prefers 
transparency over secrecy for most types of whistleblowers. However, 
in the face of these factual uncertainties and given the potential dev-
astating consequences for national security, the law has broadly pro-
tected secrecy at the cost of transparency and oversight with regard to 
national security whistleblowers. Reforming the current system to 
provide more protection for national security whistleblowers in order 
to increase transparency could undermine our legitimate need for se-
crecy in some contexts. Yet, this conclusion assumes that we exist in a 
"zero-sum" world, in which transparency gains only if secrecy loses, 
and vice versa. In the next section, I question this assumption and ex-
plore whether changes to the law affecting national security whistle-
blowers might alter the scale to provide for more transparency, but 
without negatively affecting secrecy. 
B. Suggestions for Reform 
Commentators have identified several different models the law 
utilizes to encourage whistleblowers.44o Currently, the law affecting 
illegality."). 
438. See James Verini, The Unquiet Life of franz Gayl, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Aug. 2011, 
at 21, available at <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/julyaugust_2Oll/features/the_ 
unquiet_life_oCfranz_gayl030495.php?page=aU&print=true>. 
439. See id. 
440. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effective-
ness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1151,1154 (2010) (discussing "four prototypical legal mechanisms designed to promote individ-
ual reporting: (1) Antiretaliation Protection; (2) Duty to Report; (3) Liability Fines; and (4) 
Monetary Incentives"); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 COLO. L. 
REV. 975, 995 (2008) (concluding that some whistlcblowers may be protected by an employer's 
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national security whistleblowers uses three of them - structural dis-
closure channels, antiretaliation protection, and imposing a duty to 
blow the whistle - but they have flaws as applied in this context. In-
deed, as I discussed above, Congress contemplated revising the law 
addressing national security whistleblowers during the last several 
sessions, but could not reach an agreement.441 In this section, I broadly 
outline some considerations about each of these models that may in-
form congressional debate going forward, with the goal of increasing 
governmental transparency without sacrificing necessary secrecy.442 
1. Enhanced Disclosure Channels 
When balancing transparency and secrecy, we should be clear 
about where those terms are directed: Transparent to whom? Secret 
from whom? Transparency can mean making government decisions 
more transparent to the public, which we generally desire but which 
becomes problematic when juxtaposed against the need for secrecy 
regarding national security. However, we could attain transparency 
for national security by making executive branch decisions transpar-
ent to Congress. Such transparency assists legislative oversight, an-
other important value balanced against secrecy. In other words, the 
need for secrecy in national security affairs might generally trump 
transparency to the public. However, secrecy should give way to 
transparency to Congress because of its constitutional responsibility 
as a check on the executive branch.443 
Problems in the national security context can become more 
transparent to Congress through the use of structural disclosure 
channels for whistleblowers to report misconduct directly to Congress 
if the executive branch does not address it. Currently, various laws 
contractual promise not to retaliate); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to 
Encourage COIporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1132 (identifying a "structural 
model" in which employees may utilize a disclosure channel to report misconduct) [hereinafter 
Moberly, Structural Model]. 
441. See supra text accompanying notes 190-217. 
442. I should note that at least one commentator, Professor Stephen Vladeck, believes that 
the current system works well in the "vast majority of cases." Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1544. 
However, Vladeck notes that the system does not work well when the highest levels of govern-
ment appear to approve misconduct. See id. at 1544-46 (noting that in these cases "the likeli-
hood that disclosure pursuant to the WPA or the ICWAP (to the extent they apply) will actually 
allow for meaningful oversight of the program is fleeting, at best"). Via deck astutely points out 
that, paradoxically, these are "the cases where whistleblowing is the most important - where 
government employees are involved in an illegal program that has approval from the most sen-
ior officials in the relevant agencies and departments." [d. at 1544. 
443. See Kitrosser, supra note 250, at 522-27; Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 916-18. 
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provide national security whistleblowers ways to disclose wrongdoing 
internally to an IG, who is located within the executive branch itself.444 
However, Congress will find out about the report only in certain cir-
cumstances: (1) through a semi-annual report the IG sends to the 
agency head, who must pass it on to Congress;445 (2) if the IG becomes 
aware of "particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or defi-
ciencies," and makes a report to the agency head who must send it to 
Congress;446 or (3) in response from a demand to report to Congress 
an "urgent concern," if the head of an agency permits a whistleblower 
to talk with Congress.447 In other words, the law allows for an agency 
head or IG to filter, and even block, reports to Congress from nation-
al security whistleblowers.448 
Although IGs theoretically provide an independent investigation 
of whistleblower reports, the President may remove an IG,449 and IGs 
typically act under the supervision of an agency head. As an example, 
the CIA's IG reports directly to and is "under the general supervi-
sion" of the Director of the CIA.450 Moreover, the Director can pro-
hibit the IG from conducting an investigation into wrongdoing if the 
Director determines the prohibition "is necessary to protect vital na-
tional security interests. ,,451 The Director must report this type of or-
der to Congressional intelligence committees,452 but, again, Congress 
only receives secondary and filtered information about the disclosure. 
The new IG position for the entire intelligence community, de-
scribed above,453 resolves some of the inherent tensions of an IG in-
vestigating the IG's own agency because it would permit an investiga-
tion from someone outside of a specific agency. But, the law subjects 
this overarching IG to restrictions similar to those of other IGs, in-
444. See, e.g., 50 U.S.c. § 403q (2006) (CIA 10). The Civil Service Reform Act does assert 
that employees have a "right" to give information to Congress. See 5 U.S.c. § 7211 (2006). 
However, that right does not attach to a remedy. The WPA provides remedies for prohibited 
personnel practices like retaliation, but the WPA does not apply to most members of the intelli-
gence community. See id. §§ 2302(a)(1) & (2)(C). 
445. See, e.g., 50 U.S.c. § 403q(d)(1) (CIA 10). 
446. See, e.g., id. § 403q(d)(2) (CIA 10). 
447. See, e.g., id. § 403q(d)(5) (CIA 10). 
448. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1121-24 (describing blocking and fil-
tering problems with whistleblower reports). 
449. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403q(b)(6) (CIA 10). If a President removes the 10, the President 
must provide the reasons for the removal to Congressional intelligence committees. See id. 
450. See id. § 403q(b )(2). 
451. ld. § 403q(b)(3). 
452. See id. § 403q(b)(4); 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(f)(2) (2006). 
453. See supra text accompanying notes 353-70. 
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cluding control by the Director of National Intelligence.454 The Direc-
tor in charge of intelligence will still control all of the investigation 
and reporting to Congress. An IG may be a good first option to re-
ceive whistleblower disclosures, but the IG cannot be the only option 
because an IG is inherently an internal (rather than external) check 
subject to the ultimate control of the executive branch.455 For exam-
ple, IGs from intelligence agencies offered little assistance during the 
warrantless surveillance controversy because they did not offer a view 
on the legality of the program, could not compel testimony, and did 
not receive support from key members of the Bush Administration.456 
In other cases, such as with CIA renditions and the "enhanced inter-
rogation techniques" used against terror suspects, the press found out 
about the problems before the CIA IG.457 Two commentators ex-
plained these events by arguing that the IG's "reputation within the 
Agency is so low that people risk prosecution [by leaking to the press] 
rather than merely report their concerns to the authorized internal 
guard.,,458 As a result, according to some, "[a]gency Inspectors Gen-
eral have proven themselves ineffective defenders of whistle blower 
rights," suggesting that Congress require more information on IG in-
vestigations to permit enhanced legislative oversight.459 Indeed, some 
have argued that during the 1990s and 2000s, congressional oversight 
of national security issues became "dysfunctional,,460 and "broken,,461 
in part because excessive executive branch secrecy kept the right in-
f . f . C 462 ormatIOn rom gettmg to ongress. 
454. See 50 U.S.c. §§ 403-3h(k); 403-3h(c); 403-3h(f). 
455. See Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of "Deep Throat": The Disclosure Process of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 617, 640 (2005) (noting that IGs are theoretically independent but they are placed in the 
agencies themselves and "lack both decision-making and enforcement powers, which limits the 
overall effectiveness of the disclosure process"); Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 511. Assuming this 
remains the only option, Check and Radsan make a thoughtful suggestion that an IG's term 
could straddle presidencies, like the Director of the FBI who is appointed for a ten-year term, 
thus reducing presidential influence. See Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 292. 
456. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 511. 
457. See Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 288. 
458. ld. 
459. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187, at 21. Not everyone agrees. Check and Radsan 
assert that "[t]he [CIA] IG, straddled between two branches, has enough independence to do 
the job." Check & Radsan, supra note 392, at 292. 
460. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST A'nAcKs ON THE U.S., supra note 400, at 420 ("Con-
gressional oversight for intelligence - and counterterrorism - is now dysfunctional."). 
461. DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE OVERSIGHT: 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 15 (2006). 
462. See id. at 27 ("First and foremost, of course, is that much of intelligence agency work 
takes place under the shroud of extreme secrecy. Congressional overseers - members and staff 
alike - do not know what they do not know."); Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1058-59 (detailing 
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Whistleblowers can help with that information flow if their in-
formation has a more direct route to individuals who can truly inves-
tigate complaints should the IG route prove insufficient.463 Congress 
needs direct, unfiltered reports from national security whistleblowers 
if the executive branch does not resolve problems identified by whis-
tleblowers. Some may object to providing a direct line to Congress for 
fear that it would compromise necessary secrecy regarding national 
security matters. However, congressional members have relevant se-
curity clearances, as do many members of their staff.464 As important, 
both the House and Senate have in place procedures to handle classi-
fied information.465 The Security Act of 1947 already contemplates 
that Congress, through its intelligence committees or the "Gang of 
Eight," should receive information about intelligence activities and 
covert operations.466 Thus, if the law directed whistleblowers to au-
thorized people in Congress with a procedure set up to handle classi-
fied information, then whistle blowers could assist with transparency 
about national security without a corresponding decrease in secrecy.467 
The transparency would not be to the public generally, but it would 
be to a separate branch of government constitutionally charged with 
oversight of the executive branch.468 
Accepted theory regarding whistleblower disclosure channels al-
so supports permitting reports to Congress. Professor Wim Van-
dekerckhove has set forth a "three tiered" model for disclosure, in 
which a whistleblower should first report internally within an organi-
zation.469 The whistleblower should report externally only if the inter-
problems with oversight even when Congress receives classified briefings). 
463. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1149-50 (describing the benefits of 
Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement that corporations install a whistleblower disclosure channel per-
mitting employees to report misconduct directly to the audit committee of the board of direc-
tors, which would bypass management blocking and filtering). 
464. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1073-74, 1077. 
465. See id. at 1073-75, 1080-84 (describing Congressional rules for handling classified in-
formation). 
466. See 50 U.S.c. § 413(a)(1) (2006) (noting that the executive branch must keep the "con-
gressional intelligence committees ... fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities 
of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity"); id. § 413b 
(providing procedures for informing Congress about covert actions). 
467. See Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1075 ("Congress is considered to have a reliable track 
record for non-leakage and it has a political incentive to avoid leaks in order to avoid blame by 
the executive branch for the same. "). 
468. Cf BOK, supra note 12, at 110 ("Even where persuasive reasons for collective practices 
of secrecy can be stated, accountability is indispensible. "). 
469. See Wim Vandekerckhove, European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears?, in A 
GLOBAL ApPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM 
EXISTING WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 15, 18 (David Lewis ed., 2010). 
126 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLlCY JOURNAL [Vol. 16:51 
nal disclosure does not address the misconduct successfully.470 If so, 
the next "tier" of disclosure would be to a regulator, "acting on behalf 
of wider society.,,471 Congress serves perfectly as the outside regulator 
to the executive branch because of its oversight obligations and be-
cause, to use Vandekerckhove's words, Congress has "a controlling 
mandate with regard to [the executive branch], derived directly or in-
directly from a political representation of society.,,472 I discuss whether 
national security whistle blowers should be permitted to disclose to a 
third tier - the general public - in the final section of this Part.473 
A second objection to permitting executive branch whistleblow-
ers greater access to Congress, which is more difficult to resolve de-
finitively, involves the current separation of powers detente described 
in Part III. The issue here is not as much about secrecy as about Pres-
idential power to determine if, when, and how the executive branch 
will give information about national security to the legislative branch. 
The President's constitutional prerogatives for secrecy are at their 
height when national security is at stake. Although Congress has nev-
er accepted that the President's power in this field is exclusive, Con-
gress also has not shown a willingness to challenge such arguments.474 
It should. First, as a statutory matter, one hundred years ago, 
Congress gave a "right" to federal employees to give information to 
Congress, a right currently located in the Civil Service Reform Act 
that applies to all employees - without an exception for intelligence 
community workers.475 Supporting that right with statutorily-
mandated disclosure channels would seem to fall easily within the 
power of Congress. Second, as a constitutional matter, Congress has a 
constitutional role in protecting national security. Professor Kitrosser 
argued persuasively that the Constitution envisions a "robust struc-
470. See id. 
471. See id. 
472. [d. 
473. See discussion infra Part IV.B.iv. 
474. See, e.g. S. REP. No. 111-101, at 27 (2009) (noting that in the debate over the ICWPA, 
Congress agreed to modify disclosure requirements "to address the Administration's concerns" 
regarding constitutional separation of powers issues); id. at 28 (stating that the Senate Commit-
tee agreed to alter provisions of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act in response to 
separation of powers concerns raised by the Obama Administration). 
475. See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). The definition of "employee" that applies to all of Chapter 
5 of the U.S. Code, unless otherwise indicated, does not have an intelligence community excep-
tion. See 5 U.S.c. § 2105 (2006). The exclusion for intelligence community employees comes 
from the WP A, which is located in Section 2302 of Title 5 and describes "prohibited personnel 
practices" for employees of only certain, non-intelligence, agencies. See 5 U.S.c. § 
2302(a)(2)(C) (2006). Thus, intelligence community employees have a "right" to give infor-
mation to Congress, but no remedy if the agency retaliates against them for doing so. 
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tural checking" by Congress of Presidential power, in which "the ex-
ecutive branch can be given vast leeway to operate in secret, but re-
mains subject to being overseen or otherwise restrained in its secrecy 
by the legislature.,,476 Allowing Congress to limit Presidential secrecy 
permits the balancing between constitutional norms of secrecy and 
transparency required by national security whistleblowers: 
On the one hand, the Constitution clearly values transparency as an 
operative norm. This is evidenced by myriad factors, including the 
necessities of self-government, the First Amendment, and Article 
1's detailed requirements for a relatively open and dialogic legisla-
tive process. On the other hand, the Constitution reflects an under-
standing that secrecy sometimes is a necessary evil, evidenced both 
by the congressional secrecy allowance [in Article I, section 5, 
clause 3] and by the President's structural secrecy capabilities. Per-
mitting executive branch secrecy, but requiring it to operate within 
legislative parameters, themselves open and subject to revision, 
largely reconciles these two values.477 
Louis Fisher, who testified before Congress on this issue, made a 
similar argument that "Congress has coequal duties and responsibili-
ties for the whole of government, domestic and foreign.,,478 Moreover, 
this concept is not new. In 1976, Professors Halperin and Hoffman 
examined the various constitutional powers assigned to Congress and 
the President and determined that they "necessarily imply independ-
ent but concurrent efforts by the respective branches on behalf of na-
tional security interests.,,479 Congress provided employees in other ar-
eas the ability to give information directly to Congress, and it should 
expand that right to national security employees as wel1.480 The consti-
tutional arguments for presidential secrecy in the national security 
arena may be persuasive when arrayed against the public's need for 
transparency.481 However, when pitted against transparency to Con-
gress to assist with its constitutional oversight responsibilities, the 
476. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 917-18. 
477. ld. at 918; see also Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 522-27. 
478. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't 
Reform, 11lth Congo 1 (2009) (statement of Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law 
Library of the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Fisher Statement]. available at <http://democrats. 
oversighLhouse.gov/images/stories/documents/20090513183833.pdf>. 
479. Halperin & Hoffman. supra note 259, at 153. 
480. Moreover, part of providing a real outlet to Congress for whistleblowers also would 
include requirements that national security agencies make clear how an employee or contractor 
should report wrongdoing. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra note 187. at 20 (recommending that 
agencies "provide the proper guidance to their employees and contractors so they will know 
how to report their complaints within the law"). 
481. See U.S. V. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). 
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President's demands for secrecy should be more circumscribed. 
Will Congress do anything with more information? Professor 
Kitrosser also argued that Congress does not actually want to oversee 
national security issues because "congresspersons are generally best 
off appearing tough and resolute, while retaining the ability to plead 
ignorance should things turn out badly.,,482 Similarly, Professor Neal 
Katyal asserted that Congress has abdicated its responsibility of over-
sight with regard to foreign affairs.483 However, as a political matter, 
more direct, unfiltered information from whistle blowers may force 
Congress to assume its constitutional checking function for fear that 
not doing so will have greater political ramifications should they ig-
nore the information. As Congress receives better information, it will 
be harder for it to avoid its oversight role, which can lead to better in-
formation for public debate.484 Moreover, Congress has shown a will-
ingness to undertake official investigations in the past that have 
pushed for more transparency and served as a countermeasure to the 
executive branch's tendency for over classification.485 Further, part of 
the benefit may be in the deterrent value of whistleblowing.486 Execu-
tive branch actors will know that their decision making may be scruti-
nized externally, which may lead to better decisions in the first in-
482. Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 484. Kitrosser also has argued that 
The non-public nature of much information funneling means that "Congressional 
efforts here remain largely hidden" and thus politically unhelpful to its partici-
pants. The complexity of much national security information also diminishes its 
political resonance. Furthermore, the charge that information disclosure will harm 
national security is easy to make and has substantial popular appeal, making it po-
litically risky to push for disclosures. Indeed, the current [Bush] Administration 
frequently makes the charge that congressional hearings on national security will 
provide "the enemy" with valuable information. Fears that the executive branch 
will intentionally leak national security information and blame Congress for the 
leak also have been known to exist on Capitol Hill. 
Kitrosser, supra note 252, at 1084-85 (citations omitted). 
483. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dan-
gerous Branch from wilhin, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2314 (2005). For Katyal, as a result of this abdi-
cation, checks and balances must be accomplished from within the executive branch itself. See 
id. Among other things, he proposes an impartial decision-maker that would resolve inter-
agency disputes, id. at 2337, an idea seemingly adopted by the government in creating the new 
IG for the Intelligence Community. This enhanced internal oversight may prove to be benefi-
cial, for as Stephen Aftergood has argued, "some of the most effective checks and balances on 
government operations, including new public disclosures of formerly secret information, take 
place through the process of internal oversight." Aftergood, supra note 385, at 848. 
484. See Aftergood, supra note 385, at 847 ("The normal friction that accompanies congres-
sional oversight very often serves as a driver of public disclosure."). 
485. See id. (giving the Church committee investigations of intelligence activities and the 9/ 
11 Commission as examples). 
486. See Vandekerckhove, supra note 469, at 18 ("The possibility of the second-tier being 
invoked then serves as a deterrent to the organization."). 
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stance.487 
2. Retaliation Protection 
Structural disclosure channels help address information-flow 
problems because they direct employees to a recipient who might fix 
the problem identified by the whistleblower.488 Yet, for employees to 
report, the law also should address employee fears of retaliation. Alt-
hough some minimal antiretaliation protection for national security 
whistleblowers exists now, several flaws should be fixed to truly en-
courage whistleblowers and remedy any retaliation they experience.489 
Currently, as set forth in more detail in Part III.B., supra, the law 
contains several prohibitions on retaliation against national security 
whistleblowers, but little in the way of remedies for any retaliation. 
For example, the laws creating an IG for the intelligence community 
and for the CIA bar any reprisals against employees who disclose 
misconduct to the IG.490 However, the statutes do not contain any 
remedy for retaliation, which leaves national security whistleblowers 
without much security. Some whistleblowers may have administrative 
remedies available to them, such as under the act addressing FBI 
whistleblowers,491 or the Military Whistleblowers Act. 492 However, 
these remedies have not worked well in practice: a recent internal 
Pentagon investigation determined that the Department of Defense's 
administrative procedures often failed to adequately protect military 
whistleblowers.493 Moreover, these procedures do not provide the due 
process available to other federal government whistle blowers under 
the WP A: hearings in front of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 
487. Cf. Christina E Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REv. 903, 937-39 (2004) (de-
scribing psychological research showing that "accountability can improve judgment and decision 
making"). 
488. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 440, at 1141-50. 
489. Cf. Khemani, supra note 308, at 4 (concluding that current statutory protections "offer 
little protection to national security whistleblowers due to narrow judicial interpretations, ques-
tionable impartiality of the internal review mechanisms, limited access to external disclosure 
channels and review bodies, and the lack of effective remedies"). 
490. See 50 U.S.c. § 403-3h(g)(3)(B) (2006) (IC IG); id. § 403q(e)(3)(B). 
491. See 5 U.S.c. § 2303(b) (2006); 28 C.F.R. pt. 27 (2011). 
492. 10 U.S.c. §§ 1034(c)-(g) (2006). 
493. See Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Def., Assessment Report: Review of the Office of 
Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations, Directorate for Military Reprisal 
Investigations 16 (May 16, 2011), available at <https:llwww.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
351491-dod-ig-internal-review-of-whistleblowing.html> (last visited June 23, 2012); see also Tom 
Vanden Brook, Report: DoD Delays Endanger Whistle-blowers, USA TODAY, Feb. 22,2012, 
available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-22Ipentagon-whistle-blower-
delays/53198210/1>. 
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with an appeal to the Federal Circuit.494 If a Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act passes along the lines of the bills that have been 
proposed recently, many whistleblowers currently covered by the 
WP A (but still excluding intelligence community whistleblowers) 
would be able to bring de novo claims in federal district court if the 
MSPB does not resolve their claim within 270 days.495 
National security whistleblowers should be treated equivalently 
to other types of federal whistleblowers regarding the substantive and 
procedural remedies for retaliation. Originally, the WPA excluded in-
telligence agencies from its coverage "because the intelligence com-
munity handles highly classified programs and information that must 
be closely guarded from public disclosure.,,496 However, the concern 
that retaliation protection for national security whistleblowers would 
undermine secrecy confuses two distinct concepts of antiretaliation 
law: the protected disclosure and the prohibited retaliation. As an ini-
tial matter, the law could require national security whistleblowers to 
maintain the secrecy of their disclosures under the rules set forth by 
the classification regime. In addition, once a whistleblower makes a 
protected disclosure appropriately, the law could protect the whistle-
blower from retaliation with a full, or slightly modified, set of reme-
dies. 
Therefore, although the disclosure itself could involve classified 
material, the focus in a retaliation case would be on whether the dis-
closure caused retaliation - a determination unlikely to involve using 
details from properly classified materials. The underlying merits of 
the disclosure (i.e., whether the misconduct reported actually violated 
the law, which may involve classified information) should not be liti-
gated in a whistleblower case because retaliation law requires only a 
reasonable good faith belief that the conduct was improper.497 IGs and 
494. See 5 U.S.c. § 1221 (2006) (permitting right of action to MSPB); id. § n03(b)(I) 
(providing for review of MSPB decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
495. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Cong., § 
117. 
496. S. REP. No. 111-101, at 29 (2009); see also Fisher Statement, supra note 478, at 18 (de-
scribing Justice Department arguments that national security whistleblower legislation would 
impede upon the President's right to determine who has a need to know classified information). 
497. See Protecting the Public from Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing on H.R. 1507, The 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't 
Reform, 11lth Congo 13 (2009) (statement of David K. Colapinto, Nat'l Whistleblowers Ctr.) 
("What is at issue in a retaliation case is whether an employee made a protected disclosure ... 
and once that is established there is no in-depth examination of the underlying merits of the 
whistleblower allegations in the retaliation case. "), available at <http://democrats.oversight. 
house.goviimagesistoriesidocumentsi20090513184228.pdf>. 
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internal processes can handle the investigation of the merits of the 
disclosure separately from the issue of whether the agency retaliated 
against the whistleblower.498 Courts and adjudicatory bodies would 
not be involved in second-guessing executive branch decisions regard-
ing national security - they would only determine whether the agency 
retaliated against an employee for a protected disclosure. 
In some cases, the employee or the agency may need to use clas-
sified material as part of the claim or defense. Accordingly, new an-
tiretaliation provisions would have to account for maintaining the se-
crecy of information throughout the adjudication process. However, 
such systems could be created. Administrative law judges or hearing 
officers could be cleared for classified information, and evidence 
could be presented under seal or redacted. Currently, Title VII claims 
from intelligence community employees receive this type of treatment 
to protect sensitive information because the law permits them to file 
de novo claims for discrimination and retaliation in federal court.499 
Importantly, these precautions work for Title VII claims; in 1996 the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) studied such claims by intel-
ligence community employees and determined that the claims did not 
compromise national security.soo The intelligence agencies successfully 
removed or redacted classified information from adverse action case 
files, and the GAO determined that agencies often could litigate the 
case with unclassified documents.sOl 
The version of the WPEA endorsed by candidate Obama in 2007, 
H.R. 985 from the llOth Congress, contained provisions that seemed 
to provide the necessary balance between protecting the security of 
the disclosure and providing a true remedy for retaliation. The law 
would have protected national security whistleblowers who disclosed 
wrongdoing to an authorized member of Congress (or a congressional 
staff member with appropriate security clearance), an authorized ex-
ecutive branch official, or an IG.so2 Whistleblowers who felt retaliated 
against could submit a complaint to the IG and the agency head, and 
the IG would investigate and report to the agency head within 120 
498. See id. 
499. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000-e (2006); id. § 1981a. 
500. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-96-6, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: 
PERSONNEL PRACTICES AT THE CIA, NSA, AND DIA COMPARED WITH THOSE OF OTHER 
AGENCIES 45 (1996). 
501. See id. at 38-39. 
502. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985 110th Congo § lO(a). 
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days.s03 The agency head would have 180 days to make a determina-
tion about whether retaliation occurred, and after that the employee 
could bring a de novo claim in federal court. 504 H.R. 985 also would 
have prohibited the revocation of a security clearance as retaliation, 
an important additional protection not found in the current laws re-
lated to national security whistleblowing.sos Further, the bill would 
have limited the ability of the executive branch to claim the "state se-
crets" privilege in a whistleblower case and required a report to Con-
gress whenever the government asserted the privilege in a case.S06 
The most recent iterations of the WPEA in the 112th Congress, 
S. 743 and H.R. 3289, fall short of these protections. Although the 
bills provide more protection from retaliation for national security 
whistleblowers than currently exists, the protection is more limited 
than it needs to be. For example, the bills protect national security 
whistleblowers who disclose misconduct only to the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence or the head of their agency.S07 This limited disclo-
sure channel does not provide for reporting wrongdoing outside of 
the intelligence community, thus avoiding any meaningful oversight 
from Congress. Moreover, the bills do not provide any detail regard-
ing how a whistleblower can enforce the antiretaliation protections. 
Instead, Congress appears willing to let the executive branch provide 
a regulatory scheme "consistent with" the WP A 508 that permits ap-
peals only to a specially appointed board consisting of intelligence 
community officials.s09 Moreover, the bills subject security clearance 
revocations to an internal administrative review process involving the 
same board.s1o Finally, the proposed laws would authorize the Direc-
503. See id. § 10(b). 
504. See id. § 10(c). 
505. The MSPB has determined that it does not have authority to review an agency deter-
mination to revoke an employee's security clearance. See Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Obama Administration would have appeals of security clearance 
revocation go to an extra-agency review process rather than federal court, and if the process 
recommends reinstated the security clearance, then the law could require notification of Con-
gress if the recommendation is not followed by the agency head. See De House Statement, supra 
note 195, at 9-10. 
506. H.R. 985 required a court to find in favor of an employee on an element or claim if a 
"state secrets privilege" claim prevented the employee from proving the element or claim, as 
long as the IG investigation substantially confirmed the element or elements of the claim. See 
H.R. 985, 110th Congo § 10(c) (2007). 
507. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo § 
201. The House bill, H.R. 3289, presents identical provisions under identical section numbers. 
See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 3289, 112th Congo Title II. 
508. See, e.g., S. 743, 112th Congo § 201. 
509. See, e.g., id. § 204. 
510. See, e.g., id. § 202. 
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tor of National Intelligence to summarily fire employees and to ig-
nore other laws prohibiting the termination of employment when 
necessary for "national security.,,511 
The dearth of retaliation protection currently makes any pro-
posal for added protection sound good. Indeed, given the current lim-
its of statutory protection when national security whistleblowers use 
official channels, the system ironically encourages employees to dis-
close wrongdoing to the press or to sources like WikiLeaks in the 
hope of remaining anonymous. If a new statute protected disclosures 
deemed appropriate by the classification regime (such as to Congress, 
the IG, or an agency head), then the system would encourage appro-
priate secrecy rather than undermine it. However, the system for pro-
tecting against retaliation does not need to be as restrictive as pro-
posed by the bills in the 112th Congress. Permitting adjudication and 
review of retaliation claims outside the intelligence community would 
provide less conflicted oversight of the anti retaliation system and 
likely engender more confidence among employees. 
3. Whistleblowing as a Duty 
Finally, the law often imposes an obligation to report wrongdo-
ing when "the victim of misconduct is particularly vulnerable or the 
harm will be widespread."s12 A wide variety of employees, from cor-
porate officers and lawyers to supervisors of facilities that handle 
hazardous materials have an obligation to disclose harmful activity if 
they witness it.5!3 Experimental evidence supports emphasizing the 
"duty" model to better encourage employees to blow the whistle, par-
ticularly when an employee would perceive the illegal conduct to be 
reported as morally offensive.s14 Moreover, by imposing a duty to re-
port, the law can express to all employees, and the outside world, "an 
important message of the social desirability of whistle-blowing."sls 
The current system imposes a duty on intelligence community 
employees to blow the whistle on illegal conduct. For example, the 
federal government's Code of Ethics adopted by Congress in 1958 re-
quires all employees to "expose corruption wherever discovered" and 
to "uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United 
511. See, e.g., id. § 204. 
512. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 440, at 1163. 
513. See id. at 1163-66 (providing numerous examples). 
514. See id. at 1155. 
515. See id. at 1185. 
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States."S16 The Standard of Conduct for executive branch employees 
requires employees to "disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to 
appropriate authorities.,,517 Federal government employees must take 
an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States."S18 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these oaths can have 
some power. For example, Thomas Drake asserts that the oath he 
took as a federal employee influenced his decision to blow the whistle 
on mismanagement and waste in the NSA.519 
Yet, these oaths might conflict with secrecy oaths and written 
nondisclosure agreements required by intelligence agencies.S20 A na-
tional security whistleblower may be confronted with having to de-
cide which oath takes precedence: the oath to expose wrongdoing and 
uphold the Constitution, or the secrecy promise made when joining 
the intelligence community.521 Daniel Ellsberg argued that part of the 
reason government officials keep secrets about misconduct relates to 
the psychology of keeping promises of confidentiality in return for be-
ing permitted to be a part of an elite, secret-keeping group.S22 The se-
crecy oaths and nondisclosure agreements become part of the en-
forcement mechanism that, according to Ellsberg, has "the same 
516. See Code of Ethics for U.S. Government Service (1958), available at <http://usgovinfo. 
about.com/blethics.htm>; see also Fisher Statement, supra note 478, at 2. 
517. U.S. Office of Gov't Ethics, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Execu-
tive Branch 2 (2009), available at <http://www.usoge.gov/Laws-and-Regulations/Employee-
Standards-of-Conduct/Standards-of -Ethical-Conduct -for- Employees-of- the-Executive-Branch-
(June-2009)-(PDF)/>. 
518. 5 U.S.c. § 3331 (2006). 
519. See Thomas Drake, Why Are We Subverting the Constitution in the Name of Security?, 
WASI-!. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at A13 ("I followed all the rules for reporting such activity until it 
conflicted with the primacy of my oath to defend the Constitution."); see also Vic Walter & 
Krista Kjellman, NSA Whistleblower Now Silent, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2006, 4:00 PM), <http:// 
abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlinesl2006/07/nsa_whistleblow-2I> (reporting that Russell Tice sent a 
letter to Congress revealing NSA eavesdropping and stating "It was with my oath as a U.S. in-
telligence officer to protect and preserve the U.S. Constitution weighing heavy on my mind that 
I reported acts that I know to be unlawful and unconstitutional"). 
520. See FISHER, supra note 246, at 24-29 (discussing nondisclosure agreements); Jeff Stein, 
CIA Director Panetta Warns Employees on Leaks, Wash. Post., Nov. 8,2010, at B3, available at 
< http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/111cia_director_panetta_warns_emp .h tml> 
(quoting CIA Director Leon Panetta reminding CIA officers about their "secrecy oath, which 
obligates us to protect classified information while we serve at the Agency and after we leave"). 
521. See David Canon, Intelligence and Ethics: CIA's Covert Operations, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN 
STUD. 197,201-02 (1980) (describing conflict some CIA agents felt between CIA's secrecy oath 
and oath to tell the truth to Congress); Blahblog, National Security Agency Security Oath, 
BLOoMOUrH (July 30, 2008), <http://blogzenze.com/blogmouth/2008/07/30/national-security-
agency-security-oath/> ("I solemnly swear that I will not reveal to any person any information 
pertaining to the classified activities of the National Security Agency, except as necessary to-
ward the proper performance of my duties or as specifically authorized by a duly responsible 
superior known to me to be authorized to receive this information."). 
522. Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 777-78. 
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psychosocial meaning for participants as the Mafia code of omerta.,,523 
The law should be clear that exposing governmental waste, 
abuse, and illegality takes precedence over any contractual obligation 
to keep information secret. The versions of the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Enhancement Act in the 112th Congress might help make this 
unambiguous. The most recent bills contain provisions that require 
each executive branch nondisclosure agreement to state explicitly that 
the agreement incorporates and does not undermine the various whis-
tleblower laws and regulations that affect national security whistle-
blowers.524 Although these bills have other shortcomings, the provi-
sions related to these nondisclosure agreements should be retained 
and implemented. Acknowledging the priority of one's duty to report 
over the duty of secrecy can reduce the conflict between these oppos-
ing obligations and make employees more willing to report miscon-
duct.525 
Importantly, the WPEA bills also contain a requirement that 
heads of agencies inform employees how they can make lawful disclo-
sures of misconduct when the disclosure includes classified infor-
mation.526 Moreover, the bills require each IG to appoint a Whistle-
blower Protection Ombudsman to educate employees about 
antiretaliation protections.527 Oddly, however, the bills exclude the in-
telligence agencies from this requirement,528 an exclusion that should 
be withdrawn in order to give all executive branch employees infor-
mation about their duty to blow the whistle. Even without this re-
quirement, some agencies have begun to provide clearer direction to 
their employees regarding how to report misconduct. On October 12, 
2011, the Department of Homeland Security issued a proposed ru1e-
making in which DHS employees would be required to report allega-
tions of waste, fraud, abuse, or corruption to "appropriate authorities 
within DHS, such as the DHS Office of Inspector General, the ap-
propriate Office of Internal Affairs, or Office of Professional Respon-
'b'l't ,,529 silly. 
523. Id. at 780. 
524. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §§ 
104,115. 
525. See BOK, supra note 12, at 228. 
526. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo § 
112. 
527. See, e.g., id. § 120. 
528. See, e.g., id. 
529. See Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Department of 
Homeland Security, 76 FED. REG. 63,206, 63,207 (proposed Oct. 12,2011). 
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Any duty to blow the whistle should correspond with antiretalia-
tion protection that applies when a whistleblower acts pursuant to this 
reporting obligation. Courts have held that reporting misconduct as 
part of one's job duty can eviscerate First Amendment and WP A pro-
tection from retaliation.530 In response to these rulings, the WPEA 
bills also contain provisions rejecting these courts' "job duty" excep-
tion for both WP A whistle blowers and national security whistleblow-
ers.
531 These provisions also should be retained. 
Utilizing the "duty model" can be effective, but only if the law 
makes clear to national security employees that the duty to expose 
misconduct takes priority over the duty of secrecy. To the extent pos-
sible, employees should not receive conflicting messages about these 
dual obligations. However, the law also can make clear that disclosing 
classified information as part of a whistleblower report should be ac-
complished in a way that protects the secrecy of the information. The 
disclosure channels and antiretaliation protections mentioned above 
work together with this duty to provide a multi-faceted and consistent 
approach to supporting whistleblower disclosures, while also respect-
ing the need for secrecy regarding national security matters. 
4. Extreme Cases 
Reforming the three models currently used to address national 
security whistle blowers can greatly improve the balance between 
transparency and secrecy by providing more oversight without signifi-
cantly threatening important secrecy concerns. The law could funnel 
disclosures to appropriate legislative and executive branch officials 
without making classified information public. Moreover, the law 
could remedy retaliation while still respecting important classification 
concerns. Various versions of the WPEA introduced in Congress over 
the last few years would improve the current system tremendously. 
These improvements would encourage disclosures of low-level, or 
even agency-wide, abuses because people outside the agency would 
receive information about the misconduct. These recipients would, 
presumably, correct the misconduct because of their oversight re-
sponsibilities. 
However, what about the extreme cases involving more wide-
530. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (First Amendment); Huffman v. Of-
fice of Personnel Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (WPA). 
531. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2011, S. 743, 112th Congo §§ 
101,202. 
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spread extra-agency wrongdoing or misconduct authorized by the 
President? As Professor Stephen Vladeck noted, internal whistle-
blowing channels like those provided by the IG Act and the ICWPA 
"may not be enough when the relevant program has been approved at 
the highest levels of the Executive Branch, or when there are other 
reasons to doubt the impartiality of the relevant Inspector General or 
the Special Counsel."S32 Moreover, disclosure to Congress only mat-
ters if Congress can do something about the disclosure publicly, which 
is not always the case.533 What if a national security whistleblower dis-
closes classified misconduct to the appropriate congressional recipi-
ent, but nothing happens? 
Vandekerckhove's three-tier model would suggest that a whis-
tie blower should be permitted to disclose matters of public concern 
directly to the public if unsuccessful with initial disclosures to the first 
and second tiers.s34 Otherwise, the executive and legislative branches 
would not have any accountability "to the wider society" regarding 
how they address concerns being raised within the branches.535 In fact, 
the WP A currently protects disclosures of non-classified information 
to the media, supporting the three-tier model. However, Van-
dekerckhove did not address national security issues specifically and, 
as demonstrated above, such disclosures might require a different 
balancing than other disclosures. 
Despite those secrecy concerns, good reasons exist not to have a 
wholesale prohibition on national security whistle blowing to the pub-
lic. An unrestricted ban ignores the public interest side of the trans-
parency-secrecy equation.536 Moreover, public debate on these issues 
may be more important than on any other, and sometimes leaving 
oversight to Congress will not be sufficient?7 
Accordingly, Professor Michael Scharf and Colin McLaughlin 
suggest that retaliation protection also should be provided to whistle-
blowers who disclose national security information to the media un-
der limited circumstances: if the whistleblower has a "reasonably 
532. Vladeck, supra note 296, at 1535. 
533. See id. 
534. See Vandekerckhove, supra note 469, at 18. 
535. See id.; Halperin & Hoffman, supra note 259, at 141 (arguing that government officials 
who learn about illegal conduct have an obligation to make that information public). 
536. See A.J. Brown, Flying Foxes and Freedom of Speech: Statutory Recognition of Public 
Whistleblowing in Australia, in WHISTLEBLOWING AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 86, 94 (David 
Lewis & Wim Vandekerckhove eds., 2011). 
537. See BOK, supra note 12, at 203 ("Neither committees nor legislative groups meeting in 
secret to oversee clandestine practices offer sufficient guarantees of accountability."). 
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good faith belief that her allegations are accurate and that the disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid serious harm," the whistleblower has "ex-
hausted internal procedures unless she reasonably believes that dis-
closure would subject her to retaliation, or that the employer would 
conceal or destroy the evidence if alerted," and the whistle blower 
"publicly identifies herself as the source of the information."s38 This 
suggestion has the benefits of protecting disclosures of only the most 
serious harms to the public and requiring a whistle blower to utilize 
the first two tiers of disclosure channels before resorting to the media 
as a last option.539 Indeed, permitting extreme cases to be disclosed to 
the media (acting as a proxy for the public at large) serves as an in-
centive for the government to take seriously a commitment to receiv-
ing whistle blower disclosures and remedying the misconduct whistle-
blowers identify.540 
However, the information disclosed should be more strictly de-
fined than Scharf and McLaughlin proposed. They suggested that 
"the harm in question could be physical (e.g., death, disease, or physi-
cal abuse), financial (e.g., loss of or damage to property), or psycho-
logical (e.g., invasion of privacy, or inducing terror), but lower level 
harms (e.g., injustice, deception, and waste) would under most cir-
cumstances not be sufficient to meet this standard. ,,541 Although I 
agree with the goal of only permitting reports to the media of truly 
"serious" harms, their standard seems too loosely defined to give 
much predictive value. Instead, the protections should be limited to 
538. Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 579-80; see also Khemani, supra note 308, at 
27 (asserting that "disclosure to the media should only be protected if it is used as a last resort"). 
539. Porter Goss has argued that "[t]hose who choose to bypass the law and go straight to 
the press are not noble, honorable or patriotic. Nor are they whistleblowers. Instead, they are 
committing a criminal act that potentially places American lives at risk." Goss, supra note 408, 
at A25. However, my suggestion assumes one does not "go straight to the press" but rather has 
tried to disclose the misconduct to the first two tiers available and has been unsuccessful at hav-
ing the misconduct addressed. 
540. Congress might need to amend the Espionage Act to clarify that it does not prohibit 
the media from receiving and publishing information appropriately received from whistle blow-
ers under any such provision. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Stat-
utes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1000 (1973) (describing 
arguments that Espionage Act could be interpreted to apply to media disclosures of classified 
information); Mayer, supra note 7, at 57 (noting scholarly arguments that Espionage Act was 
meant to prevent spying, not mere publication of information). 
541. Scharf & McLaughlin, supra note 239, at 580. 
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disclosures about illegality,S42 where the public interest is the highese43 
and when the information should have been classified initially. Like 
other Executive Orders related to classification, President Obama's 
EO 13,526 makes clear that classification may not be used to conceal 
violations of law, inefficiency, administrative error, or to prevent em-
barrassment to the government.544 Limiting the disclosures to infor-
mation that should not have been classified in the first place because 
it covered up illegality provides an appropriately high burden for the 
whistleblower (thus discouraging disclosures without sufficient public 
value) while also recognizing that the classification system serves as 
the distinguishing feature between national security whistleblowers 
and other whistleblowers.545 If the classification system was inappro-
priately invoked to hide wrongdoing, then it should not prevent whis-
tleblowers from disclosing the information to the public in order to 
expose the misconduct.546 The whistleblower should bear the burden 
of proving improper classification in order to give appropriate defer-
ence to the classification process and to protecting important secrecy 
concerns. 
Unlike the reforms related to improved disclosure channels to 
Congress, stronger antiretaliation protections, and bolder statements 
about a government employee's duty to report misconduct, neither 
Congress nor the President appear interested in making it easier to 
disclose national security information to the media, even under the 
limited circumstances suggested above. Notably, President Obama 
does not stand alone politically in his quest to punish leaks of national 
security information. Democratic Senator Benjamin Cardin intro-
duced legislation to make prosecuting leakers easier by prohibiting 
the disclosure of any type of classified document - currently the law 
only prohibits publishing certain categories of intelligence, such as in-
formation related to communications technology or nuclear weap-
542. See BOK, supra note 12, at 130-31 (arguing that professionals with a duty of confidenti-
ality should still breach secrecy obligations "where serious harm is likely to occur"). Similarly, 
Daniel ElIsberg suggests that whistle blowers who reveal "criminal behavior" to the press should 
be immune from prosecution. See Ellsberg, supra note 243, at 799. 
543. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antirelalialion Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 375,382 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court broadly interprets retaliation statutes 
because of society'S interest "in having the law enforced"). 
544. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7,75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29,2009). 
545. C/. Kitrosser, supra note 170, at 930 ("[J]udgments as to legal impropriety [of disclo-
sure] should not follow automatically from the facts of classification and disclosure."). 
546. (1 BOK, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing against confidentiality when used purely as "a 
means for deflecting legitimate public attention"). 
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ons.
547 The WikiLeaks disclosure of thousands of Afghanistan war 
documents led to a vitriolic congressional response across the political 
spectrum: two Democratic Senators scrutinized a bill that would have 
provided broader protections for reporters who refused to reveal con-
fidential sources in order to ensure that the bill would only apply to 
"traditional" news sources and not Web sites like WikiLeaks.548 A 
Republican Representative asked the State Department to consider 
WikiLeaks a terrorist group,549 and a Democratic Senator wanted es-
pionage charges brought against WikiLeaks' founder Julian Assan-
ge.550 
However, other countries have taken a different view and have 
provided exemptions to laws prohibiting disclosure of state secrets if 
the disclosure is in the public interest and it does not damage national 
security. 55! Some countries, such as Luxembourg, require a showing 
that the person who disclosed the information intended to damage 
national security.552 Moldova and Georgia specifically require a bal-
ancing of the public interest against the damage to national security.553 
Regardless of the approach, the law should account for unusual 
or extreme circumstances in which both executive branch and con-
gressional actors fail to act appropriately on valid whistle blower dis-
closures. Ultimately, in those very few circumstances when govern-
ment actors seem united to hide illegal government conduct, 
transparency to the public should overcome the natural presumption 
of secrecy in national security matters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the competing principles and factual varieties, can we truly 
balance secrecy and transparency with the law related to national se-
curity whistle blowers? These are complex issues, and cases like 
Thomas Drake should make Congress and President Obama recon-
sider whether the current balance skews too far toward hiding im-
547. See Espionage Statutes Modernization Act of 2011, S. 355, 112th Cong.; see also Ben-
jamin, supra note 155. 
548. Charlie Savage, After Afghan War Leaks, Revisions in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
3,2010, at A12. 
549. See Shane, supra note 151. 
550. See id. 
551. See DAVID BANISAR, LEGAL PROTECTIONS AND BARRIERS ON THE RIGHT TO 
INFORMATION, STATE SECRETS AND PROTECTION OF SOURCES IN OSCE PARTICIPATING 
STATES 22 (2007) (providing examples such as Denmark and Austria). 
552. See id. 
553. See id. 
2012] WHISTLEBLOWERS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 141 
portant information about misconduct from Congress and the public. 
Statutory whistleblower provisions either exclude national security 
employees explicitly or only half-heartedly encourage them to blow 
the whistle on misconduct. By erecting ineffective measures, perhaps 
we have failed to address either branch's concerns because the law 
neither fully encourages whistle blowers to go to Congress nor ade-
quately maintains the secrecy that is needed for some state secrets. 
Other reforms could increase transparency and address some of 
the flaws in the secrecy system. With regard to the over classification 
problem, the law could make it easier for employees to object to in-
formation being classified and to protect them from retaliation when 
they do.554 The Espionage Act could be amended to make prosecuting 
whistleblowers more difficult by requiring the prosecution to prove 
the whistleblower meant to harm national interests and by permitting 
a defense that the information released was improperly classified be-
cause, for example, it was classified in order to conceal illegality or 
embarrassing information.555 Congress could provide reporters a stat-
utory privilege not to reveal sources.556 Legislation could limit the use 
of the state secrets doctrine to avoid civil lawsuits by whistleblow-
ers.557 Entire articles can be, and have been, written on these topics. 
For now, I just note that there are many moving parts to the issue of 
how best to encourage transparency and to protect needed secrecy. A 
comprehensive approach does not appear forthcoming, but perhaps if 
Congress and the President address the needs of national security 
whistleblowers by strengthening the models described above, then 
other reforms may follow. 
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